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ABSTRACT 
 
 This project examines and challenges the West’s generally accepted two category 
approach to the world’s belief systems.  That is, it will deconstruct the religion / science 
‘paradigm’ that has developed over the past two centuries.  It will argue that the dichotomy 
between the two categories was created by modernity for the purpose of establishing an 
exclusive view believed to be based on knowledge.  This exclusive view, philosophical 
naturalism (science), was set in opposition to all alternative views identified as religion.  
As the exclusive view, though constructed on a defective foundation of knowledge, 
philosophical naturalism, nonetheless, became the privileged interpreter and explainer of 
reality in the academy of the Western world.  
 As a work in the area of epistemology and the philosophy of religion, this project 
will challenge philosophical naturalism’s claim to knowledge.  The approach will be 
philosophical and historical critically assessing both modernity’s and postmodernity’s 
basis for knowledge.  Without a rational basis for exclusive knowledge the popular 
dichotomy dissolves.  The implications of this dissolution for ‘religious studies’ will be 
addressed by offering an alternative scheme that provides a more plausible way to divide 
the world’s belief systems.       
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Chapter 1  
INTRODUCTION 
 That there is such a thing as ‘religion’ in the world few would deny.  Everyone 
today, at least in the West, seems to know what religion is and, just as important, everyone 
seems to know what religion is not.  A familiar account is that religion can be best 
explained as a certain set of beliefs, rules, and practices for living.  It is thought to be belief 
in a transce1ndent reality, one that is not part of this material world, one that is holy, or 
sacred, and makes certain things in this world holy or sacred.  It consists of performing 
particular rituals at particular times, and, of course, it is often belief in a higher power, a 
God or gods.  Additionally, it is thought to be a set of beliefs that explain and interpret life 
and, by implication, the nature of ultimate reality.  To believe in this type of transcendent 
reality and to perform the prescribed behaviors or rituals is to be religious, so the typical 
account goes.   
 We in the West use the term, religion, freely and assume everyone knows what we 
are talking about.  We refer to Christianity, Judaism, Islam, and Buddhism, for example, as 
religions and the adherents of these as those who are religious.  There are the faithful, those 
who follow their religion more or less consciously and consistently, there are those who 
are somewhat religious, and, of course, there are those who have no religion at all.  The 
common understanding seems to be that there is religion and non-religion, religious people 
and non-religious people, and there are religious views and there are non-religious views.   
 At what can be called the ‘popular’  level, the term religion, as just summarized, 
appears to be clearly understood and can be differentiated using the descriptions listed 
above from what it is not, thus producing two separate categories—religion and non-
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religion.  Even without an explicit scholarly definition of religion these two categories are 
evident in virtually every area of life.  For instance, an average bookstore will have 
numerous book sections including one on religion.  Historians speak of religious histories 
and news analysts report on the latest happenings in the religious world.  Critics, such as 
the group known as ‘the new atheists,’ express their disdain for religion and assert the need 
to abolish it favoring the idea of a world without religion—a totally secular world.1  
Examples depicting religion as a distinct category are endless, thus establishing a type of 
belief paradigm—religion and non-religion—a particular way of looking at the world that 
has become a commonly accepted conceptual scheme.  These two categories have been 
received by the modern Western mindset and often without much critical thought.  It’s 
considered a given.    
 After several years of teaching Philosophy, Philosophy of Religion, and World 
Religions at the college level, this author has become convinced that the dichotomy 
between a religious perspective, or worldview,
2
 and a non-religious one is deeply-seated in 
                                                          
1 Philosopher of religion, Alvin Plantinga, identifies the “new atheists” as Richard Dawkins, Daniel Dennett, Christopher 
Hitchens, and Sam Harris with an aim to “run roughshod over religion.”  “[T]hey attribute most of the ills of the world to 
religion….religious belief is unreasonable and irrational,” Where the Conflict Really Lies (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2011) x-xi.  Victor Stenger would also include himself in this group and has addressed the relationship between 
contemporary atheism and religion in his work, The New Atheism: Taking a Stand for Science and Reason (New York: 
Prometheus Books, 2009).  The naturalistic claims of the “new atheists” will be developed more in what follows. 
 
2
 The term ‘worldview’ as used in this project means a unified comprehensive system—a metanarrative—that attempts to 
present a coherent view of existence by explaining the meaning and purpose of the world and life in its totality.  As 
human beings, we tend to subscribe to and place ourselves into a grand, or master, narrative.  Christianity, as an example, 
is one of many.  George Lindbeck and William Abraham come very close to the intended meaning.  Lindbeck writes, 
“[R]eligions are seen as comprehensive interpretive schemes, usually embodied in myths or narratives and heavily 
ritualized, which structure human experience and understanding of self and world….a religion can be viewed as a kind of 
cultural and/or linguistic framework or medium that shapes the entirety of life and thought.”  The Nature of Doctrine 
(Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1984) 32-3.  Abraham writes, “Religious belief should be assessed as a rounded 
whole rather then taken in stark isolation.  Christianity, for example, like other world faiths, is a complex, large-scale 
system of belief which must be seen as a whole before it is assessed.  To break it up into disconnected parts is to mutilate 
and distort its character.  We can, of course, distinguish certain elements in the Christian faith, but we must still stand 
back and see it as a complex interaction of these elements.  We need to see it as a metaphysical system, as a world view, 
that is total in its scope and range.” An Introduction to the Philosophy of Religion (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 
1985) 104.   For a detailed exploration of the concept see David Naugle’s, Worldview: The History of a Concept (Grand 
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the Western consciousness and continues to be the putative position, which is not 
surprising since no strong challenge to it appears to be forthcoming.
3
  The religious and 
non-religious categories are often characterized and exemplified by the religion and 
science model.  Many students enter the classroom presupposing the generally accepted 
divide between religion and science as popularly understood.  They tend to insist that a 
‘scientific view,’ prima facie, is a justifiable alternative to a religious view.   
 In keeping with the popular understanding, students consistently present the 
scientific view as the non-religious view—the neutral, publicly held view.  Religion, 
though notoriously difficult to define, is nonetheless believed to be a particular bias based 
on faith or belief, personal feelings, or family tradition, and is not grounded in knowledge 
and facts.  Put simply, a religious view lacks evidence and proof, it is often said.  Science, 
on the other hand, is about the pursuit of neutral brute facts obtained through the use of 
reason and the scientific method resulting in knowledge that can be publicly verified.  The 
scientific view is commonly expressed as a naturalistic view, a materialist conception of 
the universe—one in which only a material reality exists.  A non-material, or spiritual, 
realm is considered non-verifiable and, therefore, not science.  In support of the scientific 
view, students will often make an immediate appeal to the voices of the leading lights, 
such as physicist Stephen Hawking’s authoritative statement, “[i]t is not necessary to 
invoke God to light the blue touch paper and set the universe going,” or to biologist 
                                                                                                                                                                               
Rapids: W.B. Eerdmans Publishing Co., 2002).  The worldview idea will be dealt with more in the final chapter of this 
work. 
   
3 As a work of interest here see Talal Asad’s, Genealogies of Religion (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 
1993).  In it he explores the idea of religion as a construct of European modernity from the perspective of anthropology 
and questions the inadequacy of Western modernity as a universal ideological model.  Three additional works arguing a 
similar theme are Daniel Dubuisson’s, The Western Construction of Religion  (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University 
Press, 1993) and Russell McCutcheon’s, Manufacturing Religion (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997), Timothy 
Fitzgerald’s, The Ideology of Religious Studies (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000). 
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Richard Dawkins’ general thesis, “the factual premise of religion—the God hypothesis—is 
untenable.” 4  While many students tend to be accepting of alternative views to science, 
some are less tolerant and have other favorite authors like Sam Harris and Victor Stenger.  
A contributor to the perceived tension and intolerance between science and religion, 
science writer, Sam Harris sees a clash between them and emphasizes his disdain for 
religion when he says, “[w]hich of our present practices will appear most ridiculous from 
the point of view of those future generations that might yet survive the folly of the present?  
It is hard to imagine that our religious preoccupations will not top the list.”5  Physicist, 
Victor Stenger, when speaking of religion makes a similar comment;     
 
Faith is absurd and dangerous and we look forward to the day, no matter 
how distant, when the human race finally abandons it.  Reason is a noble 
substitute, proven by its success.  Religion is an intellectual and moral 
sickness that cannot endure forever if we believe at all in human progress.
6
 
 
Such rancor needs explanation.  The exclusively Western perceived distinction between 
religion and non-religion, as just illustrated, is oftentimes portrayed as truth v. opinion, or 
more moderately expressed as knowledge (science) v. faith (religion).  Western modernity 
has produced two categories with these two binaries as a common mechanism for 
deciphering them.
7
  But, why these two?  A distinction has been made, but what is the 
                                                          
4  Stephen Hawking and Leonard Mlodinow, The Grand Design (New York: Bantam Books, 2010) 180, and Richard 
Dawkins, The God Delusion (New York: Houghton Mifflin Co. 2006) 189. 
 
5  Sam Harris, The End of Faith (New York:  W.W. Norton & Co., 2005) 48. 
 
6  Victor Stenger, The New Atheists: Taking a Stand for Science and Reason (New York: Prometheus Books, 2009) 244. 
 
7 Chapter two will define Modernity in more detail.  For now it is to be understood as the time following the European 
Renaissance, Protestant Reformation, and the work of Descartes and Locke that was characterized by individualism and 
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essential difference?  Are there fixed rational grounds for these categories, as the scholars 
just mentioned have argued (as well as many others), or are they what Thomas Kuhn calls 
a product of ‘normal science, a ‘paradigm?’  That is, as Kuhn explains, “achievements that 
some particular scientific community acknowledges for a time as supplying the foundation 
for its further practice.”8  While commitment to the same paradigm provides the basis for a 
consensus on particular research traditions, it is “sufficiently open-ended to leave all sorts 
of problems for the redefined group of practitioners to resolve.”9  Some of those problems 
are now coming to light and in need of resolution.  
 This project will respond to some of the issues inherent in the current science / 
religion ‘paradigm’ by offering a detailed explanation on the question regarding the origin 
and purpose of these two categories of belief.  How are the two categories to be 
understood?  Differences at the most basic level will be considered.  It will seek to 
implement the insight of philosopher, Surrendra Gangadean, with his axiom, “[c]ritical 
thinking is by nature presuppositional; without the more basic in place, what comes after 
cannot be understood.”10  What is meant by this is that beliefs about various things are held 
together by reason and can form a ‘belief system’ when focusing on a particular topic.11  
                                                                                                                                                                               
subjectivism and a move away from authoritarian standards and toward objective standards that are determined in 
isolation from the values and practices of particular cultures. 
 
8
 Thomas Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962) 10. 
 
9  Kuhn, The Structure, 10. 
 
10 Surrendra Gangadean, Philosophical Foundation: A Critical Analysis of Basic Beliefs (Lanham: University Press of 
America, Inc., 2008) quoted from the preface. 
 
11 The idea of a ‘belief system’ here is intended to mean logically connected beliefs, a coherence of ideas, an affirmation 
that a proposition, or propositions about the existence, experience, meaning, and nature of the world are true (held 
individually or collectively), and are more or less consciously and consistently held.  The idea of a belief system is 
essentially a ‘worldview.’  Sam Harris rightly recognizes the significance of beliefs when he says, “A Belief is a lever 
that, once pulled, moves almost everything else in a person’s life.  Are you a scientist?  A liberal?  A racist?  These are 
merely species of belief in action.  Your beliefs define your vision of the world; they dictate your behavior; they 
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Some of the beliefs within the system are more basic than others, are either explicitly or 
implicitly held, and are, therefore, foundational.  For instance, beliefs about what so-called 
religion is and does presupposes a more basic belief about the nature of reality.  In other 
words, the idea of religion is embedded in one’s larger worldview.  The idea of religion is 
understood in light of one’s most basic belief about what is ultimate.12  Is religion a thing 
in itself, sui generis, or a product of culture, such as an ideological socio-political 
perspective?  Regardless of the particular understanding, so-called religion is about beliefs 
concerning ‘what is’ (metaphysics), how that is known (epistemology), and how these 
beliefs are practiced in order to achieve ‘the good’ (ethics).  There is a systematic order to 
‘presuppositional’ critical thinking.  All human beings have beliefs and are held more or 
less consciously and consistently.
13
  This is the case whether the beliefs are of a so-called 
religious nature or of a so-called naturalistic nature.  
 Western discourse on religion is regularly compared and contrasted to what has 
come to known as the secular—another binary.  Discussion about the idea of religion and 
its relationship to the secular, secularism, and secularization is unavoidable, but will not be 
the primary focus here.  It will be important in so far as theories of secularization are 
interrelated with Western modernity. However, the specific details of that discussion are 
for other projects, such as Charles Taylor’s comprehensive tome, A Secular Age.  In his 
                                                                                                                                                                               
determine your emotional responses to other human beings.”  End of Faith, 12.  More on this will be discussed in the next 
chapter. 
 
12 Ivan Strenski, in his, Thinking About Religion: An Historical Introduction to Theories of Religion, addresses this point 
in his first chapter section on ‘Natural Religion.’  In it he states, “Those that adhered to the idea of Natural Religion 
typically felt that human beings therefore can know about ultimate truth by their own human abilities.  Divine 
intervention is not required for people to know God, for example.” (10). Here he seems to indicate that intellectual 
inquiry on basic issues has, historically, been equated to the idea of religion.  This, of course, assumes a particular 
definition of the term ‘religion.’  (Oxford:  Blackwell Publishing, 2006).  See also Roy Clouser’s, The Myth of Religious 
Neutrality (Notre Dame, In., University of Notre Dame Press, 2005).  In this work Clouser argues that religious belief is 
belief in anything with eternal attributes, that is “divine per se.” 
  
13 Gangadean, Philosophical Foundation, 3. 
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work, Taylor understands secularization to be a feature of modernity, but challenges some 
of the popular theories of secularization / religion and proposes an alternative explanation.  
He asks and attempts to answer the simple, yet complex, question undergirding the very 
idea of secularization; “why was it virtually impossible not to believe in God in, say, 1500 
in our Western society, while in 2000 many of us find this not only easy, but even 
inescapable?”14  But, as he also asks, how and why did things change?  “How did the 
alternatives become thinkable?”15  In other words, how did Western culture get from a 
position of uniformity of belief to a state of accepting alternative views?  Taylor attempts 
to answer this.  To borrow a pertinent line from Taylor, and one that fits this project, “[t]he 
story of what happened in the secularization of Western Christendom is so broad, and so 
multi-faceted, that one could write several books this length and still not do justice to it.”16  
The present project will also address Taylor’s questions, but will consider them through 
the lens of modern philosophy.  Of particular interest will be one of those contributing 
facets, the epistemological changes that helped define Western modernity and ultimately 
produce the idea of religion. 
 While the relationship between modernity, secularism, science, and religion is 
historically and culturally as Taylor says, multi-faceted, it will be important to keep in 
mind that this work will focus primarily on the epistemic component that produced the two 
belief categories—religion and science.  That is, the significance of what qualifies as 
knowledge will be explored as a major contributing factor in the development of the 
                                                          
14 Charles Taylor, A Secular Age (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2007) 25. 
 
15 Taylor, Secular, 25. 
 
16  Taylor, Secular, 29. 
 8 
 
category distinction and the difference.  Both categories claim ‘to know,’ however, that 
claim needs to be explored more fully and the meaning clarified.    
 To start, it seems clear from the above comments that, according to the popular 
understanding, one view is perceived to be based on reason and the others not.  Science is 
based on reason and religion is not, it is often argued.  This view of science has produced a 
scientific perspective on the world that has come to be technically called, philosophical or 
metaphysical naturalism, a product of Western modernity.
17
  It is important to note here 
that metaphysical naturalism is distinct from science and functions as a perspective, or 
philosophy, that interprets the data of science.  This proposition will soon be borne out.     
 Due to the wide acceptance of this view, particularly in the Western academy, the 
notion that naturalism qualifies as the predominant, or privileged (favorably accepted as 
true and, therefore, authoritative), view of reality is pervasive.  As the authoritative view, 
scholars presuppose it to study the alternative ‘religious’ views and do research in the 
‘science of religion’ or the ‘phenomenology of religion.’  It is the function of reason and 
science to produce the proper understanding of alternative views that purportedly reject the 
authority of reason and the naturalistic view, and favor fideistic dogma and tradition.  
                                                          
17 For the purposes of this work, naturalism, and more specifically philosophical or metaphysical naturalism, will be 
considered a ‘worldview’ similarto the definition in footnote 2 above.  Chapter two of this work will explain how it came 
to be considered a worldview.  The basic metaphysical beliefs of this view are something similar to William Drees’ 
statement that “naturalism assumes that all objects around us, including ourselves, consist of the stuff described by 
chemists in the periodic table of the elements” and that theism is irrelevant.  Drees also quotes an applicable comment by 
Charley Hardwick that further defines naturalism, “(1) that only the world of nature is real; (2) that nature is necessary in 
the sense of  requiring no sufficient reason beyond itself to account for its origin or ontological ground; (3) that nature as 
a whole may be understood without appeal to any kind of intelligence or purposive agent; and (4) that all causes are 
natural causes so that every natural event is itself a product of other natural events.” “Religious Naturalism and Science,” 
in Clayton and Simpson, eds. The Oxford Handbook of Religion and Science (New York: Oxford University Press: 2006) 
110. The idea of modernity in this project will be delimited and understood primarily from an epistemological 
perspective.  As such, the focus will be on the impact of changes between pre-modern, modern, and postmodern with 
respect to what qualifies as knowledge.  A more specific explanation will be demonstrated in chapter two.  The term 
‘naturalism’ is not intended to mean the same as it is used by J. Samuel Preus in his, Explaining Religion: Criticism and 
Theory from Bodin to Freud (Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1996) or in Russell McCutcheon’s, Manufacturing Religion (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1997).  Both of these scholars view naturalism strictly as a method “to study religion as a 
part of human culture and history…without the benefit of clergy.”  Manufacturing Religion, ix.   
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Thus, even though there may be uncertainty regarding how to define religion specifically, 
there appears to be a general consensus on what religion is and is not, which hinges on the 
use of reason and indicates the strength of the entrenched dichotomy.      
 But how does one particular view attain a privileged status?  There should be no 
doubt that the view grounded in reason and knowledge ought to be the privileged view.  
There is no higher authority.  For rational human beings, to use reason consistently 
produces integrity and results in being human in the fullest sense.  Reason and consistency 
also produce meaning.  To use Gangadean’s words, “[p]ersons as rational beings need 
meaning.  Integrity, as a basic form of honesty, is a concern for consistency.”18  When used 
properly, reason also produces knowledge, which then results in particular practices.  
Conversely, not to use reason consistently, or to hold beliefs without proof or evidence, 
would be to be devoid of knowledge and integrity.     
 To recognize this relationship is to recognize that knowledge, or the lack of it, has 
an ethical component as well.  The ethical feature is evident in the famous quote by W.K. 
Clifford, a significant figure of enlightened modernity, “it is wrong always, everywhere, 
and for anyone, to believe anything upon insufficient evidence.”19  He refers to this as ‘the 
ethics of belief.’  One’s beliefs must be grounded in sound reasons, they must be rationally 
justified.  Choices must be grounded in knowledge and not opinion.  Modernity requires 
rational evidence as a necessary condition for belief as expressed above by naturalists, 
Hawking, Dawkins, and the others.  The significance of these points is that there is a 
necessary relationship between belief, knowledge, and practice.   
                                                          
18  Gangadean, Philosophical Foundation, 143-148. 
 
19 W.K. Clifford, The Ethics of Belief, quoted in Steven Cahn, ed., Ten Essential Texts in the Philosophy of Religion 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 2005) 372. 
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 But is all of this emphasis on reason anything more than the on-going misguided 
promotion of the Enlightenment dream?  Some have argued that it is not and that reason 
has been overstated and over extended.  Postmodernity has proposed a more ‘chastened’ 
view of reason, one that limits reason’s capability, which will be discussed in more detail 
in chapter four.    
 In spite of the postmodern challenge, naturalism has held fast to Enlightenment 
ideals and the deliverables of reason and has been the privileged position for most of the 
twentieth century and into the twenty-first.  It has claimed to be the most reasonable 
position.  Part of the explanation for its success has been due to the failure of theism to 
produce rational justification for its truth claims, thus the declaration that religion is based 
on a blind faith and not reason.  To avoid this same fate, naturalism will eventually face the 
same critical tribunal.  For it to succeed and continue as the privileged view, naturalism 
will have to demonstrate that it is indeed based on a rationally justified, sound argument.  
It must produce reasons that prove its first principles.  That is, it must be shown to be 
based on more than dogma, opinion, and tradition.   
 This notion regarding the significance of reason raises an important question; if 
naturalism is based on facts and is the most rational view, then why would any rational 
person opt for an alternative view?  The obvious response by many naturalists is that a 
rational person would not.  Hence the charge that religion is non-cognitive and believers 
have no rational basis for their belief seems to substantiate the need for a category 
distinction.  Given the very real tension here, how, then, is this issue to be explained?  
What is apparent is that in the commonly accepted paradigm there are two distinct 
categories of belief systems.  One category consists of a naturalistic view of the world and 
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the other category consists of a multitude of alternative belief systems that are unified in 
their rejection of naturalism.  While the idea of naturalism is reasonably clear as explained 
above, of what, then, does the category called religion consist?  What is religion and, more 
specifically, what is a religious belief and a religious belief system?  Is religion a thing in 
itself, an intrinsic part of human nature (sui generis) that all humans innately possess?  
That is, do they have a religious inclination by nature?  Is it something that is identifiable 
that can be researched and studied as a science and as a cultural phenomenon?  Does it 
require a particular discipline that can justify inquiry and a ‘science of religion’ or 
‘phenomenology of religion’?20  Is it something that can be isolated and scientifically 
analyzed as many scholars in the field of religious studies, past and present, have said that 
it is?  Or is it as other scholars have argued—just an ideological social or psychological 
construct and not an isolatable thing in itself to be studied?   
 Some contemporary scholars have attempted to answer these questions by exposing 
the idea of religion as a modern Western invention, an ideology, and created, whether 
consciously or unconsciously, for the purpose of legitimating authority and power within 
institutions.
21
  Jonathan Z. Smith is one of those scholars who contend that the idea of 
religion is a general category of diverse views about the nature of existence and the world 
that has been socially constructed.  Smith argues that “[t]here is no data for religion.  
Religion is solely the creation of the scholar's study.  It is created for the scholar's analytic 
purposes by his imaginative acts of comparison and generalization.  Religion has no 
                                                          
20 See Mircea Eliade’s, The Sacred and the Profane (New York: Harcourt Brace &Co., 1959), an illustration of sui 
generis religion and Russell McCutcheon’s Manufacturing Religion in which the idea is critically assessed. 
 
21 For more on this idea see Timothy Fitzgerald’s, The Ideology of Religious Studies (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2000) and Russell McCutcheon’s, Manufacturing Religion. 
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independent existence apart from the academy ”22  This idea will be examined in more 
detail in the next chapter.      
 Yet another account of so-called religion may be just as bold as J. Z. Smith’s.  
Perhaps defining religion is self-evident.  A common denominator of all that is called 
religion is that they are all contrary to, in some form or another, the major tenets of 
naturalism.  As such, these ‘religious belief systems’ form a part of a socially constructed 
category that can be defined by what it is not.  Therefore, a separate category is required 
for all belief systems that fundamentally oppose naturalism.  Additionally, it can be 
convincingly argued that these diverse alternative belief systems have all been constructed 
for the purpose of providing an interpretation and an explanation of particular people’s life 
experiences.  But understood in this way, another important question is raised.  Could it 
not also be the case that naturalism, like religion, has been socially constructed for the 
purpose of interpreting and explaining the data of experience?  There is one category that 
is naturalistic in perspective and another category consisting of all other belief systems.  
The idea of religion, as a separate category, can now be seen as a totalizing concept 
developed by modernity that allows for grouping disparate, non-naturalistic beliefs or 
belief systems.  This establishes the two category idea, but more discussion on this is 
needed.  A ‘definition’ and additional qualification for the term ‘religion’ is important for 
this project and will also be addressed in greater detail in the next chapter.     
 It will be argued that the religion category and the two category approach to the 
world’s belief systems, commonly understood as religion and science, is inadequate and 
ought to be deconstructed and reformulated.  While this work does not argue for or against 
                                                          
22
 Jonathan Z. Smith, Imagining Religion: From Babylon to Jonestown (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982) xi.   
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Wilfred Cantwell Smith’s approach to the idea of religion, however, perhaps he was right 
in stating that a different conceptual framework is necessary to handle today’s data.23  It is 
time for a ‘paradigm shift’ in the Kuhnian sense, that is to say, a change in the way the idea 
of religion is conceived that will, of necessity, realign the relationship between so-called 
religion and science.  Both the idea of religion and naturalism can be considered 
ideologies, belief frameworks or worldviews that are grounded on presupposed basic 
beliefs.  Moreover, how can there be profitable discourse when the major term used in the 
discussion is determined undefinable?   
 These points will be addressed in what follows with three separate objectives in 
mind.  The first objective will assess the origin of the category dichotomy and the 
historical thought that produced it.  The second will be a more critical analysis, exposing 
the major epistemic issues regarding the way the categories of religion and science have 
been established with the ultimate goal being to deconstruct the existing dichotomy and 
paradigm.  And thirdly, after the existing dichotomy is deconstructed, a proposal that more 
accurately divides the world’s belief systems will be offered along with a methodology for 
more fruitful inquiry.  Once the artificial paradigm is removed a more objective assessment 
of the world’s belief systems can be made.  These three objectives will combine to 
illustrate not only that the present divide between science and religion is illegitimate and 
unacceptable, but also that the belief that naturalism ought to be the privileged view is 
unfounded.      
                                                          
23 Wilfred Cantwell Smith, in his, The Meaning and End of Religion (New York: New American Library, A Mentor 
Book, 1962) 111, argues for an approach to the idea of religion as an individual personal piety.  Smith considers religion 
to be notoriously difficult to define and any attempts as artificial constructs and ultimately a fruitless exercise. 16-22. 
Thomas Tweed also notes that “religion is not a native term; it is a term created by scholars for their intellectual purposes 
and therefore is theirs to define,” Crossing and Dwelling: A Theory of Religion (Cambridge MA: Harvard University 
Press, 2006) 33. 
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 Although this work is not a study in anthropological or socio-political value theory, 
it will, however, show how the foundational beliefs addressed herein form the basis for 
such values and theories.
24
  It is a type of ‘first order’ work.  That is, it will address and 
explore the most basic beliefs (first principles) upon which ideas such as religion, 
naturalism, secularism, and theory are constructed.  While all of these ideas will be 
mentioned, the amount of emphasis on each will need to be limited to the context at 
hand—with a more specific reference to epistemology and the ideas of religion and 
naturalism.   
 The methodology used in the project will be at once historical and philosophical—
although limited to epistemology and the ideas of religion and naturalism.  To be more 
specific, the concept of knowledge and what qualifies as knowledge played an important 
role in the development of Western modernity and, therefore, in the formation of the ideas 
of religion and naturalism.  The project will be historical by showing the progressive 
maturation of the naturalistic view that ultimately produced the category of religion.  And 
philosophical, by revealing the intellectual challenges to theism that permitted an 
exclusively naturalistic perspective on the data of science and the idea of religion to gain 
dominance, as well as to critically assess the inherent shortcomings of each.  This 
combination will expose the inadequacy of the two categories as they are currently 
expressed and the need for a reformulation.  The project is essentially a work in the 
philosophy of the idea of religion, tracing some of the intellectual developments that have 
                                                          
24 Manuel Vasquez, in his work, More Than Belief: A Materialist Theory of Religion (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2011) uses what he calls “a non-reductive materialist framework” to describe how particular so-called religious 
believers appeal to the supernatural to “build their identities, narratives, practices, and environments.  Thus it behooves 
scholars of religion to take seriously the native actor’s lived world and to explore the biological, social, and historical 
conditions that make religious experiences possible as well as the effects these experiences have onself, culture, and 
nature.”(3). Vasquez assumes the category distinction and illustrates, at least descriptively, how a so-called religion 
functions as a combination of beliefs and comprehensive cultural practices. 
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not only informed and shaped the academic and popular conceptions of the relationship 
between religion and science, but also university religious studies programs.    
 With a metaphysical and epistemological focus, it will show that the scientific 
worldview of modernity has, with a large measure of intention, constructed the separation 
between science and religion for the purpose of claiming exclusive rights to what qualifies 
as knowledge and deems those views in the religion category as based on something less.  
Consequently, what forms and divides the two categories at the most basic level is the 
claim to knowledge, and virtually all modern academic disciplines presuppose, either 
explicitly or implicitly, the validity of this claim.
25
  Both categories have sought, and 
continue to seek, rational justification for their claims to knowledge.
26
  Each claims to have 
knowledge, and since the Enlightenment era specific criteria have been established to 
determine if it is indeed possessed.
27
  But according to strict Enlightenment standards both 
religion and naturalism, in spite of their claims, have fallen short.      
 Modernity’s view of science, as expressed by philosophical naturalism, has been 
constructed on a foundation insufficient to produce the knowledge and authority that it 
claims to have.  It claims to have knowledge of the nature of existence, which is essentially 
a statement about the nature of reality.  But this claim, it will be shown, is based on 
unproven epistemic assumptions and, therefore, cannot be considered knowledge.  Yet it 
still makes the claim to knowledge and to reason without offering rational proof for its 
                                                          
25 See George Marsden’s, The Soul of the American University (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994).  In this work 
Marsden argues that today in the American University secular naturalism is generally perceived as the only valid 
academic perspective and precludes alternative perspectives. 
  
26 Beliefs require justification in order to be considered knowledge and to be considered true.  The most basic beliefs of 
worldviews, the first principles, need to be justified by reason in order to avoid dogmatism and / or fideism.  So-called 
religious belief has not been able to do this and, consequently, has not been considered knowledge.  Presumably, 
naturalism can justify its most basic beliefs and can then claim knowledge.  The following will examine that claim. 
  
27  Chapter two will identify modernity’s qualifications for knowledge. 
 16 
 
most basic beliefs, or presuppositions—the same charge made by naturalists against 
theism, which was jettisoned for lack of proof.  Theism was marginalized and deemed 
irrelevant because it could not rationally justify its most basic belief regarding existence 
and ultimate reality—that a non-material reality exists that is infinite, eternal, and 
immutable.  When naturalism is critically examined at the most basic level it will be shown 
that, like the charge against theism, it also cannot justify its most basic beliefs, thus 
dissolving the dichotomy.  If neither category can demonstrate knowledge, then the 
popular divide between them collapses.  Moreover, without justification for the claim to 
knowledge, there is no basis for privilege.  Thus, it will be apparent that the category 
distinction between science and religion as presently conceived is a fabrication by 
modernity and needs to be deconstructed and reformulated.  If neither category can 
produce a basis for knowledge, then opinion and skepticism are the only options.   Fruitful, 
meaningful discourse then ceases.  Additionally, the term, religion, as used by modernity, 
has been misappropriated leaving the status of the term, and the category itself, unfounded 
and a source of confusion.    
 This work is not an argument supporting the idea of religion nor is it promoting 
postmodern skepticism.
28
  While it challenges the privileged position of naturalism, it is 
not an attempt to prove the existence of God.  It is, rather, a study that explores and 
ultimately deconstructs today’s understanding of the relationship between the idea of 
religion and science as two separate categories of belief, the currently popular paradigm, 
and replaces it with an alternative conceptual scheme.  As a necessary bi-product of the 
                                                          
28 Postmodern thinkers have challenged the objectivity of science and epistemic realism, which ultimately leads to 
skepticism.  While this work addresses the issue and its significance, it is not arguing for it as the sole argument against 
naturalism.  See Michael Ruse, Mysteries of Mysteries: Is Evolution a Social Construction? (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1999) and Keith Parsons, ed., The Science Wars (New York: Prometheus Books, 2003). 
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discussion, the concept of privilege will also be addressed.  A distinction between the 
perspective of religion and the perspective of science has been made historically, but the 
difference at the most basic level has not been made clear.  The intent here is to tear down 
a stronghold that has not, and is not, effectively serving the academy by facilitating growth 
in understanding, but rather, has promoted confusion.  Such an undertaking will require the 
critical analysis of the presuppositions of both in order to discover the essential difference 
between their belief frameworks.  Once clearly identified, it will be evident that the 
dichotomy and current assignment of privilege is not rationally defendable.     
 The primary focus for the project will, therefore, be on the theoretical basis for the 
distinction and differences between the two categories, religion and science (non-religion), 
which have been constructed and defined by a particular hermeneutic of Western 
modernity.  Informed by Western modernity, the meanings, purpose, and even validity of 
these categories, have become a part of the cultural landscape.  However, failure to fully 
understand the significance of the issues at hand has brought confusion to the academic 
study of the idea of religion and of science.  Current debate asks the questions; what is it 
that is to be studied?  Whose methodology is to be used in the academy, the naturalist’s or 
the theist’s, or neither?  Considered undefinable, who then has the right perspective on the 
idea of religion?  Or, more importantly, what does the term, religion, signify?        
 These are philosophical questions and issues that need philosophical answers.  As a 
work in the philosophy of religion, it will critically analyze the epistemic presuppositions 
upon which the idea of religion has been constructed.  And, since religion has become 
integrally related to science and in some sense, by modern assessments, subordinate to it in 
its contention for truth and knowledge, it necessarily addresses the epistemic 
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presuppositions of naturalism, modernity’s interpretation of science.  It will trace some of 
the intellectual developments prompted by the religion / science relationship that have, 
more or less, consciously informed and shaped all academic fields of inquiry at the 
foundational level, including the field of religious studies within the Western academy.  
 While the scope is not intended to be a detailed argument against the 
epistemological positions of the major Enlightenment figures, David Hume and Immanuel 
Kant, it will, however, reveal some of the implications of their thought and how they 
advanced the cause of empirical science, thus promoting the dichotomy.  For instance, 
since empirical science precludes the existence of the supernatural or, more generally, any 
non-material reality, it set the stage for the decline of theism as the dominant view of the 
Western world and for the ascendency of its replacement, philosophical naturalism.  A 
principal task here, then, following Charles Taylor, will be to offer a perspective on how 
and why the once dominant theistic worldview in the West eventually gave way to a 
naturalistic worldview that would determine itself to be the exclusive view for securing 
knowledge and truth.
29
         
 Few would deny the accuracy of the assessment of the religion / science 
relationship described above.  Indeed, it appears indisputable that this way of explaining 
the relationship has achieved paradigmatic status.   But as this project will show, to 
substantiate a distinction in this way is problematic on several levels.  Some have 
explained the distinction between the two categories as natural v. supernatural or belief in 
                                                          
29 J. Samuel Preus’ work, Explaining Religion, is a historical study in which he poses the question of the origin of 
religion (cause and source) to several authors with the goal of showing how “a naturalistic approach to religion achieved 
paradigmatic status as a new enterprise.”  It is important to note here that what Preus means by naturalism is that religion 
is treated as an element of culture without reference to an innate religious sense.  He traces this development through a 
series of historically influential scholars.  Explaining Religion: Criticism and Theory from Bodin to Freud  (Atlanta: 
Scholars Press, 1996).  
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God or gods v. no god.  While these distinctions may be valid, they fall short, however, as 
the definitive essence of the religion category.  As is commonly understood, not all so-
called religions affirm the supernatural or the existence of a God or gods, thus confusing 
the distinction.  If a distinction is made, then there must be a definable difference 
identified.    
 Although it is often ignored, resolving the religion definition issue is imperative for 
intelligible inquiry if dialogue is to be fruitful.  How does anyone, particularly a scholar, 
know what to inquire about without a definitive concept to work with?  What is the 
difference between religion and non-religion whether assessed philosophically or 
culturally?  What are the essential differences dividing the two categories?  Again, is 
religion a thing that is identifiable?  If religion is to be considered a concept, then it must 
have a unique characteristic, or set of characteristics, that distinguishes it from other 
concepts.  If we say that a religion, minimally, is a set of beliefs and practices, then what is 
non-religion—a different set of beliefs and practices?  It would seem that the two 
categories consist of two opposing sets of beliefs and practices, while at the same time 
being formally and functionally alike.  If a distinction is made, then the differences must be 
made clear.  For the purposes of this project, fundamental definitions will need to be 
established, which will be addressed in the next chapter.    
 A useful definition for the idea of religion is not the only issue that needs to be 
addressed.  Each of these two basic categories represents a multitude of sub-views and all 
claim to have knowledge and, therefore, truth.  The implicit question then that begs to be 
answered is—which one, if any, has knowledge and truth?  Is an answer possible?  If the 
answer is, no, then it does not matter what is believed.  Each view can claim knowledge 
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and truth without any way to have certainty or to resolve differences.  Choices would lose 
their significance and be, essentially, meaningless.  All meaningful dialogue and argument 
then ceases.  On the other hand, if one can be known to be true, then certainty and meaning 
are secured.  But how that is accomplished needs to be demonstrated.  There is much at 
stake with these questions and to the answers given.  In the grandest sense, it is the answer 
given to the question of meaning and purpose of existence itself.   
 Although the very concept of ‘truth’ is a problematic issue for today’s scholars 
attempting to remain objective with their research, nonetheless, naturalists believe that they 
possess knowledge and truth and that it has been acquired objectively.  This serves to 
substantiate naturalism’s assumed position of privilege in the academy.  However, along 
with this claim comes the burden of evidence and proof.  But the notion of proof, 
ironically, is not one that is often addressed by the twentieth century academic ethos.  
Universities are supposed to be bastions for truth seekers, but the notion of truth is more 
often explicitly ignored, while unavoidably presupposing some concept of it.  For instance, 
the commonly assumed formulation, especially in the Western academy, is that naturalism 
is thought to be the stronger position, based on knowledge, and religion the weaker, based 
on opinion and belief.  Naturalism is assumed to be ‘true’ and the owner of the exclusive 
research methodology, which is assumed to be neutral and objective.  This point is made 
manifest by the questions that are asked.  Due to its stronger position, science, or rather 
philosophical naturalism, assumes that the category of religion ‘arises’ and asks questions 
such as; where did religion come from, what is the nature of its origin, and why does it 
exist?  In other words, what are the possible causes of views, such as theism, that reject 
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naturalism?  How and why is it possible, it is queried, for these alternative views to be 
believed?   
 These are the primary concerns of a naturalistic academic approach to religion 
theory and assume a privileged role when asking these questions about opposing 
alternative views.  That is, it assumes an authoritative role and perspective when 
interpreting and explaining other views.
30
  It also assumes the validity of the two categories 
of belief—there is naturalism and then there are the alternative views.  From this it would 
appear that the idea of religion is any view that is contrary to naturalism, perhaps the 
reason for the difficulty in defining religion.  The academy is the place where critical 
thinking occurs, or ought to occur.  Should the academy not also be examining the 
uncritically held presuppositions, the foundational beliefs, of the privileged view?        
 Given the perspective of naturalism, the methods of inquiry assume that the idea of 
religion is somehow derived from nature by natural causes; it is a thing and is explainable 
just as any other object of critical investigation.  So-called religious belief systems are 
thought to be explainable in either anthropological (E.B. Tylor), psychological (Freud), or 
sociological (Durkheim) terms.  Depending on the interests of the particular theorist, the 
specific answers to the questions will vary, however.  These types of concerns, regularly 
raised in theory courses in university religious studies programs, presuppose a naturalistic 
perspective.
31
  Any affirmation of a reality that transcends a material reality is either 
                                                          
30 Preus develops the idea that “a naturalistic approach to religion achieved paradigmatic status as a new enterprise—not 
only in the sense of being articulated in thought (as in Hume’s “science of man”), but by becoming institutionalized as 
well….”  Explaining Religion, xii. 
  
31 The methodology for the study of the “science of religion” is a much debated topic in academia.  See Donald Wiebe’s 
The Politics of Religious Studies (New York: Palgrave, 1999).  In this work he uses a series of lectures to address the 
methodological issues between theology and the scientific method. See also the work of historian, Claude Welch, 
particularly chapter three, “Faith Viewed from Without: The ‘Objective’ Study of Religious Subjectivity” where he 
explores the historical development of the application of methodological naturalism in his, Protestant Thought in the 
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dubious or a discoverable product of the human psyche or culture.  The next chapter will 
discuss several contemporary religion theorists who believe they have the proper way to 
interpret the idea of religion.  What will be evident is that they claim neutral objectivity in 
their scholarship while uncritically presupposing naturalism, which actually betrays 
objectivity.    
 The two categories, while popularly conceived as mutually exclusive, are, 
nonetheless, unavoidably related as each seeks interpretive power and authority—albeit 
from their respective differing perspectives.  But in keeping with the questioning strategy, 
it can also be asked, where did this paradigm, this conceptual scheme, come from and why 
has this type of divide come to be so readily embraced in the West?  Are these categories, 
as presently divided, warranted or is the divide just a thin veil for an Enlightenment ideal 
that gained favor in order to promote one view, naturalism, over the others?  Why should 
naturalism not be considered just a modern social power construct?  To counter these 
charges, naturalism will need to provide a rational basis (proof) for its position in order to 
maintain its privileged role.  Without the support of a sound argument, could it be 
legitimately asked; from whence the origin of naturalism?  Why does it exist and how did 
it arise?  The answer given for the origin question depends on the perspective of the 
questioner and the rational soundness of the respective position.         
  The intended ultimate objective for this project will be to deconstruct the prevailing 
category dichotomy and the understanding of religion that modernity has created, 
reformulate it, and thereby provide a more accurate and fruitful method by which to divide 
and classify the world’s various systems of belief and practice.  As a deconstruction project 
                                                                                                                                                                               
Nineteenth Century, Vol.2 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1985).  Also in the same volume see 110-123 for more 
discussion on late nineteenth century methodology. 
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it will demonstrate specifically how modernity has erroneously produced this notion of 
religion and for what purpose.  Once assessed, naturalism will be shown to have been 
established on a foundation that cannot be rationally defended.  The present conception of 
religion is unacceptable and, as a construction project, a viable alternative will be offered.  
Thus, intellectual progress through growth in knowledge and understanding will result.       
Also discussed in the following will be what each category needs in order to be 
rationally justified.  A starting point for the reasoning process will need to be rationally 
demonstrated and not simply dogmatically postulated as self-evident truths in the order of 
Cartesian ‘clear and distinct ideas.’  These are the basic beliefs that form the foundation for 
a belief system.  This starting point, or first principle, works as an axiom from which 
logical inferences are made in order to arrive at meaning and truth.
32
   Since an axiom is 
ultimate, it is not possible to get behind it to confirm or verify it through demonstration.  If 
it were possible to get behind an axiomatic first principle, then something else would be 
more ultimate and would constitute a more basic principle.  For theism, the first principle, 
or basic belief concerning what is ultimate, is a God who is a spirit that is infinite, eternal, 
and immutable.  That such a being exists has not yet been rationally justified, according to 
naturalists, and is, therefore, rejected as fideism and unproven dogmatism.  If not the God 
of theism, what then ultimately exists? Other views postulate something else.  
Philosophical naturalism postulates the material universe as an alternative.  But can matter 
be proven to be all that exists and all that has ever existed, or can it also only be 
dogmatically postulated?  If it can only be dogmatically postulated, how then can 
naturalism be considered a stronger, more rational, position than theism?  How can it be 
                                                          
32  Gangadean, Philosophical Foundation, 40-41. 
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considered privileged?  This is the issue at hand and if it cannot be resolved, then we are 
left only with skepticism and Nietzsche’s ‘will to power,’ postmodernity’s answer.  
 Late nineteenth and early twentieth century so-called postmodern philosophy, 
building on David Hume and empiricism, has dealt with the issue of first principles by 
denying that knowledge of them is possible.  Reason, according to philosophers Hume, 
Immanuel Kant, and others, cannot grasp a transcendent reality in order to determine such 
things.  Continuing that trend, the modern notion of certainty has been challenged by what 
has been termed, postmodern criticism.  The postmodern outlook denies the dichotomy 
between science and religion by denying the dichotomy between truth and error.  Claims to 
knowledge of truth and error, good and evil, are contextually situated only.  Knowledge of 
ultimate reality from any perspective, theistic or naturalistic, is not possible because reason 
does not have a rationally justified starting point and, therefore, nothing can be clear to 
reason.  If nothing is clear, then distinctions cannot be made regarding true and false, right 
and wrong, good and evil, and, therefore, there is no basis for the tension between science 
and religion.  Without objective knowledge, such binaries lose their meaning.  Each view 
pursues its own relative ‘truth.’33  This view, as a postmodern response to the claims of 
naturalism and theism, will be examined in more detail below. 
 Following this introduction, five chapters will assess and analyze an aspect of what 
is being called the modern dichotomy with the last chapter including a summary of the 
project and argument.  Chapter one will further explore the tension between the categories 
and offer workable definitions for the project.  It will also demonstrate how naturalism is 
presupposed in the works of contemporary ‘religious studies’ scholars.  Because the 
                                                          
33  See footnote 28 above for works addressing this issue. 
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development of the idea of religion is interrelated with the development of science, a 
historical context tracing the new modern science of the seventeenth century and forward, 
including its related philosophical foundation, will be established in the second and third 
chapters.   
 The second chapter will explore the intellectual developments through this period 
and show how changes in epistemological thought were instrumental in determining how 
the physical sciences were understood.  Modern science, while having its roots in specific 
discoveries and theories, took a particular direction as a result of the intellectual climate of 
the day.  Subsequent to the cultural crisis created by the Protestant Reformation, an 
environment consisting of questions surrounding the nature of authority, knowledge, 
reason, and certainty were of central concern.  Consequently, the subject of epistemology, 
‘is knowledge possible’ was a formidable question—one to which modern philosophy 
attempted to respond.    
 Chapter three will sketch the rise and development of Western modernity with 
particular emphasis on the move from science within a Christian theistic framework to a 
non-theistic philosophy of naturalism.  As the new science transformed into a worldview 
philosophy and gained dominance, the once commanding Christian theistic view declined 
and was then marginalized and determined irrelevant for dialogue in the public square.  
Views incommensurate with the new empirical naturalism were categorized, beginning 
with Christianity, as religion, which would then ultimately become an expanded class and 
represented by the term, World Religions.  These views opposing naturalism, these World 
Religions, needed their origins, beliefs, and practices interpreted and explained to which 
religion theorists responded with a new academic discipline—the science of religion.  The 
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basic question of David Hume would then need to be addressed, from whence did these 
belief systems—these religions—arise?   
 The fourth chapter will bring this long standing issue to the present by exploring a 
contemporary challenge to modernity and its understanding of the religion / science 
dichotomy.  It will specifically challenge naturalism’s claim to exclusive knowledge.  It 
will explain the epistemological strategy of non-foundationalism, the epistemic basis for 
postmodernity that has challenged the very idea of a foundation for objective knowledge 
that leads to certainty.   
 The fifth and final chapter will bring the project to its conclusion as well as argue 
that the category and the term, ‘religion,’ is no longer useful for a consistent and 
meaningful advancement of human knowledge and understanding.  With the dichotomy 
deconstructed, the chapter will then develop a radical proposal for better understanding 
diverse worldviews.  It will offer an alternative conceptual scheme that has the potential to 
avoid the difficulties and connotative baggage associated with the term ‘religion’ and the 
resultant theories about origin and nature (e.g. cultural, psychological, social, etc.).  The 
proposed alternative term and concept is the German word, Weltanschauung (worldview), 
which, for starters, is definable, comprehensive, and distinguishable from what it is not.  It 
will be argued that the concept, Weltanschauung, in conjunction with basic beliefs, offers a 
different framework by which to categorize the world’s various understandings of reality 
and show how this can be done.  In its most basic sense, worldview will be understood as a 
set of beliefs that give meaning to one’s, or a culture’s, experience.  It will show how belief 
systems have analyzable formal structures that allow for grouping according to 
fundamental beliefs.  These beliefs then produce the descriptive data of phenomenology.   
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Chapter 2 
SCIENCE AND RELIGION – THE POPULAR PARADIGM 
Two Categories of Belief  
 The diverse beliefs and practices of people that make up the cultures of the world 
have provided rich opportunities for scholarly research and discovery—the substance of 
science.  Western scientific thought, as it gained momentum and expression in the 
eighteenth century Enlightenment era, recognized this diversity and sought to organize and 
categorize views different from its own, which would come to be understood as religion 
and, eventually, world religions.
34
  The category of religion, which has been understood at 
least since the early eighteenth century to consist of distinct and explainable belief systems 
and practices that can be differentiated from non-religion, arguably arose from 
controversies of modernity in England.  Historian, Peter Harrison, in his Gifford Lectures 
and subsequent book, ‘Religion’ and the Religions in the English Enlightenment elaborated 
convincingly on this theme.
35
  The scientific view produced by modernity has been 
variously characterized by terms such as materialism, metaphysical naturalism, 
philosophical naturalism, or simply, naturalism, and emphasized a perspective ultimately 
                                                          
34 Wilfred C. Smith chronicles the evolution of the Latin term religio from its earliest usage to the present.  For a detailed 
background explanation on this point, see his, The Meaning and End of Religion, 38-44. 
   
35 In his work on the rise of the idea of religion from the Enlightenment forward, Peter Harrison argues that “[t]he origins 
of the modern idea of religion can be traced to the Enlightenment.  This study shows how the concepts ‘religion’ and ‘the 
religions’ arose out of controversies in seventeenth and eighteenth-century England.  The birth of ‘the religions’, 
conceived to be sets of beliefs and practices, enabled the establishment of a new science of religion in which the various 
‘religions’ were studied and impartially compared.”  Commenting on Wilfred C. Smith, Harrison states, “[i]t is Smith’s 
contention that during the age of reason the name ‘religion’ was given to external aspects of the religious life, to systems 
of practices.  Whereas in the Middle Ages the concern of the Christian West had been with faith—a ‘dynamic of the 
heart’—in the seventeenth-century attention shifted to the impersonal and objective ‘religion’.  Increasingly this term 
came to be an outsider’s description of a dubious theological enterprise.”  Harrison further examines this process of 
objectification, or reification, of religious faith, focusing particularly on the English contribution to the ideation of 
‘religion’ and ‘the religions.’ ‘Religion’ and the Religions in the English Enlightenment (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 1990) 1-2.  Tomoko Masuzawa traces the advent of world religions in her, The Invention of World 
Religions (The University of Chicago Press: Chicago, 2005).  See also Talal Asad’s, Genealogies of Religion (Baltimore: 
The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993). 
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and exclusively based on the deliverables of science.  While each of these terms is 
associated with modernity in some way, naturalism will be most commonly used in this 
project and intended to be synonymous with the others.  This new developing view 
functioned as a non-theistic alternative to the prevailing Christian theism.   
 As the naturalistic view progressed and the beliefs and practices of other cultures 
were explored in the nineteenth century, Christian theism became part of a larger general 
category and called religion. The religion category functioned as modernity’s means to 
separate all other perspectives on reality from the naturalistic position, thus forming a 
dichotomy, or contradiction, between two mutually exclusive categories of belief.  A 
polarity between theism and non-theism was the result.  James Thrower, in his work on 
historic atheism, emphasizes this point and makes the following comment; 
There is, however, a way of looking at and interpreting events in the world, 
whose origins, as I hope to show, can be seen as early as the beginnings of 
speculative thought itself, and which I shall call naturalistic, that is atheistic 
per se, in the sense that it is incompatible with any and every form of 
supernaturalism.
36
 
 
Non-theism, as an alternative to theism, established itself more clearly as a viable 
worldview during this time.  It is now generally defined by the achievements of the 
empirical sciences, thus distinguishing and distancing it from the so-called religious views.  
As a result, the modern West has been forced to come to grips with how to understand the 
relationship between the ostensibly antithetical classical and medieval representations of 
what has come to be called a religious understanding of the world, particularly as 
expressed by Christian theism, and the new modern alternative outlook characterized by a 
                                                          
36  James Thrower, Western Atheism: A Short History (Amherst, NY: Prometheus Books, 2000) 3-4.  
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progressive, materialistic science.  Thrower identifies the rise of the secularist attitude in 
Western Europe in the Middle Ages with the dissociation of faith and reason and the 
limitation placed upon the scope of reason.  This then gave rise to the development of 
physical science as an exclusive and exhaustive way of looking at the world.  He also notes 
the dynamic in naturalistic atheism as having “a consistency which makes it a genuine and 
alternative way of looking at the world from that which has inspired the religious 
believer.”37     
   Christian theism, the predominant view with which modernity had to deal, was 
considered to be an entity having certain characteristics, such as belief in a transcendent, 
supernatural reality, which could be identified and placed in a separate generic category.  
Such a view was considered by some to be incompatible with and even in opposition to the 
emerging current of naturalistic ideas gaining momentum in Britain and Europe.  It was 
soon considered a hindrance to intellectual advancement and knowledge.
38
  The term 
‘religion,’ having already been a part of Christian self descriptive language, was applied as 
a general label of classification.  Christian theism, as a belief system, acquired the status of 
a religion and, as such, became rising naturalism’s chief dialogue interlocutor and 
contender for primacy in the West.   
 Due to the dominant position of Christian theism in the West historically, this 
project focuses primarily on it as the representative for the category of religion, the 
primary interest of modernity and naturalism.  The naturalistic view, as a distinct entity 
and category with its own identifiable characteristics that were separate from Christian 
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38 Thrower, Western Atheism, 96-116.  See also, John Hedley Brooke, Science and Religion: Some Historical 
Perspectives (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1991) Chapter 7. 
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theism, became, and continues to be, the non-religious view.  This alternative view, the 
non-religious and identified with science, developed somewhat historically parallel with 
the idea of religion. Thus we have two developing frameworks of belief and practice, 
religion and non-religion, each a product of Western modernity.  The historical evolution 
and interrelationship of these two entities will be explored in the next two chapters, but 
first some comments on the perceived tension between them.    
Category Tension   
 The idea of religion as it has developed is an on-going topic of endless dialogue 
and oftentimes tension over its place in the modern and, what has come to be called, the 
secular world.  In response, a relatively new field of inquiry devoted specifically to issues 
related to the relationship between religion and science has gained interest and momentum 
in recent years.  Scholars are frequently challenged with questions about how these two 
diverse perspectives should relate, if at all.  Are these different ways of understanding the 
world actually in conflict with each other or are they two mutually exclusive disciplines of 
inquiry with no need for conflict or intersection?  While the relationship issue has been a 
debated matter for at least the past two hundred years, several views have prevailed 
depicting the two as mortal enemies, friendly allies, or somewhere in between.
39
  Most of 
the dialogue has been framed in these terms.  However, as historian John Hedley Brooke 
has noted,    
Popular generalizations about that relationship, whether couched in terms of 
war or peace, simply do not stand up to serious investigation.  There is no 
                                                          
39 For a detailed discussion of the various views on this relationship see David C. Lindberg and Ronald L. Numbers, eds., 
God and Nature: Historical Essays on the Encounter Between Christianity and Science (Berkeley and Los Angeles, CA: 
University of California Press, 1986).  See also The Oxford Handbook of Religion and Science, eds., Philip Clayton and 
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such thing as the relationship between science and religion.  It is what 
different individuals and communities have made of it in a plethora of 
different contexts.  Not only has the problematic interface between them 
shifted over time, but there is also a high degree of artificiality in 
abstracting the science and the religion of earlier centuries to see how they 
were related.
40
   
 
As Brooke indicates, a normative prescription of how these two entities are to relate does 
not exist.  Perhaps this is due to the fact that much of the dialogue has been largely 
undertaken without adequate assessment of the presuppositions held by each perspective.  
Additionally, the historical context is so important for properly understanding these two 
terms that attempts to reify them result in only artificial definitions.  Brooke further notes 
that it would be a mistake to do this, “as if they could be completely abstracted from the 
social contexts in which those concerns and endeavors took their distinctive forms.”41  
Conceptions of the natural world and how it is to be conceived and explained have been an 
integral part of human history, especially in its social and political application of scientific 
innovations.  It is therefore imperative that the specific use of the terms, religion and 
science, be understood in their historical context as accurately as possible.     
                                                          
40
 John Hedley Brooke, Science and Religion: Some Historical Perspectives (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University 
Press, 1991) 321.  Brooke goes on to say that “Part of what was meant by natural philosophy in the seventeenth century 
involved a discussion of God’s relationship to nature.  Religious beliefs could operate within science, proving 
presupposition and sanction as well as regulating the discussion of method.  They also informed attitudes toward new 
conceptions of nature, influencing the process of theory selection.  In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, despite 
vigorous attempts to separate scientific and religious discourse, the meaning attributed to scientific innovations continued 
to be reflected in the often conflicting social, religious, and political uses to which they were put.” 321.  
 
41  Brooke, Science and Religion, 8. 
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 The assumption, of course, in all of these relationship perspectives is that this 
inquiry has value and an ongoing dialogue of some type is worth the effort.  A recent 
symposium sponsored by the International Society for Science and Religion focused on the 
importance of continued dialogue between the two disciplines.  The end product of the 
work was a book entitled, Why the Science and Religion Dialogue Matters.  In it, most of 
the contributors reflect the conviction “that the dialogue between science and religion is of 
wide social and cultural importance.”  Emphasizing this point, Fraser Watts, one of the 
editors and a contributor, comments that “religion and science each proceed best when 
they’re pursued in dialogue with the other, and also that our fragmented and divided world 
order would benefit more from a stronger dialogue between science and religion.”42      
 Implicit in these statements, at least minimally, is a perceived separation and 
tension between religion and science that many believe needs to be addressed in order to 
achieve some kind of cultural accord.  The term, tension, may be too strong or too weak for 
some, but if not tension, then definitely a chasm that separates in some way according to 
the common conception.  However, on the surface, to even speak of tension and separation 
seems odd if religion and science are understood in a straightforward manner.  For 
instance, in a fundamental sense, religion, as delineated above, is often thought of as belief 
in a transcendent reality.  It does not typically deny the existence of the physical world (in 
the West), but affirms a spiritual in addition to a material reality.  Science, on the other 
hand, also in a fundamental sense, consists of counting, weighing, and measuring the data 
gathered by exploring the physical world.  Fundamentally, it is a descriptive and not a 
                                                          
42 Fraser Watts and Kevin Dutton, eds., Why the Science and Religion Dialogue Matters (Philadelphia, PA: Templeton 
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prescriptive process.  Philosopher, W. V. Quine, puts it this way; “[w]hat makes for 
science is system, whatever the subject.  And what makes for system is the judicious 
application of logic.  Science is thus a fruit of rational investigation.”43  For science, 
whether a transcendent reality exists or not does not seem to be a primary concern for 
gathering data and producing fruit.  The two appear to be complementary, as they were 
thought to be prior to the mid-nineteenth century.
44
  So why the separation and / or the 
tension?  
   The tension arises at a different level, and in part, due to the ambiguity 
surrounding these two terms.  It exists because the meaning and significance of the terms, 
religion and science, are embedded in a larger belief system, a worldview, or what some 
have termed an ideological construct.  Belief systems provide the framework by which the 
data of experience and science is interpreted and explained.  For meaning and significance, 
data needs to be interpreted.  As comprehensive views of the world are formed and 
adherents become more consciously aware of their own beliefs, the differences between 
one view and another become more apparent.  The terms religion and science have been 
transformed from their original meanings as religio and scientia and have become 
substantive elements of comprehensive worldviews.  As Brooke noted, they become 
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44 Historian, Theodore Dwight Bozeman, explains in his detailed historical work on Protestants and science that 
“antebellum America, marked by a lively and growing interest in natural science and evangelical Protestantism, widely 
nurtured the comfortable assumption that science and religion, Baconianism and the Bible, were harmonious enterprises 
cooperating toward the same ultimate ends.”  Nineteenth century American Protestantism desired “to secure a broad 
harmonization of science with religion” and viewed Francis Bacon as a pious evangelical believer.  This attitude 
“reflected a ‘doxological’ view of natural science, which styled the scientist a worshipful elucidator of the Divine 
creation.  The conception of research as praise rested on a long tradition of scientific piety and concentrated on 
manifestations in nature of providential design, order, and care.” He goes on to say, “the emergence of the issue in this 
predominant form—science versus religion—was a new and uncoveted experience for orthodox apologists.  They had 
regarded their previous skirmishes with impious science as passing collisions that did not endanger the centraledifice of 
the holy alliance”  Protestants in an Age of Science: The Baconian Ideal and Antebellum American Religious Thought 
(Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1977) xv, 161, 168. 
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contextualized.  Religion and science, as presently understood, are separated not because 
they are fundamentally antithetical to each other, but because they have become embedded 
in, and identified with, worldviews that perceive, interpret, and explain experience, the 
nature of the world and reality, differently.  So-called religions offer an interpretation in 
the form of a metanarrative that explains the meaning and nature of the world and reality.  
Included in that interpretation is a view of the physical world and the exploration of it.   
 For science, on the other hand, the gathering of so-called ‘neutral’ data does not 
stop there, but includes more.  To use the oft-quoted phrase, all data are theory-laden.  
Like religion, the additional component for science, or rather philosophical naturalism, is 
that of interpretation, which precedes theory and explanation.  Data by itself is 
insignificant—it has no meaning, and, therefore, must be incorporated into a larger 
framework.  Philosopher of science and religion, Ian Barbour, has aptly noted, 
“[e]xpectations and conceptual commitments influence perceptions, both in everyday life 
and in science.”45  As rational beings, humans need meaning and significance in order to 
understand experience, and interpretation is part of the rational process that provides it.  So 
religion and science, or rather, naturalism, both interpret and explain the data of 
experience, however, begin the process from different basic beliefs.  More on this point 
will be discussed below.    
 Naturalism then, in addition to gathering data, also interprets the data and develops 
its own metanarrative (e.g. Darwinism) that, like so-called religion, explains the nature and 
meaning of the data, which reflects basic beliefs about reality itself.  In other words, 
philosophical naturalism, the worldview that has come to represent modern science, 
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interprets and explains and, therefore, formally functions like a religion.  Both are involved 
in interpretation, but affirm something different to be the most basic, or ultimate, reality.  
Each has a different starting point.  Each interprets and explains in light of its most basic 
judgment about what is ultimately real—a metaphysical judgment.  Whether explicitly 
acknowledged or not, naturalism makes, of necessity, a metaphysical statement.  It cannot 
avoid it in spite of the postmodern argument to the contrary.  It makes a metaphysical 
judgment when it affirms that reality is material existence only.  So-called religion also 
affirms the existence of a material reality, but additionally affirms the existence of a non-
material (spiritual) reality.  The two categorical views, religion and naturalism, formally 
function the same, however, hold metaphysically opposed basic beliefs.     
 While the tension may not have been fully apparent by the mid-nineteenth century, 
as modernity matured and science transformed into a worldview based on philosophical 
naturalism, the separation and tension between the two perspectives became more 
pronounced.  Awareness of metaphysical differences increased.  Alvin Plantinga considers 
this point to be the major issue between religion and science.  He does not contrast religion 
and science as such, but puts it more specifically, as does this present work, by framing it 
as worldview v. worldview, or theism v. philosophical naturalism.  He identifies the 
worldview tension as “where the conflict really lies,” and as one of our culture’s biggest 
debates.
46
   
 When understood in this way, these two worldviews are contradictory to each 
other, which then demands explanation.  Contradictory propositions cannot both be false 
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and cannot both be true.  Of logical necessity, one must be false and the other must be true.  
Arguments are made by each position and offered as evidence to justify belief.  Due to the 
different beliefs regarding what is ultimate, the tension is often recognized as such and 
sides are taken forming a separation, or dichotomy, between these two categories of belief.  
While this work will address the reason for the tension, it will, however, frame it 
differently than the typical discourse.  The approach will explore a more basic issue, the 
foundational presupposition of each category, which is seldom addressed.  That is, science 
(or philosophical naturalism) and so-called religion have come to be understood as two 
separate ways of viewing reality, which then constitutes the two different categories of 
belief.  Each belief system, or category, has a foundational belief that separates one from 
the other.   
 Much has been assumed in the making of these two categories and the 
presuppositions need to be identified.  Whether or not the basis for the category 
distinctions as presently understood is valid needs to be assessed conclusively.  For 
instance, what are the most basic beliefs of each category regarding what is ultimately 
eternal and what is the essential difference between, and support for, their claims?  Each 
category claims ‘to know’ and to have exclusive knowledge about the ultimate nature of 
reality.  One category claims that matter only is eternal and the other that a non-material 
spirit is the only eternal reality.  But can each respective category rationally support its 
claims or can they merely dogmatically postulate belief and opinion?  The commonly 
accepted view affirms that the philosophical naturalism representing science can claim 
knowledge, and religion cannot.  But can this claim be demonstrated or has it just been 
assumed to be so?  If the claim of naturalism can be demonstrated to be false or, as 
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postmodernity maintains, unknowable whether true of false, should the academy, for the 
sake of accurate scholarship, re-evaluate its approach to the relationship between religion 
and science? 
 It should be clear that the tension is not between so-called religion and science, but 
between the worldviews of theism and philosophical naturalism.  As mentioned above, 
while the relationship between science and theism has been a debated topic, if a poll were 
taken today the average person, both inside and outside of academia, would most likely 
side with those who sense a tension.  Militaristic adjectives such as conflict, warfare, 
battle, and weapons have been common terminology in writings describing the relationship 
since the late nineteenth century and continue to today.  Given that each affirms a different 
conception of ultimate reality, it would be hard to see it in any other way.  If understood 
from the conservative theist’s perspective, it would be hard to conceive of the relationship 
from the end of the nineteenth century to the present as anything other than one of conflict.  
Since this project addresses the rise of philosophical naturalism and the marginalization of 
theism and, therefore, prima facie confrontational, the attention here will be directed at the 
conflict between the two.    
 At this point an effort to establish at least a minimal definition of the idea of 
religion and science to better differentiate the two is in order.  Without an understanding of 
the fundamental difference between what is presently called religion and science, it is 
impossible to draw conclusions regarding the relationship.  What this will reveal is that 
science, like religion, is an ambiguous idea and must be understood from within the 
hermeneutic of Western modernity.  Additionally, if the category distinction promoted by 
modernity cannot be rationally substantiated, it can then be nothing more than a convenient 
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social construct of Western modernity.   Some of the intellectual developments that have 
more or less consciously informed and shaped all academic fields of inquiry, including the 
field of religious studies, will be explored.  This category tension forms the backdrop for 
what follows.  
The Idea of Religion      
 After using the term religion numerous times above and discussing the tension 
surrounding it, it is significant to note again that today the term, religion, is considered 
undefinable by many religion scholars and has led to much confusion as to what religion is 
and just as important, what it is not.  But is it necessary to define the term?  
Anthropologist, Talal Asad, has commented that “there cannot be a universal definition of 
religion, not only because its constituent elements and relationships are historically 
specific, but because that definition is itself the historic product of discursive processes.”47  
In other words, any attempt at definition would need to be contextualized.  As Brooke also 
noted above, the historical context is significant for understanding the idea of religion.  
What is meant by these scholars is that the term cannot be universalized.  But the attempt 
continues.  Arguably, additional confusion has been largely due to the efforts of religion 
theorists to negotiate in and around the dichotomy in question.  To persist in using the term 
without an understanding of what it is, is to perpetuate the confusion.  Some kind of 
workable definition seems imperative.   
 A term that cannot be accurately defined presents its own set of problems, one 
being that it cannot be a concept.  A concept allows for differentiation from what it is not 
by getting to the term’s essential meaning.  The essence of something is identified by 
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isolating the distinctive qualities that all members of a class and only members of that class 
always have.  At present, the term religion does not allow this.  As a result, many texts on 
the subject address, albeit reluctantly, a series of questions such as the following, but 
without a clear resolution.  How are religions identified and what are their essential 
components?  Do some beliefs and practices constitute a religion while others do not?  Are 
all humans religious or are only some religious?  How does a religious understanding of 
the world differ from a non-religious one?  What is religious knowledge and what is 
religious belief?    
 Within the context of the current understanding, these analytical types of questions 
can be answered with only a relative degree of accuracy, if at all.  Without a workable, 
sustainable definition that allows for at least a minimal consensus on the fundamentals 
makes a distinctive objective for religious studies virtually impossible.  For instance, how 
do religious studies differ from cultural studies, anthropological studies, philosophical 
studies, political studies, theological studies, or scientific studies for that matter?  Granted, 
there may be overlap and shared terms in all of these, but what is the essential difference 
between these disciplines and so-called religion?  Some would argue that there is no 
difference and that so-called religions are nothing more than socially constructed 
ideologies that need to be researched as cultural phenomena, which will be discussed in 
more detail below.   
 Religion scholars have struggled with this most challenging demand for definition 
and its place in intellectual inquiry.  For religion to be a concept it must have specific 
characteristics that all members and only members of the class ‘religion’ have in common.  
And as just mentioned, this allows the idea of religion to be differentiated from what it is 
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not.  It is at this point that comprehensive definitions have stumbled.  Consequently, many 
religion scholars accept as incontestable that the term, religion, is undefinable, considering 
it simply a collective name, and opt for something like William James’ view that religion 
“consists in the belief that there is an unseen order, and that our supreme good lies in 
harmoniously adjusting ourselves thereto.”48  But this statement is exceedingly broad, 
contributing to and illustrating the problem.  The difficulty here is that this expression is so 
broad that it could conceivably include all views, including naturalism.  A naturalist may 
propose that “our supreme good lies in harmoniously adjusting ourselves” to the “unseen 
order” inherent in natural selection and the survival of the fittest.  But if that is the 
intention of the statement, then the dichotomy would lose its meaning and dissolve.  All 
views could be included in only one category, the religion category, or the non-religion 
category.  If all is religion, then none is religion.  But this, most likely, was not James’ 
intention at all.  However, an assertion like this when not clearly crafted loses its intended 
meaning.  Though it does indicate the difficulty in identifying a common characteristic that 
allows for a comprehensive definition for all that is typically called religion.  But perhaps, 
it is not as difficult as it may at first appear.   
 Expressing a possible cause for this difficulty is Jonathan Z. Smith in his now 
famous statement already quoted above, “[t]here is no data for religion…..Religion has no 
independent existence apart from the academy ”  If James’ vagueness and Smith’s 
judgment are correct, the dichotomy then collapses—the current paradigm is flawed.  This, 
it will be shown, is the logical consequence and needs to be advanced further.   
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 Taking a similar position, religion historian, Timothy Fitzgerald makes a strong 
case that the idea of religion has been misconceived.  He argues that there are either 
theological studies or cultural studies.  The current idea of religion, he says, is that it 
“indicates some reality that is not already covered by ‘society’ and ‘culture’, that religion 
is something over and above and additional to society and culture.  Outside of a specific 
theological claim, this implication is, I believe, a fallacy.”49  He goes on to say that many 
scholars hope to employ religion as an analytical concept, to distinguish religious 
institutions and values from non-religious ones.  But, to do this, he contends, is a futile 
quest because “it either operates as a theological concept, though one disguised by the so-
called science of religion; or alternatively it operates at a very general level of meaning 
that makes it virtually indistinguishable from ‘culture.’”50  He summarizes his thesis well 
with this statement: 
[T]he more the researcher distances himself or herself from the explicit or 
implicit theological domination of ‘religion’, adopting for example 
sociological or anthropological critical perspectives, the more irrelevant the 
concept of religion will become, except as an ideological construct of 
western and western-dominated societies from which the scholar has 
progressively freed him or herself and that itself requires critical analysis.
51
   
 
Both J. Z. Smith and Fitzgerald reject the notion that the idea of religion has a trans-
cultural essence—that it is something that can be isolated from cultural studies.  The points 
they make strongly challenge the status of the idea of religion as a separate category of 
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study.  As a result, to identify religion as sui generis, a thing in itself and a separate 
category for inquiry, is a misguided endeavor.   Some attempt to find a characteristic, or set 
of characteristics, that all of the diverse so-called religious views have in common, but 
Smith and Fitzgerald, as well as others, argue that they are searching in vain.  Rather, 
cultures and their institutions and practices reflect the beliefs and values of agents making 
choices, personally and collectively.   
 Contrary to those like Smith and Fitzgerald who want to reduce religion to a more 
basic discipline, earlier scholars, like Mircea Eliade and Rudolf Otto, have contended that 
religion discourse cannot be reduced to any other form of discourse because it is a basic 
discipline—it is sui generis.  That is, the idea of religion exists universally; it has an 
essence and is identifiable as distinct from all other types of inquiry.  There is such a thing 
as ‘religious’ phenomena, they argue, and it is a part of the human experience—it is part of 
human nature.  A classic argument for sui generis religion has been the argument from the 
argumentum e consensu gentium, the general consent of mankind, or from the Protestant 
Reformer, John Calvin’s, sensus divinitatis, a universal sense of deity in all humans.  The 
idea here is that within the human consciousness is an intuitive awareness of the ‘sacred’ 
(Eliade), the ‘holy’ (Otto), and of a transcendent God (Calvin).  This intuitive awareness 
then qualifies as a ‘religious’ awareness.52  Advocates of the sui generis idea argue that 
religion is something that is unique in its characteristics and this uniqueness needs to be 
researched and studied.   
 If religion has an essence, then it must be a concept and have a defining quality that 
all members of the class ‘religion’ share.  It must have a universal, identifiable nature.  A 
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plethora of ideas, such as the ‘sacred,’ the ‘holy,’ or the sense of deity have been offered as 
‘religious’ phenomena and as the common and defining characteristic to give religion a 
unique status for inquiry.  But what is the ‘sacred’ or the ‘holy’?  How is it determined and 
identified?  Is sacredness and holiness discovered in human nature or is it arbitrarily 
determined by a particular cultural context?  These ideas, however, presuppose beliefs 
about human nature that must be clearly stated and analyzed.  The notions of ‘sacredness,’ 
‘holiness,’ and the sensus divinitatis (innate awareness of God), are, as Fitzgerald argues, 
theological concepts and must be understood in light of the basic belief of theism.  The 
discussion is then pushed back into the area of metaphysics and first principles, the essence 
of human nature, which will be addressed in subsequent chapters.   
 Putting the sui generis issue aside for now, the point can be made that even without 
a clear definition, the idea of religion is still applied to varied and contradictory belief 
systems, which then form a category of belief.  What, then, holds these disparate views 
together?  What is the common denominator, the common ground?  This gets to the issue 
addressed by the scholars noted above.  There is no commonality that can be identified as a 
trans-cultural object in need of discovery and investigation without presupposing a more 
basic belief concerning essences.      
 Smith and Fitzgerald have challenged the idea of religion as a separate entity that 
stands above the ordinary workings of culture.  Rather, they see it as a subcategory of 
culture and as an ideological totalizing concept for analyzing the diverse values and 
strategies of power inherent within various cultures and societies.  Works in anthropology 
and sociology are misleading when they suggest that they are about the ‘religious’ 
experience of a particular culture.  They are really attempts, says Fitzgerald, “to study the 
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institutionalized values of specific social groups, the different ways in which values are 
symbolically represented, and the relation of those values and symbolic representations to 
power and other aspects of social organization.”53   
 Variously understood as a theological, sociological, anthropological, psychological, 
or broadly cultural phenomenon, the idea of religion has managed to survive as well as 
elude a clarifying definition.  Numerous attempts at comprehensiveness have been offered 
in order to delimit the idea.  Nonetheless, this effort has been met with little success.  The 
lack of an agreed upon definition has caused much perplexity and tension regarding how to 
understand the relationship between the idea of religion as it relates to the physical and 
social sciences.  Consequently, the popular religion / science dichotomy is perpetuated.  So 
the question continues to be asked, or avoided, what is this thing called religion and what 
does it do?  To ask David Hume’s question, how and why did it arise?  Or, did it?  Is it 
innate, an integral aspect of human nature?  These are fair questions that have been asked 
historically and have captivated the creative imaginations of the social sciences and 
humanities.     
 So it does not seem to be asking too much to demand a working definition.  If there 
is not a workable definition, then how does the scholar know what has purportedly arisen?  
The answer may be cloaked in irony.  Perhaps it is imbedded in the worldview of 
modernity and is obvious.  While a definition of religion from within the religion category 
may be impossible due to the diversity of views, however, modernity’s naturalism easily 
defines religion as any belief system that is incommensurate with its own, which is 
essentially what modernity has done.  For modernity, religion equals non-naturalism.  If 
                                                          
53  Fitzgerald, Ideology, 12 
 45 
 
naturalism is rejected, then the specifics, the distinctive features, of the alternative views 
really do not matter.  For instance, Freud’s The Future of an Illusion, or more recently, 
Pascal Boyer’s, Religion Explained, each operates from an explicitly naturalistic 
perspective and framework.  They each presuppose a naturalistic frame of reference; the 
privileged view attempting to apply a naturalistic methodology for answering questions 
regarding the cause and origin of alternative views—the so-called religions.  What is 
apparent is that the divide between so-called religion and non-religion has already been 
presupposed, implying, at least minimally, some sort of definition, which enables one view 
to be separated from others.       
 It should be clear at this point that naturalists understand alternative views to be 
either a psychologically or socially constructed category.  It should also be apparent that 
what is called religion consists of various belief systems that can be understood, at least 
minimally, by what they believe and do.  They attempt to interpret and explain a 
conception of reality, essentially how the world works, which includes the assorted 
practices associated with each.  The common characteristic of the diverse views at the most 
basic level is that they all seek to make sense out of human experience.  That is, they 
describe, interpret, and explain experience in order to maximize the meaning of it, and 
particular beliefs that form a system are what makes that happen.    
 It should also be clear that, similarly, naturalism is also a belief system that 
describes, interprets, and explains the nature of reality along with its various ways of 
practice and, therefore, also seeks to make sense out of human experience.  The formal 
features, structure, and function of diverse belief systems are alike, but with different basic 
beliefs.  That is, each belief system consists of, whether explicitly stated or uncritically 
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presupposed, a metaphysic, an epistemology, and an ethic.  The belief categories of 
naturalism and so-called religion are similar in that each attempts to interpret and explain 
the meaning and significance of existence and the human experience of it.  Each view 
inferentially derives from its basic beliefs an interpretation and explanation of the data of 
existence and experience.  In other words, both philosophical naturalism and so-called 
religion construct systems of interrelated beliefs and propositions that serve to interpret 
and explain the nature of the world so as to make sense of it.  Formally, structurally, and 
functionally, they are the same.  So at the most basic level naturalism and the idea of 
religion are the same.  As one philosopher of religion, Surrendra Gangadean explains it, 
“religion is the belief or set of beliefs one uses to give meaning to one’s experience….since 
all give meaning to experience, all are religious.”54  James’ attempt at definition, 
unwittingly, came to the same conclusion.  All belief systems attempt to do the same thing.  
Once again, if all is religion, then none is religion.  When understood in this way, the term 
‘religion’ loses its distinctive and definitive characteristics and therefore cannot be a 
concept.  It loses its meaning.  All of the world’s diverse belief systems then qualify as 
religion.   
 Whether so-called religion or naturalism, belief systems are constructed for the 
purpose of giving meaning to human experience.  This includes determining the 
significance and meaning of data gathered from the physical world—what is typically 
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called science.  Inherent in the respective systems are beliefs concerning the nature of 
ultimate reality, how that reality is known, and how life ought to be lived.  Sam Harris 
reflects the relationship between beliefs and practice with his comment, “[y]our beliefs 
define your vision of the world; they dictate your behavior; they determine your emotional 
responses to other human beings.”55  Beliefs and practice are causally connected and 
cannot be separated.   
 If all belief systems are formally and functionally the same and develop for the 
purpose of producing meaning, then, as Gangadean has stated, all views are essentially 
‘religious.’  If all views are essentially religious, then the term ‘religion’ could easily be 
replaced with the term ‘worldview.’  Perhaps the term, worldview (Weltanschauung), is 
better suited as a general category to capture the world’s belief systems.  It is more 
comprehensive and more inclusive.  Naturalism and religion would then be subsumed by a 
larger category heading—worldview.  All belief systems, whether naturalism or so-called 
religion, interpret and explain existence and, therefore, constitute a view of the world.   
 The points just made address what belief systems fundamentally are and what they 
fundamentally do.  The notion of ‘meaningfulness’ is the common denominator for all 
belief systems (religions / worldviews).  All beliefs and belief systems, whether naturalism 
or so-called religion, function and are structured to achieve the same end—meaning.  And 
as will be shown in what follows, the test for meaning is reason.
56
  Beliefs are meaningful 
when they are consistent with each other and do not violate the laws of thought—they are 
not contradictory.  With the ‘definition’ of religion just discussed, the popular paradigm, 
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the two categories of science and religion, collapses and the discussion shifts.  The focus is 
now on a single category consisting of a multitude of worldviews that are structured in 
such a way as to achieve meaningfulness.  But even with only a single category the 
question of differentiation still remains.  Can the multitude of views in the single category 
still be grouped separately?  How are they different?  Some may argue that the popular 
divide is still valid because no substantive change has been effected.  One view, 
naturalism, is still based on reason and knowledge and the others are not, it is claimed.  
This claim, however, still needs to be critically evaluated.  The challenge to the popular 
paradigm and to naturalism as privileged is not quite complete.  The first step was to 
clarify the issue of definition with respect to structure, function, and meaning, and the 
second is to address the claim to knowledge and privilege, which is to follow.   
 While the structure and function for all worldviews is the same, the content, or 
belief particulars, are not.  This same critique would apply within the so-called religion 
category as well.  The respective basic beliefs of each view are significantly different and 
even contradictory.  Each view holds a different belief regarding what is ultimately real 
(eternal).  That is, there are opposing beliefs with respect to what ultimately exists.  Keep 
in mind that this whole issue of religion/science and worldview is over differences 
regarding which way is the correct way to understand existence.  Moreover, the main 
difference in the various views is not primarily found in the familiar notion that one view 
believes in the supernatural and the other does not, as is commonly believed.  Some views 
considered religious, such as Buddhism, affirm a non-material ultimate reality, but not 
necessarily a supernatural reality.  It is at the most basic level of belief, beliefs about what 
ultimately exists and has always existed, that differences in worldviews ought to be 
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critically assessed.  When this is done, the two popular categories dissolve allowing for a 
new, more objective and comprehensive, scheme.        
 As an example, naturalism (science) and Hinduism (religion) oppose each other in 
the popular paradigm.  However, when their most basic belief about existence is examined 
they fall into the same belief category.  Both views believe that something is eternal (our 
most basic belief) rather than nothing, and both views believe that ‘all’ that exists is 
eternal.  They differ, however, on what it is that ultimately exists, which is an inferred and 
less basic belief.  Naturalism believes that all that exists is eternal and that it is matter, 
whereas Hinduism believes that all that exists is eternal and that it is non-matter.  What is 
significant here is that they are in the same category at the most basic level.  The question 
of existence and eternality, as well as a new proposal for dividing belief systems, will be 
discussed in more detail in chapter five.  In that chapter all three options regarding what is 
eternal will be examined—all is eternal, none is eternal, and some is eternal (some is not 
eternal).
57
  Every worldview, functioning as an ideological concept, affirms explicitly or 
implicitly a belief about what is most ultimate and its adherents bear responsibility for the 
rational justification of that belief.       
Explanation, Presuppositions, and Privilege  
 At this point it is becoming more clear that the idea of religion and non-religion is a 
fabrication of modernity.  Modernity promotes a worldview grounded in a particular 
interpretation of the data of science and experience.  Modernity’s understanding of 
alternative, opposing views is embedded in the worldview of modernity.  How alternative 
views are interpreted and explained is determined in light of the interpreter’s most basic 
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belief about what ultimately exists.  Interpreting and explaining is not a neutral, objective 
enterprise.  As an example, two renowned contemporary historians of religion demonstrate 
how interpreting and explaining reveals uncritically held presuppositions, which reflect a 
particular worldview and belief about existence.   
 In his work, Explaining Religion, J. Samuel Preus, presupposes the validity of the 
dichotomy in question.
58
  He traces several significant religion theorists, such as Bodin, 
Vico, Hume, Durkheim, and Freud, with the intent to show how each accounts for, in 
Preus’ estimation, “the key issue—that of origins” (cause and source) that eventually 
produced the naturalistic paradigm for the interpretation of religion.
59
  From the work of 
these theorists, he articulates how the development of a modern naturalistic approach to the 
study of religion superseded a theological approach.  He argues that a theological approach 
to understanding the world’s belief systems may be acceptable from its limited perspective, 
but is not acceptable for the academy.
60
   A naturalistic approach, he contends, is more 
objective and therefore ought to be the preferred method of study.  Because a theological 
approach assumes a particular belief system it cannot be objective, he explains, and is, 
therefore, unacceptable for academic use.  He challenges the popular notion “that the only 
proper approach to religions is ‘from the inside,’ and……argues that a clear distinction 
between a naturalistic approach—with its own explanatory apparatus—and religious 
approaches is necessary to achieve a coherent conception of what the study of religion is 
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about.”61  In Preus’ judgment, a naturalistic explanation of non-naturalistic as well as 
supernatural belief systems is more fitting for the academy.  He thus implicitly 
presupposes a definitive division in his explanation.  That is, without explicitly defining 
religion, he reinforces the distinction between the natural and the supernatural, thus 
affirming the dichotomy as well as implying that non-natural worldviews equal religion.  
He identifies a difference and makes the value judgment that a naturalistic method of 
inquiry is superior to any alternative.  He implies that the religion category consists of 
whatever is incommensurate with his own naturalistic worldview.    
 Another champion of this perspective is Donald Wiebe.  In his work, The Politics 
of Religious Studies, Wiebe strongly contends for the “need to reconsider the value of a 
return to evolutionary theory to re-establish a unifying framework for the study of 
religion.”62  It is his contention that “[a] study of religion directed toward spiritual 
liberation of the individual or of the human race as a whole, toward the moral welfare of 
the human race, or toward any ulterior end than that of knowledge itself, should not find a 
home in the university.”63  His assumption is that knowledge is gained only by a unifying 
framework, naturalism.  Additionally, he quotes Maurice Cowling as offering the only 
acceptable action for scholars of religion, “as scholars, are committed, the only moral 
action to which they are commanded and the only ‘social responsibility’ to which their 
professional position compels them, is to use their energies in order to explain.”64  But 
from what perspective ought the idea of religion be explained?  He offers insight into his 
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position when he suggests that a fruitful application of this particular framework of 
explanation can be found in Pascal Boyer’s, Religion Explained: The Evolutionary Origins 
of Religious Thought.
65
  The materialistic evolutionary method advocated here is 
considered, by Boyer, to be a productive way to explain the source and cause of religion.  
The reason for this, according to Boyer, is that the human mind has been prepared by a 
material process.  Our minds, he says, “are prepared because natural selection gave us 
particular mental predispositions”—a predisposition for the idea of religion.66  The basic 
first principles of a naturalistic worldview are presupposed as the only acceptable 
methodology for explaining and interpreting the world’s alternative belief systems.  The 
worldview of naturalism is assumed to be true.    
 Once again, an explanation that presupposes a definition of religion as the non-
natural, or supernatural, and as something that arises is offered.  Both of these scholars 
propose a methodological naturalism for inquiry, interpretation, and explanation that is 
grounded in metaphysical naturalism.  They each work within a prescribed worldview that 
allows them to interpret and explain those views that are contrary to their own.  How is this 
approach any more objective, what Preus demands, than a theological approach?  With 
these examples it is apparent that explanation for Preus, Wiebe, and Boyer includes, indeed 
presupposes, interpretation, which includes a basic belief about ultimate reality, the 
meaning of experience, and the data of science. 
 These scholars argue that their own naturalistic worldview offers the best 
perspective for the proper interpretation and explanation of all other worldviews and 
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therefore ought to be the preferred, privileged, position.  The dichotomy for them is valid.  
They argue that naturalism is fundamentally different than alternative views, it is ‘outside’ 
of all other belief systems, as opposed to adherents on the ‘inside,’ and is, therefore, in a 
better position to be more objective.  They assume that their position is value-neutral.  The 
interesting thing here is that they do not see themselves as working from within a 
position—a worldview.  They view their assessments, their value judgments, as neutral and 
objective.     
 Theism, however, could make the same claim.  For instance, naturalism and 
Hinduism are belief systems that need to be explained.  Theists could claim that they can 
assess these worldviews, as well as others, as an ‘outsider,’ and would therefore be just as 
objective as a naturalist.  Can naturalism explain itself as an ‘outsider?’  Obviously, no.  
The naturalist would then counter the theist with a charge of metaphysical bias because the 
theist has presupposed something about the ultimate nature of reality, thus making his 
judgment biased.  But has not the naturalist done the same thing?  Methodological 
naturalism is promoted and defended as the only objective method of inquiry, while 
assuming metaphysical naturalism—a statement affirming the ultimate material nature of 
reality.  The problem here, of course, is that naturalists want to claim neutrality, with no 
metaphysical bias, and, therefore, consider themselves more objective.  They want to claim 
methodological naturalism only without recognizing their presupposed metaphysical 
foundation of naturalism.  
 A distinction has been made by Preus, Wiebe, Boyer and others and it appears to be 
based upon a natural / supernatural model.  But this model, however, is inadequate.  It does 
not take all views into account sufficiently.  For instance, Buddhism, commonly believed 
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to be a religion, does not fit into the category of naturalism or supernaturalism.  For 
Buddhism, the ‘real’ world is of a non-material (spirit) nature and the spirit world is all that 
ultimately exists—the material world is illusory.  The spirit world is all that exists and has 
always existed—it is eternal.  This could be called spiritual monism.  Conversely, material 
monism would be the view that all that exists is the material world and it has always 
existed (naturalism).  Each view believes that all that exists is eternal, but differs on what it 
is that eternally exists—spirit or matter.  The contradictory to both of these views, spiritual 
monism and material monism, is theism.  Theism believes that some (not all) that exists is 
eternal and some is temporal (came into existence).  So the worldview model being 
proposed is based upon what is believed to exist eternally.  That is, it is about the basic 
concept of existence and what ultimately exists.  In other words, all worldviews believe 
either all is eternal or only some is eternal (some is not).  This model more accurately 
categorizes the world’s belief systems, which will be developed more in the final chapter.  
 The materialist metaphysical presuppositions of Freud, Preus, Wiebe, and Boyer, 
however, are quite clear.  Just as it is demanded that the theist produce proof for its 
metaphysical presuppositions, so proof is required for the naturalist’s metaphysical 
presuppositions.  Naturalists need to prove rationally, or otherwise, that only the material 
world exists and that it has always existed, which has not been demonstrated.    
 This project, while it may be sympathetic to the concerns of Preus and Wiebe for 
wanting objectivity in scholarly inquiry, nonetheless, objects to their failure to recognize 
the presuppositions inherent in their own perspective.  They not only implicitly define with 
their categories, but also determine the only acceptable method of inquiry.  They argue that 
their own naturalistic worldview offers the best perspective for the proper interpretation 
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and explanation of all other worldviews and therefore ought to be the preferred, privileged, 
position.  They argue that naturalism is fundamentally different than alternative views, it is 
neutral and ‘outside’ of a particular category of beliefs, as opposed to ‘inside,’ and 
therefore in a position to be more objective.  But this cannot be substantiated.  They defend 
and promote methodological naturalism as the only objective method of inquiry because 
they assume metaphysical naturalism to be true—a significant bias.  Nineteenth century 
theists attempting to explain views contrary to Christianity and labeling them ‘alternative 
religions,’ were doing something similar.  Theists wanted to understand opposing views 
through the lens of Christianity whereas non-theists wanted, and continue to want, to 
understand opposing views through the lens of naturalism.  Basic intellectual honesty is at 
stake here.        
 Why should naturalistic presuppositions be assumed to be the privileged interpreter 
of all worldviews?  From a theist’s perspective, could it not also be asked, from whence 
philosophical naturalism, why did it arise?   It seems to make sense that the privileged 
view needs to be the proven, rationally justified, view.  A sound argument needs to be 
given in support of one approach over the other.  Presuppositions need proof.  It needs to 
be rationally demonstrated that naturalism is, if it is to be the privileged view, the only 
logical position to hold.  But as it will be demonstrated in more detail in chapter five, this 
cannot be done.   
 Wiebe laments that the science of religion has not yet found a place, its own 
identity, in the academy.
67
   Could this be due to the fact that the idea of religion has not 
yet been clearly identified as an object of inquiry and research?  The real question is, is it 
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even possible?  So far, it seems that no evidence can be produced that justifies two separate 
categories for the world’s belief systems as they are currently conceived, or that naturalism 
ought to be the privileged worldview.      
 The worldview subcategories can now be minimally understood as one group, 
which believes in a spirit reality only (Eastern views); a second group, which affirms a 
spiritual as well as a material reality (Western theism); and a third group, which affirms the 
existence of a material reality only.  In this light, the differences at the most basic level and 
the basis for the categories becomes more apparent.
68
  But more clarity is still needed.  
Since these opposing views, as stated, are contradictory, only one can be rationally 
justified.  Either a spirit reality is most ultimate and eternal, or a material reality is most 
ultimate and eternal, but not both.
69
   
 The real issue now becomes, can the worldview that affirms the existence of a 
spiritual, non-material, reality be rationally justified or can the worldview of naturalism 
rationally justify that only a material reality exists?  Put differently, can one of these 
perspectives give reasons (rational proof) for its claim to knowledge and truth, or can they 
each only make dogmatic claims?  The ultimate challenge then is for one view to produce 
rational proof that defeats all others.        
 That the modern dichotomy has been erroneously constructed should be coming 
into focus with the issue of knowledge still needing more discussion. When naturalism and 
the idea of religion are understood as just explained, the relevance of the question, why 
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69 This is to be understood as a contradiction when naturalism presupposes that all that exists is matter and eternal while 
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does the science and religion dialogue even matter, becomes more explicit.  It is a matter of 
truth and error, and as Sam Harris has argued, life and death.  Beliefs have consequences.  
Worldview Studies  
 If there is no basis for a ‘religion’ category and if no view has been rationally 
justified, then what is the role in the academy, if any, for what has come to be called 
‘religious studies?’  With the dichotomy dissolved and the idea of religion undefinable, it 
would allow scholarly inquiry from a much broader base.  Religious studies could be 
termed ‘worldview studies,’ which would include naturalism as one particular worldview.  
Naturalism would be understood as an alternative worldview consisting of beliefs and 
practices just as Christianity or Buddhism.  If preferred, each of these belief systems could 
also be termed ideologies.  If the world’s belief systems, including naturalism, are 
understood as beliefs that inform and shape the varied cultures of the world for the purpose 
of attaining meaning, then progress in understanding can be made.  Worldviews have 
differences at the basic level and will therefore influence cultures differently.  What is 
believed to be ultimate reality will determine interpretation and explanation of existence 
and the experience of it.  Naturalism will produce a different culture than, say, Taoism or 
Hinduism.  The particular labels, for instance Christianity, would be retained as a general 
identification moniker.           
 University Religious Studies research programs could then be dedicated to the 
investigation of how worldviews function, interrelate, and influence cultures.  Basic beliefs 
would be identified and the consequences of those beliefs could be traced through all the 
various academic disciplines.  Researching and studying theories of religion, such as the 
classical theories, would be seen as irrelevant.  In order to better facilitate that end, Arizona 
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State University has recently merged the disciplines of Philosophy, History, and Religious 
Studies.  Perhaps, with this move, it could be conceived that, in a broad theoretical sense, 
History and Religious Studies would gather and describe data, whereas Philosophy would 
categorize for rational consistency and interpretation beginning with basic belief.  Arizona 
State University’s Religious Studies program has recognized this point, to an extent, and 
addresses it on its university webpage.  Generally speaking, this present project follows 
this pattern by merging disciplines.  ASU’s webpage states; 
For a long while many westerners have tended to think that religions are 
either “dying out" or have been relegated to the private sphere where they 
have little public or political importance.  Recent events in the United States 
and around the world, however, have made it harder and harder to sustain 
this view. In our increasingly cosmopolitan world, the need to understand 
the root beliefs and values of diverse cultures has become a political and 
moral imperative.  The academic study of religion seeks to explore the deep 
intersections between religions and cultures which have shaped, and 
continue to shape, personal and collective identity.
70
     
 
The implication here is that it is the mission, a ‘moral imperative,’ for religious studies to 
interpret and explain the meaning and significance of the diverse beliefs and practices of 
the views in the category—religion.  Understanding “root beliefs” is important.  Root 
beliefs establish the basis for worldviews, or paradigms, in the Kuhnian sense, that shape 
what is acceptable cultural life.  As Barbour has noted, “[a]s scientific models lead to 
theories by which observations are ordered, so religious models lead to beliefs by which 
experiences are ordered.  Beliefs, like theories, can be propositionally stated and 
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systematically articulated.”71  The idea here is, as stated above, that beliefs produce 
consequences.  Beliefs (metaphysics/epistemology) determine behavior (ethics).   
 The category of religion, once considered by secularism to have been relegated to 
the area of personal piety—back to the beginnings of its original meaning—or on its way 
to extinction, now seems to be experiencing a type of renewal.  Put differently, it was 
believed that naturalism would eventually preclude the existence of all other views.  Not 
only does the Religious Studies department acknowledge the perseverance of these other 
views, but also deems it a moral obligation to know them.  But whether dying out or 
resurging, the category remains the same—distinct from what is perceived as the 
privileged, more rational view of naturalism, or non-religion.  Nonetheless, perhaps this is 
a move in the right direction, one that recognizes the idea that both secularism and religion 
are social constructs with no sui generis status.   
 Given this context, university research programs in religious studies then, at least at 
ASU it would seem, serve the role of descriptive sciences for the purpose of understanding 
anthropological and sociological interrelationships.  Beliefs and practices of the various so-
called religions (worldviews) are critically analyzed through the work of these research 
programs with the goal of understanding the implications for cultural life.  The same 
Arizona State University Religious Studies webpage says as much with its statement; 
Religious Studies brings together perspectives and approaches from history, 
sociology, anthropology, philosophy, and literature to gain a more 
comprehensive understanding of the individuals and traditions that 
constitute religions and cultures.   
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This statement appears to suggest a conception of religion that is more than personal views 
expressed in private.  It intends to approach the study of so-called religion as an integral 
component of culture or even as fundamental belief systems that inform and shape culture.  
This approach is a departure from the former norm that conceived of religion as an add-on 
component expressed in personal belief and practice.  Therefore, to study religion would 
encompass a broader cultural study rather than simply the study of private beliefs.  When 
considered in this light, religious studies could also be conceived as worldview studies.  
Understood in this way, however, would mean leaving the popular view of religion behind, 
along with the category dichotomy.   
 With ASU’s revised mission statement, the door is open to understand all of the 
world’s belief systems, theism as well as naturalism, as worldviews that inform and shape 
cultural life.  As the statement above indicates, “[t]he academic study of religion seeks to 
explore the deep intersections between religions and cultures which have shaped, and 
continue to shape, personal and collective identity.”72  Could this statement not also apply 
to so-called non-religious views such as naturalism?  Does not naturalism also shape 
personal and collective identity?  Perhaps naturalism as a belief system or worldview 
should be included in the Religious Studies program.  Beliefs at the most basic level, the 
metaphysical level, whether theistic or naturalistic, determine behavior and practice.  
While the mission statement offers a modicum of hope for a more objective approach to 
understanding diverse worldviews, the prevailing paradigm is, nonetheless, still well-
entrenched and in need of reformulation. 
Summary 
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 Though a theistic, or so-called religious, worldview dominated the West for well 
over a millennium, the past century has been one of continued decline for theism.  This 
decline can be observed most significantly in the academy where the naturalistic view has 
ascended to supremacy.  Naturalism, as one belief category, has been determined by 
modernity to be more rational, if not the only rational view, and, therefore, considered 
more authoritative and believable.  As such, it is the privileged position.  The idea of 
religion, on the other hand, is considered to be faith dependent and has not produced the 
proper evidence, or proof, to warrant any type of knowledge to substantiate truth claims 
suitable for dialogue in the public square.  Religion is grounded in belief, and science is 
grounded in knowledge, it is said.  Therefore, it is assumed that a religious view essentially 
fails to pass the bar of rationality.  Hence the dichotomy, reason and naturalism v. faith and 
religion, developed forming two separate categories of belief, each having its own 
interpretation and explanation regarding the nature of existence.  The category of religion, 
and eventually world religions, then became the group of beliefs, or belief systems, that 
were outside of, and incompatible with, the rational, naturalistic perspective and analyzable 
from that perspective.   
 This understanding has become so much a part of and so entrenched in Western 
thought life that to imagine an alternative is almost unthinkable.  The divide is often 
viewed in terms of binaries such as the holy and the profane, nature and grace, faith and 
reason, sacred and secular, or fact and value, to mention a few.  Talal Asad has noted that 
these binaries “pervade modern secular discourse, especially in its polemical mode” and 
adds that they express that which is in opposition to the secular.
73
  In light of this, 
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questions such as, what is fundamental to the dichotomy and how is it justified, are 
paramount.  Can any current approach to understanding the relationship between religion 
and science be substantiated apart from careful analysis of presuppositions?  The 
prevailing mindset, or ‘modern conceptual scheme,’ needs to be critically analyzed, and 
most specifically, the idea that naturalism is more rational and therefore has grounds for 
being the privileged position.  
 The point here is that the academy is aligned with this view and assumes it to be 
objective and neutral.  So-called religion generally, and Christian theism specifically, no 
longer has the esteemed position of sole interpreter and explainer of reality in the public 
square of Western culture that it once did.  Rather, it has been relegated to the area of 
personal piety.  A naturalistic understanding of the world, particularly in the citadels of 
higher learning, has become dominant and has assumed the role once held by theism, thus 
marginalizing theism and determining it to be intellectually untenable and even 
irrelevant—hence, the assignment to the area of personal values only.  Compared to the 
nineteenth century, theistic belief in the academy today and, indeed, belief in any 
transcendent reality has been virtually vanquished.  The idea of two mutually exclusive 
categories with the claim to knowledge as the dividing factor appears to be permanently 
fixed in the Western cognitive structure.    
 With what has been said so far, it is clear that Western modernity has been 
successful at shaping how its own idea of religion ought to be conceived.  Modernity’s 
development of science has defined religion to satisfy its purposes making the two 
categories unavoidably related and mutually exclusive.  Modernity has divided the world’s 
belief systems in such a way that favors a naturalistic worldview and is perceived as the 
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rational view, against non-naturalistic worldviews that are perceived as non-rational.  The 
perceived rational view is the favored or privileged view and, therefore, the preferred view 
in the academy.  Because of the divide, tension between the views has been the result.  If 
the rational view is the privileged and preferred view, as it should be, then it is requisite for 
the view holding that position to demonstrate its conformance to reason.  If it cannot, then 
it ought to be abandoned as the privileged position.  Theism lost this position and was 
replaced because it could not demonstrate its conformance to reason.  But can its 
replacement do any better?  The answer to this question will continue to be explored in 
subsequent chapters.      
 As emphasized above, the modern understanding of religion and science cannot be 
isolated from the general and overall rise of modern Western thought.  The making of 
religion and philosophical naturalism were a part of, and products of, this historical 
process.  The philosophical precursors will now be explored in the next chapter. 
 But before moving ahead, a clarification is first in order.  The assessment regarding 
the decline of theism and the rise of naturalism is not to suggest that religion, as commonly 
understood, is losing adherents or disappearing, but rather, that its intellectual currency in 
the academy has lost its value as a truth claim.  But in spite of the loss and the rise of the 
naturalistic worldview, alternative belief systems (religions) are, nonetheless, still thriving 
and even expanding.
74
  Other worldviews continue as viable options, as ideas by which 
people shape their lives, in contrast to the exclusive claims to knowledge made by 
naturalism.  As a topic for another project, a valid question could be, why is this occurring?    
                                                          
74 See Philip Jenkins, The Next Christendom: The Coming of Global Christianity (New York: Oxford University Press, 
2002).  Also see Rodney Stark and Roger Finke, The Churching of America, 1776-2005: Winners and Losers in Our 
Religious Economy (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 2005).  These works show expansion of so-called 
religions in various parts of the world.   
 64 
 
Chapter 3 
PHILOSOPHICAL PRECURSORS TO MODERNITY’S MAKING OF RELIGION 
 There was a time when the idea of religion, more specifically Judeo-Christian 
theism, and science were considered complementary.  Theologians and the new ‘scientists’ 
viewed all truth as God’s truth and were engaged in the mutual pursuit of the same end.  
But by the end of the nineteenth century this relative harmony experienced an unparalleled 
breech that prevails to the present.  What were the causes of this breech?  How did the idea 
of religion end up as a distinct category separated from scientific inquiry and often 
considered at odds with it?  The answers to these questions are in part due to an 
epistemological shift that took place in earlier centuries and subsequently paved the way 
for the nineteenth century growth of naturalism (the philosophical perspective of 
modernity) into a dominant worldview.  The question of knowledge and how it was to be 
qualified as knowledge became the paramount question with which rising modernity would 
wrestle.  This new worldview needed rational justification and that justification was to be 
found in its understanding of knowledge.  From the Enlightenment forward, the view that 
believed that it possessed knowledge and could demonstrate it, would prevail as the true 
light for human culture and, therefore, qualify it to define reality.  The theistic worldview, 
through a series of epistemologically related intellectual revolutions, beginning with the 
sixteenth century Protestant Reformation and extending through the early twentieth 
century, lost its exclusive position as the definer of reality for the Western world and was 
usurped by a naturalistic view.  The claim to rational superiority by the new naturalistic 
view was resounding and appeared to be decisive.  The following will explore some of the 
philosophical (epistemological) and theological precursors that made the transition from 
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the pre-modern period to the modern possible, which was necessary for producing the 
categories of religion and science.  
From Pre-modern to Modern  
 The decline of the Christian theistic worldview in the West took place 
progressively on several fronts.  As the predominant view, theism experienced a significant 
threat to its unity when the exclusive authority of the Roman Catholic Church was 
challenged.  The crisis of authority precipitated by the Protestant Reformation made an 
absolutely radical break with the past seem mandatory.
75
  Cultural upheavals in sixteenth 
century Europe severely eroded various concepts surrounding the prevailing theory of 
knowledge of the time—one rooted in authority.76  With the collapse of traditional 
authority structures, explains religion historian, Jeffrey Stout, disintegration of the terms 
closely connected with knowledge such as certainty, demonstration, opinion, probability, 
and authority led to an epistemological crisis to which various philosophers sought to 
respond.  This loss cannot be overstated with respect to its impact on the new modern 
mindset.  A method by which to reconstruct normative standards for right judgment and 
regulation was necessary after the unsettling theological tensions of this time.  One such 
philosopher was René Descartes (1596-1650) whose response was to avoid the terms 
associated in any way with ‘authority’ and reconstruct a foundation for knowledge based 
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on demonstration and absolute certainty.
77
  Stout views Descartes’ quest for certainty as a 
“flight from authority” designed to release morals and politics from traditional Christian 
theism.  A new starting point—one that would transcend the epistemic disparity of the 
situation and be independent of history—was the desired goal.78  In rejecting authority, 
says Stout, “Descartes tried to make received opinion and conceptual inheritance 
inessential to thought.”79      
 The philosophical climate of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries with the 
major preoccupation with epistemological issues, unavoidably, had an impact on Christian 
theism and the development of the categories, religion and science.  Issues concerning the 
certainty and starting point of knowledge, beliefs and their justification, and foundations 
for knowledge all came under critical analysis in the early modern era.  The outcome was a 
distinctively modern cognitive structure for belief justification—commonly known as 
foundationalism.  With this particularly Cartesian approach to knowledge, the 
epistemological assumptions of pre-modern authority were called into question and the 
subsequent implications for Christian theism and science were monumental.  The dogmatic 
canons of the pre-modern mindset were no longer acceptable for knowledge.  The 
transition from a pre-modern epistemology grounded in the basic beliefs of a received 
tradition to a rational structure built upon a foundation of self-evident first principles was a 
radical move.  But in light of the cultural crisis of the time this is just what Descartes 
                                                          
77 Jeffrey Stout, The Flight From Authority, (Notre Dame: Notre Dame Press, 1981) 6;  In this work Stout seeks to 
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78 Stout, The Flight From Authority, 67. 
 
79 Stout, The Flight From Authority, 6. 
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proposed.  So what is foundationalism and what is its significance for the categories of 
religion and science?    
Epistemological Foundationalism  
 Foundationalism, explains philosopher, Nicholas Wolterstorff, is a 
characteristically Western phenomenon and essentially a theory of knowledge and 
rationality, that is, “a theory of what is rational for a given person to accept, to believe.”80  
The fundamental issue underlying foundationalism is one of belief justification.  Beliefs 
are based, or grounded, on something.  Beliefs need to be justified and foundationalism is a 
system that justifies or warrants beliefs.  It is one particular epistemic logic or structure 
designed to provide a support or ‘ground’ for beliefs which, by themselves, have no 
support.  An appropriate metaphor here would be a building.  Foundational beliefs for 
epistemic foundationalists are considered to be directly held self-evident truths that form 
the foundation for the superstructure of knowledge and are not inferred from any other 
belief or proposition.  They are one’s most basic beliefs and constitute direct or immediate 
knowledge and are usually considered bestowed by intuition.  Through intuition the 
knower grasps with certainty ‘clear and distinct ideas’ (Descartes), ‘impressions’ (Locke), 
or ‘sensations’ (Russell).  These foundational propositions are then true by correspondence 
with states of affairs in the physical world (modern empiricism).  The foundation stops the 
otherwise infinite regress of reasons and inevitable skepticism.  If beliefs are to be justified 
then the regress must end in a foundation of beliefs that require no additional reasons for 
their justification.  Philosopher, Robert Audi, states it simply, “foundationalists tend to 
                                                          
80 Nicholas Wolterstorff, “Introduction,” in Faith and Rationality, eds.  Alvin Plantinga and Nicholas Wolterstorff (Notre 
Dame, London: University of Notre Dame Press, 1983) 2.  Wolterstorff also states that foundationalism has been 
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hold that justification belongs to a belief, whether inferentially or directly, by virtue of its 
grounding in experience or reason.”81   Beliefs held inferentially are considered rational if 
they are logically consistent with a more basic belief.  Inferred beliefs are ultimately 
supported by the most basic belief or set of beliefs.  What makes these beliefs rational is 
that the inferred beliefs provide adequate evidence for the more basic beliefs and the more 
basic beliefs provide adequate evidence for those inferred.  This approach to knowledge is 
attractive due to the human need for certitude and meaning.   “What lures and inspires the 
typical foundationalist,” notes Wolterstorff “is the conviction that it is possible for us 
human beings to have direct insight into certain facts of reality—to have direct 
awareness.”82      
 Not just any proposition, however, is considered basic and foundational.  Only 
those propositions that meet certain criteria qualify.  The history of foundationalism has 
been extensive—from Aristotle to the present—and has modified the included definitive 
tenets.  Ancient and medieval foundationalists tended to hold that a proposition is basic if 
it is either self-evident (e.g. 2+2=4) or evident to the senses.  Modern foundationalists—
Descartes, Locke, Leibniz, and others—tended to think of a basic belief as one that is 
either self-evident or incorrigible.  An incorrigible belief is one of which a person is 
immediately and indisputably aware, such as a feeling of hunger.  The consensus seems to 
be that these three categories constitute what has been termed classical foundationalism.
83
  
Wolterstorff identifies the goal of the classical foundationalist as to secure a sense of 
                                                          
81  Audi, The Structure of Justification, 149.  This description is given in contrast to the alternative structure for epistemic 
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82  Nicholas Wolterstorff, John Lock and the Ethics of Belief (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996) xi. 
 
83 Alvin Plantinga, “Reason and Belief in God,” in Faith and Rationality, eds. Alvin Plantinga and Nicholas Wolterstorff 
(Notre Dame, London: University of Notre Dame Press, 1983) 58-9.   
 69 
 
certainty and to “form a body of theories from which all prejudice, bias, and unjustified 
conjecture have been eliminated.”84  This was to be achieved by constructing a theoretical 
structure of knowledge on a foundation of certitude.  Historian, Peter Gay, makes the point 
that pre-Enlightenment antecedents concerning the certainty and starting point of 
knowledge, beliefs and their justification, and the foundations for knowledge, were the 
means for modernity to accomplish that end.
85
 
 It is this type of belief justification that has become the distinguishing feature of 
modernity and a principal Enlightenment ideal.  The concept became the basis for 
autonomy in human critical reflection and was designed for determining universal 
standards that all humans could reasonably believe.  Epistemologically, the transition from 
pre-Enlightenment to modernity finds its principal perpetrators in Descartes and John 
Locke (1632-1704), whom Audi identifies as the beginning of two great traditions 
regarding reason, its capacities and its modes of activity.
86
  With his interest in reason and 
his intention to depart from traditional authority, perhaps Descartes was more a product of 
his cultural history than he realized.  Philosopher, Stephen Toulmin, has observed that 
European thinkers, particularly the French, have had a recurrent preoccupation with the 
idea of “starting again with a clean slate.”  Toulmin calls it “the myth of the clean slate.”87  
The quest for certainty and the equation of rationality were important for Descartes and the 
rationalists, but they were convinced that “the modern, rational way of dealing with 
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85 Peter Gay, The Enlightenment: An Interpretation (New York: Alfred A. Knopt, 1966) 17, Peter Gay says “It has been 
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86 Robert Audi, The Structure of Justification (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993) 459. 
  
87 Stephen Toulmin, Cosmopolis: The Hidden Agenda of Modernity (New York: The Free Press, 1990) 175. 
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problems is to sweep away the inherited clutter of traditions, clean the slate and start again 
from scratch.”  This notion has played a significant part in the intellectual and political 
history of France with the most spectacular illustration being the French Revolution.
88
  
Undoubtedly, Descartes, in keeping with French tradition, was seeking a clean slate with 
his intuitive turn to the subject. 
 Audi understands Descartes’ paradigm for rationality as intuition stressing the 
intellect’s insight into truth, its deductive power, and its active character.  From an internal 
starting point, he seeks to build a knowledge of the world based upon the foundational 
notion of clear and distinct perceptions.  As the mind surveys the field of experience and 
clearly fixes itself on an object, it then elicits the will’s natural assent to the manifest truth.  
Knowledge acquired from perception, then, is an intuition of the mind.
89
  We will later see 
that it is at this point of intuitive principles that the postmodern philosophers will object.   
 Descartes’ motivations for achieving certitude were essentially apologetic in 
nature—an attempt to defend Christian theism particularly against skepticism.  With his 
method of “universal doubt,” he sought certainty through securing a foundation for 
knowledge that would lead to logically unchallenged first truths and thus fortify his 
position against skepticism.  “Cartesian epistemology,” according to Stout, “begins by 
embracing the challenge of radical skepticism as sufficiently cogent to call for serious 
attention.”90  Descartes argues for the acceptance of the truth claims of Christian theism by 
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those without faith with an appeal to natural reason “for they might suppose,” he says, 
“that we were committing the fallacy that logicians call circular reasoning.”91  Faith, for 
Descartes, is useless to persuade those who do not believe.  Reason alone provides 
appropriate means to bring one to accept either religion or a moral life.  Knowledge based 
on certitude alone, not probability, is acceptable to discredit unbelief.  Therefore, according 
to Descartes, all knowledge that is considered only probable is rejected as knowledge. 
 The inevitable question before Descartes was, what constituted certitude and by 
what method could it be obtained?  His answer was universal mathematics.   With 
mathematics he believed he had found the means to achieve an objective viewpoint and 
grasp certitude.  With this affirmation, theologian, Trevor Hart, contends that Descartes, in 
effect, “drove a wedge between the categories of faith on the one hand and knowledge on 
the other.”92  Hart is undoubtedly correct for the history of modern Western theoretical 
thought followed Descartes’ lead and accentuated the dichotomy, which continues in the 
religion / science divide. 
 John Locke took a different approach to certainty and knowledge.  For Locke, 
knowledge of the external world arises not through the inferential assent from the internal 
to the external, but through the multitude of perceptions from the outside that reach the 
receptive mind within.  The attentive subject receives perceptual knowledge as a normal 
product of sensitivity to the causal powers of objects, rather than through an act of the will 
                                                                                                                                                                               
whether rationalism was the proper response to unbelief.  See Richard Muller, Post-Reformation Reformed Dogmatics, 
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92  Trevor Hart, Faith Thinking: The Dynamics of Christian Theology (Downers Grove: InterVarsity Press, 1995) 31. 
 
 72 
 
and the active pursuit of clear and distinct truth.
93
  Whereas Descartes’ epistemology 
tended to be actively influenced by the will and, therefore, took the form of a voluntaristic 
rationalism, Locke’s was mainly naturalistic and involuntarist empiricism.94  Though 
different in epistemic approach (rationalism versus empiricism) the common philosophical 
goal of an indubitable universal foundation for knowledge and certainty was fervently and 
judiciously pursued by both.
95
  A foundational type cognitive structure was the result.   
 Theologian, Ron Thiemann, a student of the transition from the pre-modern to 
modern, views the move by Descartes and Locke as a monumental shift away from the 
biblical epistemology of the Protestant Reformers and their belief that knowledge is 
presupposed as the gift of God’s grace, to an epistemology in need of an ‘indubitable 
foundation’ and ‘demonstration.’96  A  key feature of the new foundationalist epistemology 
was that beliefs needed to be justified by argument appealing to convictions held 
independently of Christian scripture, or special revelation.  With this turn was the 
introduction of non-biblical referents being appealed to for belief justification.  For 
Thiemann, epistemology and modernity are causally linked.  Epistemology is the 
transporting vehicle and identifying quality of modernity.  By rejecting authority, he 
argues, Descartes was in need of a new basis for belief justification, a neutral universal, 
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which became rational demonstration.
97
  This is clearly in contrast to the theologians of the 
Reformation who held that knowledge is given by God and is believed as a basic 
conviction and background belief.
98
  Descartes and Locke were arguing that these 
‘background beliefs’ needed rational justification.  The fideism of the Reformers, the mere 
affirmation of belief without rational demonstration, was no longer adequate.  With 
foundationalism, a basis for knowledge was now established that was not dependent upon 
testimony and authority.  Historically, this is a significant epistemological shift and turn 
toward a broader application and use of the term religion.  What was not grounded in a 
foundation that was rationally derived was not considered knowledge.  This condition 
precluded claims to knowledge that were grounded in tradition or authority, thus the 
beginning of a divide—religion and science.  
The Rise of Modernity         
 What is called modernity is much more than simply what is current.  Enlightened 
modernity, grounded in the wider epistemological phenomenon of foundationalism, has 
clearly produced a way of viewing the world that is in sharp contrast to the way it was 
viewed in the pre-modern period. The former way of viewing the world was eclipsed and 
replaced with a new one—the modern.  Following the European Renaissance, Protestant 
Reformation, and the work of Descartes and Locke, the time was right for the dissolution 
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of accepted institutional, authoritative, norms and a restructuring with contrasting 
individualism and subjectivism in view.  The new cognitive structure, foundationalism, 
emerged as the predominant distinguishing feature of the shift from pre-modern to modern 
thinking.  Modernity became definitively characterized by a foundational type knowledge 
theory inextricably linking the intellectual mindset and trends of the seventeenth century 
and the beginning of the modern era.  The transition from pre-modern to modern occurs in 
the immediate post-Reformation, or pre-Enlightenment, period and it is in the pre-
Enlightenment era that the rise of the modern cognitive structure has been identified.
99
 
 The changes expressed themselves in a modern outlook and to properly define 
modernity is not an easy task.  The most famous attempt is arguably Immanuel Kant’s.  
With Descartes as his philosophical father,
100
 Kant characterized the whole Enlightenment 
age as the emergence of humanity from its self-imposed “indecision and lack of courage to 
use one’s own mind without another’s guidance.”  What this meant for Kant was 
freedom—“freedom to make public use of one’s reason in all matters.”101  Endorsing 
Kant’s view, Georg W. F. Hegel (1770-1831) followed with a similar statement when he 
said, “The greatness of our time rests in the fact that freedom, the peculiar possession of 
mind whereby it is at home with itself in itself, is recognized.”102  For Hegel, the principle 
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of the modern era was the Protestant principle of autonomous individual thinking and its 
philosophical beginning was with Descartes.  
 Beginning with the premise that knowledge constructed on a self-evident 
foundation is autonomous, Kant and Hegel developed the idea that human beings had the 
capability to re-form their rational faculties within their ostensible limitations.  With the 
shackles of tradition and authority of the Christian Church gone, an exhilarating sense of 
liberation emerged.  Unrestrained by the strictures of medieval conventions and 
empowered by the individualism spawned during the Protestant Reformation, autonomous 
human reason was free to explore all the putative bastions of previous eras and view the 
future optimistically from a new perspective.  Philosophy received a new stature.  In Kant, 
says Toulmin, “the French Enlightenment’s social ideals found philosophical 
expression.”103   Traditional ways of understanding the world and the organization of it, 
which had previously been determined by the medieval Church, were rejected in favor of 
ways that were believed to be better and more effective—and essentially, modern.   
 With the eclipse of traditional authority, those better ways were determined and 
guided by autonomous Reason, which became the guiding light for knowledge and truth 
for modern enlightened humanity.  The idea here, as philosopher, Colin Brown, puts it, 
was “to strip Christianity of such extras as faith and belief in a supernatural God who 
personally intervenes in human affairs.”104  The result, says Brown, was “universal human 
reason as the supremely commanding principle and, hence, ‘a fully attenuated Deism.’”105    
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 For Kant, Hegel, and others, offering autonomous Reason as a viable alternative to 
traditional authority seemed most tenable.  After all, Wolterstorff comments, it is an 
intrinsic faculty and not an external authority.  It is common to all people and it belongs to 
the very essence of what it is to be human.  To follow the voice of Reason is to follow 
one’s own leading and is not submitting to anyone—true freedom.106     
 Theologian, William Placher, describes this period as a movement toward objective 
standards that are determined in isolation from the value and practices of the culture in 
which they are made and as a way to understand the reasonableness and meaning of 
assertions.
107
  The shift in perspective was viewed by many in the West as a positive move 
away from an oppressive authoritative tradition grounded in the Bible as divine special 
revelation that had shaped the understanding of the world and the nature of ultimate reality 
until that time.  It was during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries that philosophers 
and theologians began to change their thinking about God, that is, their language about 
God and God’s relation to the created world and human moral effects.108  These thinkers, 
he argues; 
[G]rew more confident about human capacities—about their ability to 
understand God and God’s role in the world and to contribute to human 
salvation—and narrowed their understanding of what counted as reasonable 
articulation of and argument for faith.  That combination of a kind of 
confidence in human abilities and constricting definitions of acceptable 
reasoning led theology astray.
109
 
                                                          
106  Nicholas Wolterstorff, “Introduction” in Faith and Rationality, 5. 
 
107  William Placher, Unapologetic Theology (Louisville: Westminster / John Knox Press, 1989) 74, 75. 
 
108  William Placher, Domestication of Transcendence (Louisville: Westminster / John Knox Press, 1996) 2. 
 
109  Placher, Domestication, 2-3. 
 77 
 
 
Starting with the late seventeenth century and leading to the present, several philosophical 
and theological perspectives precipitated by the Cartesian / Lockean paradigm can be 
identified that influenced and shaped intellectual trends and the future of a theistic 
worldview.  Rationalism, empiricism, idealism, materialism, and ultimately philosophical 
naturalism, the fruit of the Enlightenment project and its ideals, all contributed to the 
eventual fall of the prevailing authoritarian culture and ushered in modernity and the 
movement toward what has come to be called a secular culture.  This period is 
characterized by Enlightenment thought and represents a progressive move toward a 
radical naturalism, one devoid of divine intervention and relevance.    
John Locke and Evidentialism 
 With pre-modern tradition no longer considered a reliable source for modern 
knowledge and wisdom, the inescapable cultural agenda became apparent.  Essentially, it 
consisted of two basic questions to which Locke addressed his epistemic efforts, ‘how do 
we go about deciding what to believe?’ and ‘how do we conduct our understandings?’110  
Locke, of course, did not realize it at the time, but what he was devising would shape and 
direct not only Christian theism’s defense strategies, but a scheme for modern thought for 
the next three hundred years.  Nicholas Wolterstorff’s penetrating analysis of Locke offers 
valuable insight into the early stages of his knowledge theory.  Locke’s unique 
contribution to the growth of modern thought was, according to Wolterstorff, the 
introduction of an ethical aspect to the pursuit of knowledge and belief.
111
  Whereas 
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Descartes established a new cognitive structure by revising the boundaries and ground 
rules for proper epistemic analytical reflection, Locke added the governing aspect of 
oughtness, the ethics of belief, for imperative participation and culpability. 
 Locke, argues Wolterstorff, was the first to develop and defend the thesis that we 
are all responsible for our beliefs, and that to do one’s duty with respect to one’s beliefs 
one must listen to the voice of Reason rather than that of tradition.  Tradition, after all, says 
Locke, “is filled with error” and should not be considered the bar of truth for the 
elimination of falsehood.
112
  In all things Reason was to be the guide.  More so than 
Descartes, “Locke was the great genius behind our modern ways of thinking of rationality 
and responsibility in beliefs.”113  Locke’s epistemology was his response to the 
cultural crisis of the day.  He introduced to the modern Western world that belief, 
particularly religious belief, must first be rational and to be rational a belief must be 
supported by evidence.  Wolterstorff has termed Locke’s axiom the “evidentialist 
challenge.”114  What he did, in effect, “was take the classical foundationalist demands that 
Descartes had laid for scientific belief and lay them down for rational belief in general.”115 
 The problem, however, was that rationality needed to be defined and criteria for 
right belief established.  If the goal was to be rational, then parameters for rational belief 
needed to be set.  No area of belief was left exempt and unexamined.  Given the historical 
context and the skeptical view regarding biblical dogma and authority, theism, particularly 
biblical theism, also needed to meet the rational (evidential) standard.  With such a strong 
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view of rationality and rational belief it was imperative that standards be set that would 
qualify the evidence.  
 Locke met the epistemological challenge for evidence with a proposal that would 
govern the belief forming faculty.  His formulation consisted of three principles, which, 
applied in succession, would lead to certainty, or knowledge.  When confronted with a 
proposition for belief one must first begin with satisfactory evidence.  The principle of 
evidence requires the acquisition of “evidence for and against the proposition such that 
each item of evidence is something that one knows and such that the totality of one’s 
evidence is satisfactory.”116  Once satisfactory evidence is secured, that evidence 
determines the “probability” of the proposition, which is the second principle.  The third 
principle then, the “principle of appraisal,” “examines the (satisfactory) evidence one has 
collected so as to determine its evidential force, until one has ‘perceived’ what is the 
probability of the proposition on that evidence.”117 
 The ultimate goal for Locke was to address the issue of proper, or rational, belief 
and determine a method of assurance that would counter the enthusiasts and the notion that 
“anything goes.”  What belief is one justified in having?  Underlying Locke’s theory was 
the idea of possession.  The evidentialist challenge consisted in possessing the proper 
beliefs: “Some beliefs we ought not to have.  Some we ought to have.  Some we are 
permitted to have.  Some we are permitted not to have.”118  Propositions with proper 
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evidence call for obligatory belief, and beliefs without proper evidence call for obligatory 
dismissal.  
 Locke’s view was persuasive enough to influence epistemology for the entire 
modern era down to the present day.  The fruit of Locke’s work is abundant and his 
disciples are plentiful.  The now famous comment by W.K. Clifford “To sum up, it is 
wrong always, everywhere, and for anyone, to believe anything upon insufficient 
evidence” is a clear commitment to Locke’s principles.119  Bertrand Russell, the renowned 
twentieth century philosopher, was emphatic with his proclamation that there is not enough 
evidence to justify belief in God.
120
  And Brand Blanchard in his Gifford Lecture series is 
unambiguous about the ethical character of belief when he comments, “everywhere and 
always belief has an ethical aspect…There is such a thing as a general ethics of the 
intellect.”121  Thus, for Locke, the right kind of beliefs must be in place, those that can be 
justified in a particular way.   
Toward the Natural 
 With its new found epistemic tools in hand, modernity was equipped to repair the 
disintegrating knowledge structure and construct a new methodology independent of the 
authority of tradition.  Beliefs would now be tested by an objective standard.  The breach 
between the new scientia and the old authority gradually became more apparent with key 
proponents emerging. 
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 Historian, Peter Gay, has noted that though characteristic Enlightenment ideas 
existed long before, they achieved their revolutionary force only in the eighteenth century.  
The era had a history with overlapping closely associated generations of philosophes each 
drawing from the work of its predecessors.  With the work of Newton and Locke at the 
foundation, Montesquieu and Voltaire represented the first group, Hume, Rousseau, and 
Diderot, the second, and Lessing, Kant, and Jefferson the third.
122
  These were the 
dominant figures, but by no means an exhaustive accounting.  It was the work of the 
second group, says Gay, “who fused the fashionable anticlericalism and scientific 
speculations of the first generation into a coherent modern view of the world.”123  Of these, 
Newton, Locke, Hume, and Kant are of particular interest here.  
       In addition to Descartes’ scientia and Locke’s concern for credible belief, the 
scientific work of Newton, a contemporary of Locke, and the empiricists posed major 
challenges for philosophy and theism.  Scientific achievements were soon translated into a 
mechanistic and materialistic world view through literary works that captured the attention 
of the educated public.  With the impetus of enlightened modernity this new world view 
progressed to become the paradigm for all human knowledge.  Scholarly disciplines had to 
be ‘scientific’ in order to be acceptable.  Science defined what was reasonable and, 
therefore, true on the grounds of Lockean foundationalism.      
 With the work of Newton, Descartes, and Locke firmly in place, it did not take long 
until the basic tenets of traditional theism, particularly the doctrine of creation and the 
traditional authority of the Bible, were openly attacked.  Any view not in compliance with 
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the strictures of the new science was precluded from the category of what was reasonable.  
So-called religions, such as historic Christian theism, would only be acceptable if it met 
the standards of the natural.  Foundationalism led thinkers to make a sharp distinction 
between “natural” religion—those beliefs that were thought to be demonstrable by 
reason—and ‘revealed’ religion—the beliefs and doctrines taught by the Bible and held by 
faith.   
 What soon evolved, following natural philosophy, was a form of natural theology, 
Deism, which supported the idea of universal beliefs determined by rational deduction and 
a common ground underlying various cultural and religious practices.
124
  With natural 
theology, the rationalism of the Enlightenment found an acceptable alternative to biblical 
theism that would also satisfy the critical enlightened mind.  By the end of the seventeenth 
century it was apparent that a shift in the relationship between revelation and reason was 
occurring.             
 Though Locke’s epistemology was heavily directed by the power of natural reason, 
it still allowed for special divine revelation.  Jeffrey Stout points out that the Deists’ even 
stronger emphasis on reason undermined Locke and granted reason a more significant role, 
such that only those tenets of traditional theology that could be established independent of 
special revelation ought to be accepted.
125
  Thus, what was considered reasonable became 
the criterion and ultimate arbiter for acceptable theological belief.  Rational demonstration 
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was the only acceptable evidence for biblical credibility.  Theologian, Hans Frei, 
anticipates the implications of this position when he comments, “[o]nce the Deist raised 
the question for external evidence for revelation the status of factuality for the meaning of 
revelation became a permanent item on the agenda of religious argument.”126  With Deism, 
the formidable place of a divine authoritative scripture became questionable and 
confidence in Locke’s original program, which included a place for special revelation, was 
shaken.   
 Deists, considering themselves part of the Christian tradition, raised two key issues, 
according to Frei, that would fan the apologetic flame and be the precursor for greater 
changes to come.  The first was whether the very idea of historical revelation was even 
intelligible.  Why God would reveal himself to only a small faction of the human race 
seemed odd when truth and human happiness could be attained through rational reflection.  
The second issue questioned the likelihood of whether such a thing as special revelation 
had actually taken place.  How well attested are the biblical accounts, especially the 
miracle claims, they contested?  The naturalism of the ‘scientific age’ and the weight of 
David Hume’s skepticism would eventually cast doubt on their reliability.127 
 Though natural theology was devised to support the Christian worldview, its 
general approach stirred loss of confidence in the idea of special revelation.
128
  Locke’s 
earlier work The Reasonableness of Christianity, followed later by William Paley’s (1743-
1805) Natural Theology, were both attempts to establish the credibility of Christian theism 
                                                          
126  Hans Frei, The Eclipse of Biblical Narrative (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1974) 138. 
 
127  Frei, The Eclipse, 52-53. 
 
128 Deists were not anti-Christian or outright skeptics.  Their intent was to divest the Christian religion of meaningless 
notions such as the ‘mystery’ of revelation.  See Frei’s, Eclipse, 117. 
 
 84 
 
to the Deists apart from special revelation, through appeal to demonstrable evidence and 
natural reason.  Locke’s work in particular argued that “a good deal of the content of 
revelation lies within the reach of our unaided natural faculties.”129  Paley, building on 
Locke’s empiricism, proposed an argument justifying belief in God by appealing to the 
apparent evidence of design found in the universe.  He, like every other English-speaking 
thinker of the era, displayed an implicit trust in empirical investigation to accurately mirror 
reality.  
 The work of the Deists fueled the evidentialist challenge—that rational beliefs must 
be justified by sufficient demonstrable evidence.  But the most significant development 
was to come during the eighteenth century with philosophers David Hume and Immanuel 
Kant.  The work of these two giants was another key factor that undermined the credibility 
of biblical theism.  Their effect on theism and theology cannot be overstated.  The defense 
of the credibility of the Bible against naturalism and the demand for evidence faced a 
radical new challenge.  Following Hume and Kant, the apologetic methods of Paley, and 
others such as Blaise Pascal (1623-1662) and Joseph Butler (1692-1752) would no longer 
be intellectually acceptable.       
No Access to the Transcendent 
 The Deists asked the question whether special revelation of God had actually taken 
place.  Hume and Kant asked the more basic question, whether knowledge of God and a 
transcendent realm was even possible.  Though different in approach, their conclusions 
were the same.  And while not willing to deny the existence of God, their work, explicating 
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their answer to knowledge question, has left a legacy of skepticism down to the present 
day.   
 Theologian, Ron Nash, critically assesses the impact of Hume and Kant on 
Christian theism in his work The Word of God and the Mind of Man.  In it he speaks of the 
‘gap’ caused by David Hume and the ‘wall’ created by Immanuel Kant, both metaphors 
indicating their effect on epistemology.
130
  Hume’s major threat to Christian theism, argues 
Nash, was not from the theories for which he gained notoriety, that is, his views on theistic 
arguments and miracles, but his undermining its claims to knowledge and objective truth.  
“Hume’s gap is the rejection of the possibility of a rational knowledge of God and 
objective religious truth,” thus continuing Descartes’ effort of divorcing faith and 
knowledge.
131
   
 For Hume, beliefs are not determined by rational reflection, but rather, by instinct, 
habit, and custom.  These experiences, which are essentially non-rational, lead us to 
believe in an external world.  Reason has no power of persuasion toward a position of faith 
based on knowledge.  Too much emphasis had been placed on reason and philosophers had 
been entirely too optimistic when assessing its claims, thus also undermining Locke and 
the Deists.
132
  Hume was clearing the ground, as it were, for the construction of a new 
edifice in the intellectual metropolis.  His success in decimating empiricism stirred the 
architectonic intellect of Kant. 
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 Not willing to accept Hume’s skepticism, Kant, like Descartes earlier, set out to 
make room for knowledge.  His system for acquiring knowledge places the human mind as 
the formulator of the external world.  The mind is structured to categorize experience and 
this gives knowledge its form and structure.  The altering effect of the mind has the 
unfortunate consequence of causing a radical disjunction between the world as it appears 
(and is known) and the world as it really is.  Since the mind mediates and edits the sense 
data from the external world by its categories of understanding, the real world (the 
noumenal) is never contacted.  All that can be known is the phenomenal world, the world 
known by the senses.  That which is in the noumenal realm (the metaphysical) is forever 
unattainable.  Reason is restricted to the world of sense experience.  Only the phenomenal 
can be known and since God is by definition not a possible object of sense experience, but 
transcends the mind’s categories, God, therefore, is unknowable.   
 Kant’s system, says Nash, “had the effect of erecting a wall between the world as it 
appears to us and the world as it really is…Hume had his Gap: Kant had his Wall.”133  
God, for Kant, is cognitively both unknown and unknowable.
134
  If Christian theology was 
led astray by Enlightenment thought, then Kant applied the blindfold.  
 With his distinction between the noumenal, to which human access was denied, and 
the phenomenal, Kant believed he was making room for faith.  Reason dealt with the facts 
of sense experience while engagement with God was not an item for factual consideration 
with respect to proof or disproof, but a matter of faith.  Reason functioned within the realm 
of certainty, and faith with those things of an intuitive nature, thus further dividing any 
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perceived compatibility between natural science and Christian theology.
135
  Kant’s 
transcendental categories were so convincing for modern thought that they have been a 
virtual insurmountable obstacle for metaphysics to overcome.
136
    
 Critical of this bifurcation, theologian, Trevor Hart, accurately assesses its 
implications when he says, “This distinction effectively removed theology from the sphere 
in which rational discourse and argument is deemed appropriate.”137  Theologian, Gordon 
Kaufman, and his imaginative construction of God is a contemporary example of the effect 
of Kant’s wall and a representative of Hart’s point.  For Kaufman, “God is mysterious and 
beyond all human knowing.”138  The only possible way of any reflection on the idea of 
God is through “the mind’s supreme imaginative construct.”139  God is not known 
cognitively, but only through the non-rational faculty of the community imagination in 
history.  In Kaufman’s view, comments Hans Frei, it is the task of philosophical theology, 
through the academy, to adduce “the underlying criteria of meaningfulness and universality 
that would justify the deployment of this type of concept.”140 The two functions of the 
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concept ‘God,’ for Kaufman, thus “are the relativizing and the humanizing of the 
world.”141  
 George Lindbeck takes Hart’s thought a step further by pinpointing the basic 
problem with Kant’s epistemology.  Kant, explains Lindbeck, paved the way for the 
experiential tradition in theology by his “demolishing the metaphysical and 
epistemological foundations of the earlier regnant cognitive-propositional views.”142  Kant 
left no access to God.  Lindbeck further argues that Kant left religion impoverished, and 
Friedrich Schleiermacher (1768-1834) filled the breach with what he called “the feeling of 
absolute dependence,” but the new ideas would be given a variety of different names as the 
tradition developed.
143
   
An Alternative Theism 
 One of the new names for Christian theism associated with the effect of Kant and 
Schleiermacher is liberal Christianity.   With rational access to the noumenal closed by 
Kant, Schleiermacher pursued a new avenue for Christian theism and apologetic 
expression.  Reacting in part to the dogmatic emphasis of the day and to romanticism, 
Schleiermacher’s focus on the idea of religion was as an anthropocentric activity of the 
emotions.
144
  Religion, for Schleiermacher, was more than a reductionism of knowing (per 
German philosopher, Christian Wolff, Kant’s predecessor) and doing (Kant’s ethical 
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emphasis).
145
  The essence of religion, he argues, is “feeling” and “Christian doctrines are 
accounts of the Christian religious affections set forth in speech.”146  J.K.S. Reid, with 
Christian apologetics in mind, says that Schleiermacher “deflects theological thought into a 
new and uncharted channel.”147  Whether his later interpreters understood him correctly or 
not, he became identified in a practical way with religion as feeling as opposed to religion 
as doctrinal propositions.
148
  With Schleiermacher, theism moved away from the pursuit of 
rational justification for theistic belief and embraced a subjective and intuitive 
awareness—a move into non-cognitivism.     
 Reflecting his theology, Schleiermacher’s apologetic approach was to persuade 
religion’s “cultured despisers” (the young romanticists and intellectuals of Germany) that 
true religion is a matter of universal human “feeling” and has little to do with dogma and 
even rational thought.  He represented liberation from outmoded authoritarian dogmatics, 
favoring a truly modern form of Christian faith that appealed to the modern secular culture 
without conflicting with science.
149
  This was a type of fideism—where no rational defense 
of the worldview is offered, but rather is supported with arbitrary intuitive principles.  
Schleiermacher’s fideism represented an overt move away from direct confrontation with 
modernity’s intellectual advances in favor of a position not attempting a support with 
rational proof.   
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 With the theological views of Schleiermacher, the center of Christian theism 
progressively moved away from a transcendent view of God and more toward an 
immanentism and a focus on the subject rather than an objective metaphysics.  Though the 
eclipse of rationalism was pending, the movement toward a more consistent naturalistic 
philosophy and theology was on course.  Schleiermacher’s emphasis on human experience 
embodying the essence of divine revelation and manifestation propelled subjective 
theology to the more radical views of Ludwig Feuerbach (1804-1872).  
 Feuerbach, Hegel’s student, inverted the view of his professor and maintained that 
the infinite is in reality a projection of the finite.  As a result, he changed the deterministic 
idealism of Hegel to a humanistic materialism.  What Feuerbach implemented for his 
‘theology’ Karl Marx adapted to history as a whole.  His materialism emphasized the 
naturalistic movement from being to becoming without Hegel’s Absolute Spirit and placed 
man’s temporal life at the center of the process.150  The idealism of Hegel was turned 
upside down allowing the mind of God to become synonymous with the mind of humanity. 
 Humanity, for Feuerbach, was the central point of natural process.  He proclaimed, 
“I, on the contrary while reducing theology to anthropology, exalt anthropology into 
theology.”151  The effect of this maneuver, in keeping with modern Enlightenment thinking 
and a progression towards naturalism, is a materialistic view of humanity.  For Feuerbach, 
“Man has his highest being, his God, in himself; in his essential nature, his species.”152  
Thus, with the undermining of biblical anthropology by naturalistic anthropology, 
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naturalism achieved its goal of proclaiming divine intervention and even divine existence 
irrelevant and unnecessary.  Feuerbach inverted the Creator / creature relationship and 
transformed theology into anthropology, making theology a mere projection.  The divine 
attributes became idealizations of human aspirations and capacities.  Thus, the next step, 
Friedrich Nietzsche’s proclamation “[t]he most important of more recent events—that ‘god 
is dead,’ that the belief in the Christian God has become unworthy of belief—already 
begins to cast its first shadows over Europe,” was a relatively simple move.153  
 With the preponderance of philosophical developments from the time of Locke, an 
epistemological consensus regarding the place of theistic beliefs that were once shared in 
the Western world rapidly deteriorated.  In addition, the belief in metaphysics as a 
transcendent reality that governed the affairs of the world fell under serious criticism.  The 
new philosophic knowledge inspired by Hume’s skepticism, Kant’s phenomenalism, 
Hegel’s dialectic, as well as the subjectivism of the religion theorists, Schleiermacher, and 
Feuerbach, called into question the truth claims of a variety of Christian theistic beliefs.  
The belief in miracles, the creation of mankind and the world, the literal reading of the 
Bible as the authoritative word of God, the hope of life after death with rewards and 
punishments, heaven and hell, conscience as the inner voice of God, the sacrificial death 
and resurrection of Jesus Christ, were replaced with a naturalistic explanation.  In brief, 
beliefs that had not been questioned for centuries were now under the scrutiny of higher 
criticism and the enlightened intellect of modernity. 
 So predominant in the history of Western thought is the work of Hume and Kant 
that Nancey Murphy has convincingly argued that in the wake of Hume’s skepticism two 
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major philosophical and theological trajectories emerged that further impacted 
epistemological developments.  In reaction to Hume, two separate traditions developed 
following either Kant or Scottish philosopher, Thomas Reid (1710-1796).  From Kant’s 
reaction came Schleiermacher and the Christian liberal tradition that followed.  From Reid, 
a contemporary of Hume and Kant, came Old Princeton theology and the American 
conservative evangelical tradition.
154
  Reid, building on Butler and Paley, challenged 
Hume’s skepticism with his ‘Common Sense Realism.’  Wolterstorff notes that Reid 
viewed Hume as continuing the crisis of faith and action caused by Descartes’ proposed 
solution to the crisis he had identified.  He was readily aware that Descartes introduced the 
‘way of ideas’ and Locke and Hume followed them.155   
 Kant’s idealism and Reid’s realism, being diametrically opposed, forced a 
division.
156
  This split, explains Murphy, has been exacerbated by the philosophical 
developments of modern thought and is primarily responsible for the present divisions in 
Protestant Christianity.
157
  Each approach sought to develop and appropriate their own 
unique theological agendas.  Liberal theology constructed a view of the immanence of God 
and revelation, “not as an intrusion, but as a correlative to human discovery and God 
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disclosing himself through human means and processes.”158  Conservatives built their 
understanding on belief in the intervening work of God through special revelation, which 
conveys authoritative information about human and divine realities.  It is the Bible and not 
experience that functions, for conservatives, as the data for theology.
159
 
 With the redirection in theology, prompted by Hume, Kant, and Schleiermacher, 
came a different method for appropriating the Christian worldview.  Christian liberalism, 
following Schleiermacher’s lead, addressed the cultural application of Christian theism 
through a reconstruction of the Christian worldview accommodating it to a growing 
secularism.  Liberalism’s theological, as well as apologetic, method was designed around 
the experience of ‘the believing subject’ as the ultimate criterion and subject matter for 
theology.  Conservatives on the other hand, standing with traditional orthodoxy, rejected 
this approach in favor of objective authoritative propositions about God and the world as 
the ultimate criterion for theology.  Both liberal and conservative theologies, Murphy 
contends, have shared the assumptions of modernity.  Neither strategy was able to avoid 
the powerful influence of modernity and epistemological foundationalism.  The image of a 
structure with an immovable foundation was too appealing.  They have both constructed 
their theologies on a theory of knowledge that justifies belief to a foundation.
160
  
 The distinction between liberal and conservative theology has essentially been their 
respective choice of foundations—universal experience for liberals and the Scripture for 
conservatives.  Murphy appeals to Old Princeton theologians, Charles and A.A. Hodge, as 
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well as A.H. Strong, all greatly influential in the American evangelical movement, for 
support of her view.  On the liberal side, Schleiermacher is her selection pointing to his use 
of the ‘awareness of absolute dependence,’ common to all religions and available in 
principle to all people, as his foundational experience.  She contends that an attempt to 
show that the Christian Bible “is in fact the expected revelation…Conservative apologetics 
from Locke’s day to the present have attempted to shore up the basement…for a 
foundationalist use of Scripture.”161  Instead of a universal that is derived from experience, 
the conservative approach placed an inerrant and infallible Bible as the epistemic 
foundation.  Both of these foundations would prove to be inadequate in the face of Kantian 
metaphysics. 
 Murphy’s conclusions affirm that both liberal and conservative theologies and 
apologetic methods appropriated the assumptions of modernity.
162
  She has also concluded 
that the appropriation of Christianity, constructed on the foundationalism of modernity, has 
been ineffective in its challenge of naturalism.  The next chapter will illustrate how 
naturalism usurped the role of guiding light to the nations once held by theism.        
Summary 
 The progression delineated above shows some of the critical philosophical 
developments related to modernity’s making of religion.  It begins in the world of the early 
seventeenth century with Descartes’ ‘flight from authority’ and ends in the mid-nineteenth 
century with Feuerbach’s ‘deified humanity’ culminating in the marginalization of 
Christian theism and the birth of a new naturalistic view of the world.  During this period, 
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biblical authority is supplanted by a new sense of the proper use of reason and the 
confident optimism of Baconian science reaching fruition.  Enlightenment ideals, and 
specifically epistemic foundationalism as a key distinctive of modernity, have been 
identified and explored.  Certainty was now believed to be found in universal norms or 
standards for truth, which could be determined either empirically (Locke), with 
uninterpreted sensations, or rationally (Descartes), with logically unchallengeable, self-
evident first truths, and accessible by all rational thinkers.  The idea of special revelation, 
scripture from God, was considered superfluous.  The Enlightenment dream of a universal 
standard of rationality, a single method for determining what is true and what is false, and 
universally acceptable common ground for conversation, are Enlightenment ideals of 
modernity rooted in epistemic foundationalism ushered in and offered the segue for a 
naturalistic view of culture and the universe.   
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Chapter 4 
THE MODERN DECLINE OF CHRISTIAN THEISM AND THE RISE  
OF NATURALISM 
With the philosophical precursors having already paved the way, the greatest 
opposition to Christian theism and the idea of religion in general in the latter part of the 
nineteenth century came from the philosophical outlook that emerged from the natural 
sciences.  The naturalistic view of the world, as outlined in the previous chapters, defined 
and informed the on-going philosophical and theological debate that has extended into the 
twentieth-first century.  Whether explicit or assumed, a theory of knowledge was employed 
by modern philosophers of naturalism as well as by their critics.  Epistemological 
foundationalism and its requirement for empirical evidence continued to function as the 
exclusive theory of knowledge for modernity as well as for all challenges to modernity’s 
steady movement toward a naturalistic view during this period.      
 Conservative Western theologians, claiming to place their belief in the ultimate 
authority of the Bible and disdaining any type of natural theology, were no less immersed 
in the subtleties of the prevailing evidentialist belief structure of the era.  Natural science, 
promoting itself as neutral with respect to metaphysics, was not, however, exempt from 
also employing the same theory of knowledge to achieve its desired ends.  The Cartesian / 
Lockean epistemology of modernity served natural science’s purposes well.  Additionally, 
the emerging secular ethos, constructed on a foundation of natural science, had shaped the 
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cultural consciousness, including conservative theology, by solidifying a common 
monolithic epistemology for analytical inquiry and reflection.
163
  
 By this time the self-evident outlook of the once dominant theistic view had been 
severely challenged and forced into a defensive position.  While Christian theism was not 
yet a minority view, it nonetheless, could no longer be assumed as the normative view.  
Theism’s arguments from miracles and prophecies, the wisdom of God in creation, and the 
analogy between nature and Scripture continued to be employed.  But these arguments, 
predicated on the ostensible evidence for an intelligent designer or an appeal to ‘common 
facts’ of experience as theistic proof, were no longer convincing.  
The Maturation of Naturalism     
 Naturalism emerged as a plausible alternative interpretive scheme—one based on 
the Baconian scientific method—and ultimately presented itself as the exclusive view of 
modernity.  Facing the challenge, traditional theistic defensive strategies proved 
themselves deficient and inadequate to overcome the momentum of the new science and 
the inevitable naturalistic outlook.  The overwhelming strength of this movement initiated 
a radical reassessment of the viability of those strategies.   
As mentioned above, while the relationship between science and theism has been a 
debated topic for at least the past two centuries, several views have prevailed depicting the 
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two as mortal enemies, friendly allies, or somewhere in between.  But if a poll were taken 
today, the average person both inside and outside of academia would, most likely, side 
with those who sense a tension.  Militaristic adjectives such as conflict, warfare, battle, and 
weapons have been common terminology in writings describing the relationship.  Given 
that each affirms a different conception of ultimate reality, it would be hard to view in any 
other way.   
Two of the most famous past promoters of the conflict, John W. Draper (1811-
1882) and Andrew Dickson White (1832-1918), tended to magnify the tension that did 
exist, nurturing at least the perception of warfare.  Draper, son of a Methodist minister and 
member of the science faculty of New York University, stated that “[t]he ecclesiastic must 
learn to keep himself within the domain he has chosen” and that “[r]eligion must relinquish 
that imperious, that domineering position which she has so long maintained against 
Science.”164  Draper’s scathing sentiment was principally directed at the Roman Catholic 
Church for its repressive treatment of scientific achievement, though it was intended for 
Protestants as well.   
White, professor of history at Cornell, echoed Draper’s attitude and was no less 
adversarial with his assessment.  In his A History of the Warfare of Science with Theology 
in Christendom he wrote the following, 
More and more I saw that it was the conflict between two epochs in the 
evolution in human thought—the theological and the scientific….an 
evolution, indeed, in which the warfare of theology against science has been 
one of the most active and powerful agents.
165
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Since this project is about the rise of philosophical naturalism and the marginalization of 
theism and, therefore, prima facie confrontational, the attention here will be directed at the 
conflict between the two.  If understood from the conservative Christian apologist’s 
perspective, it is hard to conceive of the relationship at the end of the nineteenth century as 
anything other than one of conflict.  Of course, even that proposition is predicated on how 
science is defined and understood as well.  Though some scientists and even historians 
(e.g. White) objected to a ‘religious’ view having any influence on the natural sciences, the 
objective here will be to explore why many conservative Christian theists came to view 
science, at least the variety that was propounded during the last half of the nineteenth 
century, as a threat and how they responded.  It is worth noting, however, that not all 
conservative theologians were opposed to the naturalistic theory of evolution in total.  For 
example, Benjamin Warfield (1851-1921) and Augustus Strong (1836-1921), both 
Americans, and James Orr (1844-1913), a Scotsman, all eminent Protestant theologians, 
saw nothing problematic with the theory and adopted some version of it.   
 Whereas the eighteenth century proclaimed freedom from ecclesiastical authority in 
the name of enlightened reason, the nineteenth century produced a viable system for 
interpreting experience and the world apart from any kind of theism or divine revelation 
and, thus, marginalized Christian theism even further within the trend toward modern 
secularization.  Clearly, the tendency of modernity was to distance itself from divine 
necessity.  The theistic hypothesis, proclaimed Pierre Simon Laplace (1749-1827), was 
indeed no longer needed.  Laplace helped substantiate this position with his nebular 
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hypothesis for the origin of the universe, which precluded God as the necessary first 
cause.
166
    
This new developing tradition, or secular view of the world, was permeated with 
optimism.  John Draper enthusiastically expounds on the virtues of the new perspective 
with these comments; 
  
The ecclesiastical spirit no longer inspires the policy of the world…The 
intellectual night which settled on Europe, in consequence of that great 
neglect of duty, is passing away; we live in the daybreak of better things.  
Society is anxiously expecting light, to see in what direction it is drifting.  It 
plainly discerns that the track along which the voyage of civilization has 
thus far been made, has been left; and that a new departure, on an unknown 
sea, has been taken.
167
 
 
Draper’s attitude was not unique but was representative of much of the academic 
mentality.  Christian theism rapidly lost its position of authority concerning creation, the 
nature of mankind, and the doctrine of sin and was beginning to feel the undercurrents 
stemming from the new developments in the academy.   
The line drawn by Descartes and Locke between faith and reason now also 
extended to natural science and specifically Christian theism.  Effectively, it was faith and 
theology relegated to one domain, as Draper had demanded, and reason and science to 
another.  The result of this move, says Frederick Gregory, “was to redefine the domain and 
prerogatives of religion in such a way that scientific explanations did not clash with 
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religious expression.”168  With this understanding, gaining knowledge of the physical 
world was perceived to be an objective endeavor and did not involve a religious 
dimension.
169
  The product of scientific investigation was believed to be value neutral 
‘brute facts’ and its success perpetuated the faith / knowledge dichotomy reminiscent of 
Kant’s ‘wall.’  Undoubtedly, the fruition of this development led to Martin Marty’s 
observation that secularization took place through a peaceful separation of ‘religious areas’ 
from the secular and scientific.  The harmonious coexistence continued as long as true 
science was always the base of proof for true religion.
170
   
Moreover, theology, pressed by concerns of relevancy stemming from the influence 
of Protestant scholasticism and the positive move by the new science, offered an 
accommodating alternative with the work of Schleiermacher.  While the theological 
ingenuity of Schleiermacher refused to be bound by a doctrinaire concept of nature, his 
insight was both poignant and prophetic when he wrote; 
The further elaboration of the doctrine of creation in dogmatics comes down 
to us from times when material even for natural science was taken from the 
Scriptures and when the elements of all higher knowledge lay hidden in 
theology.  Hence the complete separation of these two involves our handing 
over this subject to natural science, which, carrying its researches backward 
into time, may lead us back to the forces and masses that formed the world, 
or even further still.
171
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By this statement Schleiermacher affirms an authoritative position for natural science in 
theological inquiry concerning origins and the nature of humanity.  That special revelation 
is the exclusive source for knowledge of origins was eclipsed by the growing belief in the 
autonomy of scientific investigation as the only valid interpreter of the world and not the 
Bible or any other so-called religious text.  Scientific historical criticism became the 
normative mode of inquiry for religious knowledge.  The higher critics implemented a type 
of empirical investigation to evaluate the credibility and trustworthiness of the biblical 
documents, which oftentimes conflicted with traditional Christian beliefs.  The dichotomy 
was being strengthened; the naturalistic view built on neutral brute facts in one category 
and contrary views would fall into the category of religion.     
In an attempt to “penetrate behind the concrete issues…to the underlying problems 
which exercised the major parties in the debates,” historian, John Dillenberger, has 
identified at least two achievements implicit in the new science that initiated the eclipse.
172
  
The first, says Dillenberger, is that “[a]ll aspects of faith or of revelation had finally to be 
as clear or as self-evident as the order of nature.”  It was this widely held assumption 
which gradually led to the demise of revelation as understood in its traditional form.  
Conservative theology failed to see the implications and did not rethink the concept of 
revelation, but merely continued their traditional methodologies for defending the 
credibility and veracity of the Bible.
173
  The second achievement, Dillenberger argues, was 
that the new science had in fact become a philosophy and he explains the effect in this 
way; 
                                                          
172 John Dillenberger, Protestant Thought And Natural Science: A Historical Interpretation (London: Collins Clear- type 
Press, 1960) 13. 
 
173 Dillenberger, Protestant Thought And Natural Science, 164. 
 
 103 
 
The achievement of the movement was that of bringing the ideas associated 
with the new science into a coherent world view and of popularizing the 
results.  Its task was that of organization and of interpretation.  The new 
ideas were brought into the orbit of a shared culture, and thereby indirectly 
into the orbit of the common man.
174
      
 
Science, as Schleiermacher had surmised, replaced scripture’s once exclusive right to the 
interpretation of nature.  A clear methodological principle for understanding revelation (in 
nature) had emerged with a philosophical direction to delineate the content of that 
revelation.  As a result, an entirely new tradition of reason and nature became a substitute 
for what was once considered the exclusive domain of special revelation.
175
 
But just exactly how objective is the inquiry of natural science was the question 
that some began to ask.  The position of neutrality by the naturalists was a thinly veiled 
cover-up—a misunderstanding of the true nature of science, it was argued.  Though they 
are often unrecognized, states British scientist C.A. Coulson, moral convictions are an 
integral aspect of the project of science.  In his Science and Christian Belief, Coulson 
comments that “science itself must be a religious activity.”176  Scientists are God’s heralds 
employed in the task of exposing God’s revelation of himself in nature and thus avoid “an 
unbearable dichotomy of experience.”177  When science is properly understood the fact that 
it is constructed on inherent religious presuppositions (a metaphysical scheme) becomes 
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readily apparent.  The legacy of science betraying its religious convictions include three 
assumptions; a search for common truth, the unexamined belief that facts are correlatable 
and cohere in a scheme, and a belief in the order and constancy in nature.  For Coulson, 
these assumptions are enough to carry science into the realm of metaphysics.
178
 
Dillenberger and Coulson were precursors, of sorts, to Thomas S. Kuhn and his 
monumental work, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions.  In his work Kuhn recognized 
and developed the theory-laden nature of natural science.  Phenomena are typically defined 
and interpreted in different ways depending on core beliefs and perspective.  Phenomena, 
says Kuhn, are interpreted by “some implicit body of intertwined theoretical and 
methodological belief that permits selection, evaluation, and criticism.”179  The interpretive 
enterprise presupposes and articulates a paradigm, and the operations and measurements of 
scientists are paradigm determined.
180
  Thus, the notion of value neutral science so ardently 
held by the Western epistemological tradition has been shown to be highly debatable, since 
the work of science is in fact predicated upon presuppositions, or core beliefs, regarding 
the nature of reality.  Kuhn, following the philosophical thought of the early twentieth 
century, will be discussed more in the next chapter.  How this understanding came about, 
and the related theistic apologetics, will be discussed in the following. 
While theism was losing its exclusive position in the Western world through the 
nineteenth century, American Christian conservatives, still wanting to hold to Locke’s 
vision, had until this time continued to view the Bible as authoritative for science and 
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history in spite of the growing move toward naturalistic explanations.  The Bible, for them, 
still had the authority to speak to science as well as to areas that science could not address.  
But what they did not quite understand was that the intellectual revolution in nineteenth 
century America, which resulted in scientific positivism, pragmatism, and historicism, also 
provided explanations that fit many social trends toward secularization.  Whether Christian 
conservatives were willing to accept it or not, the strength of the movement toward 
naturalism and modern secularization was against them. 
 In spite of the incriminating speculative geologies of Charles Lyell (1797-1875) 
and James Hutton (1726-1797), science and biblical theism were relatively compatible 
until the scientific revolution associated with biologist, Charles Darwin (1809-1882).  An 
alternate explanation for the apparent order and purpose in reality, other than the 
cosmological argument from design, was now available.  The raw data acquired from 
empirical investigation, the naturalists argued, could be understood best in terms of 
mechanistic natural forces.  Explanations of a ‘plan of creation’ or ‘unity of design,’ 
according to Darwin, provided no actual information but merely served to hide 
ignorance.
181
  Darwin’s intention was to promote a positivist epistemology that limited 
science to mechanistic explanations.  His rejection of special creation, explains Neal 
Gillespie, “was part of the transformation of biology into a positive science, one committed 
to thoroughly naturalistic explanations based on material causes and the uniformity of 
nature.”182   
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 The Bible, as well as theism in general, was no longer viewed as a necessary 
component for accurate assessment in the phenomenal realm and, therefore, what was 
believed to be neutral, scientific methodology, with the help of talented exponents, Ernst 
Haeckel (1834-1919) and Thomas H. Huxley (1825-95), turned its forces directly against 
Christian theistic thought.
183
  The learner, says popularizer Huxley, needs to “seek for truth 
not among words but among things.”184  “Moreover this scientific ‘criticism of life,’ 
appeals not to authority, nor to what anybody may have thought or said, but to nature.”185  
Huxley’s prophetic utterances characterized the growing philosophical perspective and 
movement toward the replacement of a theological interpretation of the world with a 
naturalistic and secular one. 
Philosophy, science, and theology were all unavoidably involved in the pervasive 
influence of Darwin’s, The Origin of Species.  By 1859, the date of Origin’s publication, 
the way forward had already been philosophically prepared and the spirit of the times was 
receptive to Darwin’s ideas.  The philosophical development was instrumental in ushering 
in the empirical climate to receive the evolution hypothesis.  Hegel’s immanentistic 
developmentalism accompanied by Feuerbach’s denial of the Creator / creation distinction 
and total rejection of a transcendent reality were both timely developments ushering the 
way for Darwin’s speculative theory.  
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What was still needed, however, for the world to be better understood in 
naturalistic terms, was a system to integrate philosophy and science into a comprehensive 
system.  Though some forms of philosophical and scientific evolution existed prior to 
Darwin, there was no plausible system explaining how it takes place.  Darwin simply 
provided the naturalistic mechanism to the anti-transcendent processes already at work in 
speculative philosophy and theology.  Darwin and Alfred R. Wallace (1823-1913) posed 
natural selection, or as it is commonly described, survival of the fittest, as the missing 
mechanism.  In November of 1859, their position was made public in, The Origin of 
Species.  As a result, within a decade, evolution became the accepted scientific orthodoxy.  
Naturalistic evolution, originally devised by Darwin to interpret his biological data, 
became the all-encompassing system by which numerous aspects of the universe could be 
explained. 
The indomitable force of Darwinism soon transcended its biological beginnings 
and, as Dillenberger has noted, took upon itself the makings of a philosophical worldview.  
Huxley already understood his role as the champion of naturalistic evolution proposing 
“the application of scientific methods of investigation to all the problems of life.”186  
Another popularizer, Herbert Spencer (1820-1903), working in conjunction with Huxley, 
promoted Darwinism to the masses through the social sciences.  It was largely through 
Spencer that Darwinism reached the person on the street.  Spencer applied the Darwinian 
struggle for existence to every sphere of life.  The power of the evolutionary process 
convinced him that nature ought not to be interfered with, and, therefore, he ought to 
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oppose state education, poor laws, and housing reform.
187
  Societies were viewed as 
organisms and social adaptation amid group struggle was the key to its survival.  If 
humanity has evolved from animals, then it could be analyzed in biological categories. 
The areas of acceptance increased.  Not only did scientists entertain the plausibility 
of naturalistic evolution and its implications for all the sciences, but it drew the attention of 
biblical theologians as well.  As the comprehensive concept of naturalism and evolution 
enlarged its circle of influence, it became clear that it was more than a biological theory.  
The broader implications expressed in the interpretation of scientific data led to serious 
concerns from the Christian community.  Naturalism’s inherent features presented 
themselves as principles for explaining the cause of existence, principles which the 
Christian tradition had claimed exclusive rights to for centuries.  These were all worldview 
issues, rooted in presuppositions, and Christian theologians were not prepared or equipped 
to address them effectively.  Consequently, the response to the new science and naturalism 
was hotly debated, leading to divisions in the Christian community not experienced since 
the sixteenth century. 
By the time of the publication of Darwin’s next work, The Descent of Man, in 
1871, the unacceptable implications of speculative evolution for traditional Christianity 
had become apparent.  To a large extent the issue had been reduced to the place of God 
within the naturalistic scheme, or if the God concept was even necessary at all.  While the 
Newtonian view of a mechanical universe had a place for a Creator, the Darwinian view 
conceived nature as an unfinished process, thereby, eliminating the need for a Creator.  
Pearcey and Thaxton explain, 
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By the end of the nineteenth century, mechanistic philosophy had become 
radically materialistic and reductionistic.  It pictured living things as 
automata in a world governed by rigidly deterministic laws—with no 
purpose, no God, no significance to human life.
188
 
 
Many recognized, through the successful efforts of Huxley, Spencer, Draper, and others, 
that the central doctrines of traditional Christian theism, the Genesis creation account, the 
nature of mankind, sin, the authority of the Bible, and even of God, were under serious 
attack.    
As the debate expanded into the theological realm, sides were taken.  Many just did 
not know how to deal with the concept of evolution and the naturalistic movement.  
Because presuppositions were involved that contained far-reaching theological 
implications, it was not easy to disentangle the various issues encountered.  Polemics, 
which preceded any apologetic activity, dominated the theological discussion and 
eventually led to divisions. 
With the exception of Benjamin Warfield and James Orr’s adoption of a modified, 
or ‘soft,’ view on evolution, conservative theologians, however, resisted any compromise 
to the claims of naturalism.  They did not concede that Christian theism involved only the 
aspects of things beyond scientific and historical inquiry.  The influential Presbyterian 
theologian, Charles Hodge (1797-1878) of Princeton, arose as one of the few apologists 
able to confront Darwinism.  Hodge, having studied the naturalists’ work, understood their 
position and narrowed the real issue to a matter of whether one believed in the intellectual 
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process guided by God or a material process ruled by chance.
189
  His understanding of the 
limitations of science was also apparent when he said, “science, as soon as she gets past 
the actual and the extant, is in the region of speculation, and is merged into philosophy, 
and is subject to its hallucinations.”190  His primary focus was on Darwin’s view of natural 
selection without design.  The idea that chance could generate design was, Hodge 
determined, rationally self-contradictory and, therefore, impossible.  The heralded 
champion for the conservative Christian community concluded his masterful argument 
with the comment, “the denial of design in nature is virtually the denial of God.”191 
Warfield’s adoption of evolution brought a great deal of credibility to the side of 
the new science.  Along with Warfield (Hodge’s successor at Princeton), Calvinists, Strong 
and Orr, also strengthened the position, but brought further division to the Christian 
community.  Warfield’s view of evolution, though modified, was, nonetheless, a form of 
evolution.  He attempts to soften his view when he comments, “[t]he upshot of the whole 
matter is that there is no necessary antagonism of Christianity to evolution, provided that 
we do not hold to too extreme a form of evolution.”192 
Warfield clearly wanted to hold an evolutionary view and maintain the sovereignty 
of God within the process.  James Orr, like Warfield, took a similar position when he 
remarked, “[o]n the general hypothesis of evolution, as applied to the organic world, I have 
nothing to say, except that, within certain limits, it seems to me extremely probable, and 
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supported by a large body of evidence.”193  Later in the same work he declared, “[w]e need 
not reject the hypothesis of evolution within the limits in which science has really rendered 
it probable.”194  
But, as Frederick Gregory has noted, conservatives in general failed to develop a 
positive theology that effectively dealt with the issue after Darwin.  As a result, attention 
increasingly shifted away from the conservative and evangelical groups and toward a more 
liberal treatment and acceptance of the evolutionary theory.
195
  This harmonious 
acceptance was not going totally unnoticed by Christian conservatives, however, but few 
were willing to take on the momentum that had begun.  Others were uninterested, 
believing that the Christian message would not or could not be affected by the changing 
scientific views.  Gregory comments; 
As the scientific revolution progressed and a compromise seemed 
inevitable, numerous middle positions appeared attempting to reconcile 
Christian faith with modern intellectual trends.  Three reconciliation views 
emerged.  The first view held that by importing evolution into theology, 
while it would change some things, would not alter orthodoxy substantially.  
Others were less concerned about maintaining traditional Christian doctrine, 
but more in favor of adapting doctrine to the changing times.  And still 
others made evolution the cornerstone of their theological perspective and 
Christian expression.
196
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For modernity, the naturalistic paradigm became the interpretive scheme applicable for all 
experience including the biblical tradition.  The light of current knowledge was necessary 
to properly arrive at the essence of Christian doctrine.  Naturalistic hermeneutics and 
higher historical criticism were adopted and employed to achieve that end.  Within this 
context, the Genesis account of creation was understood to be a poetic account of the 
goodness of God and the dependence of mankind upon God.  Since humanity is in the 
process of change and development through an increase in knowledge, sin was viewed as 
mythological and identified with immaturity and insufficient knowledge.  Humanity, for 
the naturalist, is essentially good, but due to the lack of knowledge, unfortunate things 
happen in the world.  Additionally, scripture was no longer considered the authoritative 
word of God, as traditional Christian theism had believed and taught, but a record of 
growing religious awareness accomplished through an evolutionary process, which would 
ultimately lead to the kingdom of God on earth.  
Because it encouraged investigation into a society’s processes of change and 
development, the evolutionary model gained immediate acceptance in the academy.  The 
result was an interpretive scheme in which institutions, cultures, and belief systems 
(religions), were also viewed as evolving.  Within twenty years Darwinism and the 
evolutionary philosophy dominated all academic disciplines.  It was an absolute triumph of 
a radical new idea that captured the minds of scholars and eventually the masses.  The 
evolution hypothesis became the structural framework and the mechanism from which to 
interpret all of cultural life.  It became the presuppositional principle for explaining organic 
relationships as well as behavioral causes.  Sociologist, Robert Bellah, notes that though 
religious evolution was evident in classical times it was not until the nineteenth century 
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that elaborate schemes of religious evolution with copious empirical illustration were 
developed by Hegel, Comte, and Spencer.  In more modest and judicious form, 
evolutionary ideas provided the basis for the early sociology of religion of Emile 
Durkheim and Max Weber.
197
    
The theistic worldview, fractured from the effects of Enlightenment thought, was 
overwhelmed by the impact of the forceful new naturalistic philosophy.  Evolutionary 
Darwinism split traditional Christianity rendering it ineffective and virtually unable to 
defend the traditional view against the momentum of this formidable foe.  Though its 
decline had already begun, nineteenth century Christian theism as the reigning cultural 
beacon was progressively conquered and replaced by modernity’s new speculative theory.  
In Kuhnian terms, Darwinism produced a genuine paradigm shift.  
For the most part, modern Christian theology appropriated naturalism and the 
concept of evolution, resulting in new vitality and expansion.  The theological ethos was 
different, however.  Until the end of the nineteenth century, Christian theism was the 
dominant theology and intellectual force in most areas of life in Western culture.  It was 
the view of the majority and not a marginalized minority.  It was, in effect, the public 
religion and world view of the West.  But after the turmoil of the late nineteenth century, 
the Christian view lost its hold as a shared, public commitment and retreated to the realm 
of private, individual belief.
198
  As Dillenberger has rightly assessed, Christian theism had 
been superseded by an alternative philosophical worldview, which had won the exclusive 
                                                          
197 Robert Bellah, Beyond Belief: Essays on Religion in a Post-Traditional World (New York: Harper and Row 
Publishers, 1970) 16.  See Emile Durkheim, The Elementary Forms of Religious Life, trans. Karen Fields (New York: 
The Free Press, 1995 [1912]) and Max Weber, The Sociology of religion, trans. Ephraim Fischoff (Boston: Beacon Press, 
1964 [1922]). 
 
198 Pearcey and Thaxton, Soul of Science, xii. 
 
 114 
 
right to delineate and interpret nature and experience.  All views in opposition to 
naturalism were viewed as similar to Christian theism, that is, supernatural, and therefore 
relegated to the category of religion.  Naturalism was clearly successful, but the question 
can be asked, was it due to the soundness of its argument or the weakness of the 
opposition?  Was naturalism demonstrated to be rationally justified or did the ‘climate of 
opinion’199 overwhelm theism?  These questions still need to be answered.  
Christian Theism’s Response to Naturalism    
Historian, George Marsden, would not disagree with Dillenberger, Coulson, and 
Kuhn, but goes a step further by attempting to uncover the reasons why the theistic 
worldview was replaced and what part apologetics played, or failed to play, in the process.  
He notes that recent historians of Darwinism largely agree that the early decades after 
Origin of Species the ‘warfare’ framework for understanding the relationship between 
Christianity and Darwinism was promoted primarily by ardent opponents of Christianity.  
In spite of the fact that earlier in the century Christians had been supporters of scientific 
progress, the anti-Christian polemicists claimed this to be another instance of the long-
standing war between faith and science.
200
   
In his incisive essay, The Collapse of American Evangelical Academia, Marsden 
discusses the intellectual components that led to the late nineteenth century demise of 
conservative evangelical academia and scholarship in the face of progressing modern 
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naturalism.
201
  He underscores the severity of the issue with the question, “Why was the 
severance of evangelicalism from the main currents of American academic life so total?”202  
The answer Marsden gives is complex, but centers on epistemology, particularly classical 
foundationalism, and the effect it had on theistic apologetics and its confrontation with 
nineteenth century modernity.
203
  He argues that with the rise of modern natural science 
two alternative apologetic responses developed; the approach of Old Princeton, which 
Marsden believes aligned itself with evangelical evidentialism, and the presuppositional 
approach of Dutch theologian, Abraham Kuyper (1837-1920).  These traditions, says 
Marsden, “are two of the strongest influences on current American evangelical thought on 
faith and reason.”204  A response to the rise of Naturalism came from both of these 
traditions and the following will briefly delineate how they each fared.  Both responses 
contributed to the further development of the modern religion / science dichotomy and 
paradigm.  
By the mid-nineteenth century two separate strands of Protestant theology impacted 
Christianity’s defensive strategies against naturalism and emerged within the conservative 
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tradition—one American and the other Dutch.  These strands were an addition to the 
apologetic work previously developed and employed within conservative theology.  The 
American strand, as we have already seen in the discussion of Nancey Murphy, found 
paramount expression in the organization of Princeton Theological Seminary in 1812, 
which, through the influence of Scottish philosopher / theologians, Thomas Reid (1710-
1796), and James McCosh (1811-1894) became the center of conservative American 
theology.
205
  The Scottish Enlightenment, with its opposition to skepticism and revolution, 
promoted a Common Sense commitment to science, rationality, order, and the Christian 
tradition that dominated American academic thought for most of the nineteenth century.
206
  
Professors Archibald Alexander, Charles and A.A. Hodge, and Benjamin Warfield 
embraced this epistemic Common Sense Realism as the philosophical underpinning for the 
Old Princeton theology and specifically apologetics.  Abraham Kuyper, following the 
Dutch, or continental Reformed tradition, inspired the other strand that eventually led to 
his founding of the Free University of Amsterdam in 1880.  His immediate successors and 
legacy included Herman Bavinck and G.C. Berkouwer.    
The significance of these two developments within the conservative theological 
tradition is in their respective dealings with modernity, particularly with their apologetic 
methodologies.  Just as the larger movements—liberal and conservative—found it 
necessary to confront the culture differently due to philosophical perspectival differences, 
philosophical, or perhaps more appropriate, theological, assumptions also divided 
conservative Christians even further.     
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Marsden offers a plausible explanation as to why this split on defensive strategies 
occurred.  He argues that the epistemic foundationalism of Thomas Reid guided Old 
Princeton’s confrontation with the emerging naturalistic worldview.  With this 
development Old Princeton had essentially aligned itself with the epistemic evidentialism 
of evangelicalism.  The Kuyperian alternative, however, was not influenced by Reid and, 
therefore, did not encounter the same methodological issues.
207
  They each addressed the 
naturalism of modernity differently, from their respective epistemologies.  How each 
expression worked itself out will be summarized in the following. 
As discussed above, originally theism and scientific reasoning were not at odds, but 
were complementary.  But, “[w]hy was this view,” asks Marsden, “once dominant in 
American higher education, so preemptively banished from most of American 
academia?”208  The answer, he concludes, was that “their accommodation of Protestantism 
to science…was ‘superficial.’”  They did not “closely examine or challenge the speculative 
basis on which the modern scientific revolution was built.”209  Marsden draws heavily 
from an essay by Princeton philosopher, James Ward Smith, “Religion and Science in 
American Philosophy,”210 to make the point of Protestantism’s superficiality.  In this essay 
Smith argues that their accommodation amounted to uncritically adding the findings of 
science to the existing corpus of biblical theology.  The conclusions of modern science 
were simply viewed as additional support for the theistic argument from design.   
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This approach was superficial because compatibility between Christian theism and 
modern science was assumed without challenging modern science’s first principles.  
Rather, Christian theists adopted them insisting that objective scientific inquiry would only 
confirm Christian truth.
211
  They failed to understand the shift in the metaphysical base that 
had taken place.  The failure to recognize the inherently different foundational first 
principles and the need for the rational justification of them, as well as for their own, 
eventually led to the conclusion that a biblical or theological perspective was irrelevant for 
the empirical sciences.  
A Common Sense Response     
The evangelical apologists believed that provided reason, or common sense, was 
allowed to prevail, the raw data of nature could be interpreted in an unbiased manner and 
thus establish the credibility of the Bible.  For instance, the moral laws observable in 
nature serve to confirm the moral laws found in the Bible; hence, the author of the natural 
laws of the universe is also the author of the Bible.
212
  But in doing so, Marsden argues, 
they assumed the naturalist’s view of neutrality in their approach to empirical principles.  
Marsden explains that the leading evangelical spokesmen of the day, Francis Wayland, 
president of Brown University, and evangelical teacher, Mark Hopkins, led the charge with 
their two level approach to truth. 
Wayland, who was a popular textbook author, claimed that rational moral science 
operating independently of Scripture will, unmistakably, reveal congruent principles.  
God’s special revelation will always harmonize with natural law.  Additional written 
                                                          
211 Marsden, “The Collapse,” 223. 
 
212  Marsden, “The Collapse,” 230-3. 
 119 
 
revelation is necessary to supplement what reason already uncovers in principle.  The 
approach was to assume the total objectivity of the scientific program and then point to the 
harmonies of scientific truth and the truth in the higher realms of religion and morality, 
thus “proving” Christianity’s truth claims.213 
Mark Hopkins’ method was virtually identical to Wayland’s.  He believed and 
taught that the Bible reveals the same God that is known in nature.  If the ‘facts are 
properly authenticated’ and viewed impartially, then the clear evidence will produce the 
certain proof of the Christian religion.  So, in effect, the congruence of the biblical truth 
claims can be tested with this intuitive and indisputable knowledge.  Hopkins held to the 
prevailing opinion that our minds were endowed with innate powers that inevitably lead to 
certain beliefs.  The commonality of these powers and beliefs throughout the race, which 
also included reason, established the ‘common ground’ from which philosophy and the 
proof of Christianity could proceed.  Showing that what the Bible reveals is fully 
consistent with what we already know through natural revelation was the basis for 
Hopkins’ apologetic.  Hopkins’ argument is similar to Joseph Butler’s in pointing to the 
many analogies between the two revelations.
214
 
The evangelical evidentialists claimed to start with a neutral objective 
epistemology upon which all could agree by common sense.  This view worked as long as 
there was cultural consensus on metaphysical presuppositions.  It was presumption, 
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however, by the evangelical apologists to assume that these first principles were apparent 
to the entire human race and that everyone should agree to them.  
It was also assumed that any rational investigation of the scientific data would 
prove theism and the biblical truth claims.  The problem is there are a number of different 
interpretive constructs that could qualify as rational.  The difference, of course, is the 
starting point.  A case in point was Darwinism’s removal of the presumed intelligent 
design of nature and hence the intelligent designer.  Assuming a different starting point, 
Darwinism interpreted the data without an intelligent designer.  Naturalists, following 
Laplace, had no need for the God hypothesis.   
The principal Old Princeton apologists, Charles Hodge and B.B. Warfield, 
revealing their dependence on Locke, Joseph Butler, William Paley, and Reid (and 
following the evangelical trend), insisted that the relationship between special and general 
revelation must coincide and any scientific investigation and accumulation of evidence 
would overwhelmingly attest to that harmony.
215
  But, once again, to argue along these 
lines is begging the question.  The evidence is gathered and interpreted to support a given 
hypothesis—a hypothesis which has already been assumed.  With an alternative 
hypothesis, the same evidence could be interpreted differently.  Darwinism is an example 
of interpreting the data from an alternative hypothesis.  The real issue is how to adjudicate 
between the two mutually exclusive views.  
Hodge believed Darwin had denied design and first causes in the universe and was 
adamant in his affirmation that the denial of design in nature is virtually the denial of God.  
In Hodge’s thinking natural selection precluded the need for design and first causes.  
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Darwin’s rejection of final causes, led Hodge to conclude “it is this feature of his system 
which brings it into conflict not only with Christianity, but with the fundamental principles 
of natural religion, it should be clearly established.”216  The dictates of common sense 
would prove the congruence of Christian claims with this intuitive and indisputable 
knowledge establishing the ‘common ground’ from which philosophy and the proof of 
Christianity could proceed.  Hodge further maintains in his definition of theology that the 
Scriptures contain the facts and truths about the physical world and it is the task of 
theology “to collect, authenticate, arrange and exhibit in their internal relation to each 
other.”217    
The problem was that Hodge argued his position from within a cultural context that 
was generally metaphysically uniform.  The public consciousness for the era was 
decisively Christian and accepted the idea of a rational God who created an intelligent 
world governed by natural law.  Additionally, Christopher Kaiser explains, it is because 
humans reflect the same rationality by which God ordered creation that they can 
understand that order.
218
  The conviction that nature is intelligible came from biblical 
principles and as Carl Becker has noted; “[s]ince God is goodness and reason, his creation 
must somehow be, even if not evidently so to finite minds, good and reasonable.  Design in 
nature was thus derived a priori from the character which the Creator was assumed to 
have.”219  Becker continues to explain that the idea of natural law for Christians was 
derived from belief in God prior to observation and was not derived from observation.  
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That natural law exists was a fact of faith and not of experience.
220
  Building on this point, 
Pearcey and Thaxton note, whereas formerly the existence of God was regarded as so 
certain that it could serve as the starting point for argument, now it was the orderliness of 
nature, discovered by science that was regarded as more certain.  Order in nature became 
the starting point of argument, and the existence of God became an inference from it, 
hence, the argument from design.  This points to the massive intellectual shift that had 
taken place.
221
  
The weakness of the evidentialist apologetics of Old Princeton, explains Marsden, 
was not in their “common sense assumptions and principles, but in their failure to 
recognize that a good many other assumptions were in fact functioning in their thought.”222  
These other foundational assumptions were the points at which the apologetic method was 
constructed and the points where most vulnerable. Marsden contends that the apologetic 
response to this development from Old Princeton involved a defect in the American 
evangelical method of reconciling faith and science.  The defects became apparent in three 
specific areas.  The first was the immense confidence they had in the possibility of 
establishing most of one’s knowledge objectively.  Second, they were sure that the 
common sense certainties of Baconian science could achieve certain conclusions 
compelling to any unbiased observer in most areas of human inquiry.  Their third 
assumption was that nature is ordered, intelligible, and meaningful.
223
  These assumptions 
(essentially the list Coulson ascribed to natural science) were manifest in Old Princeton’s 
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appeal to evidence in the world and they failed to address, or indeed even recognize, their 
interpretive and perspectival nature.     
Marsden’s criticism of Old Princeton and the evangelicals is essentially that there is 
no wholly neutral epistemic foundation or universally accepted rational scheme from 
which to judge reality objectively.  All such judgments unavoidably contain metaphysical 
presuppositions by which a rational structure is constructed.
224
  Neither of these points was 
recognized by the Christian evidentialists.  
The Netherlands on the other hand, not having been influenced by enlightened 
modernity to the same degree as other western countries, experienced the least loss in 
traditional and evangelical Protestantism to intellectual science and secularism.
225
  
Hendrikus Berkhof explains that the Netherlands had remained somewhat isolated from 
modern theology until the mid-nineteenth century.  At about the same time the Neo-
Confessional theology of Kuyper appeared as a late response to the intellectual challenge 
of the Enlightenment.
226
  Consequently, the Dutch Calvinists did not make the same 
philosophical assumptions with respect to foundationalism and evidential apologetics.  
Wolterstorff notes their “revulsion against arguments in favor of theism or Christianity” 
and their tendency to be “antievidentialist.”227 
Kuyper also recognized the need for first principles, but his approach was different 
than Reid and Old Princeton.  It was his intention to distance himself from the 
evidentialists.  He had difficulty accepting the concept of an objective scientific knowledge 
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universally accessible to all intelligent humans.  He did, though, accept that subjective 
perceptions of reality can correspond to an actual reality external to the individual, but the 
acceptance of a more primal belief must come first—belief in God as Creator.228  God as 
Creator and sustainer was Kuyper’s first principle. 
Aware of Old Princeton’s shortcomings, Kuyper noted that Hodge was choosing 
“the facts of the Bible as the object of his theology” and seeking authentication for them 
rather than constructing his theology on God the Creator as his first principle.
229
  The 
problem with this approach, says Kuyper, is that “The authentication of his ‘facts’ brought 
him logically back again under the power of naturalistic science.”230  “His combination of 
‘facts and truths’ overthrows his own system.  He [Hodge] declares that the theologian 
must authenticate these truths.  But then, of course, they are no truths, and only become 
such, when I authenticate them.”231  Kuyper’s point here is that there exists a deep 
boundary line between theology and all other sciences.  The object of the natural sciences 
is the creation, but the object of theology is the Creator, and the data of natural science 
does not authenticate the knowledge of the Creator, but the knowledge of the Creator is 
necessary for the authentication of science.
232
    
Contrary to Hodge and Warfield and the evangelical evidentialists, Kuyper does 
not understand belief in God and objective reality to be the conclusion of an inductive 
argument.  The issue is the starting point.  Any harmonious scientific correspondences 
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between the subject and the external world must first begin with the Creator / creature 
distinction, as the presupposition.  For Kuyper, “doing science…presupposed a whole 
theory about the fundamental structures of the universe.”233  His was what W.V.O. Quine 
would later call a “holistic” approach.234  
Kuyper not only believed that Christian theism begins with first principles, but 
alternative life-systems do as well.  An illustration of this point is Kuyper’s understanding 
of the naturalist’s theory of evolution.  Prior to the dogma of evolution, says Kuyper, 
Christianity was the only life-system that bound all things into a single unity.  But, with 
evolution and its absolute principle, monistic mechanics, its adherents could explain the 
entire cosmos, including all life processes within that cosmos, to the very earliest origins.  
This alternative is an all-encompassing system, a world-and-life view derived from a single 
principle.
235
  The adherents, explains Kuyper, “now have a ground-dogma, and they cling 
to that dogma with unshakeable faith.”236   
Thomas Kuhn would consider this revolution as a change of worldview and a 
paradigm shift on a grand scale.  As a result, says Kuhn, “scientists with different 
paradigms engage in different concrete laboratory manipulations.”237  Additionally, it 
should not be considered possible that these two life-systems can share and work from 
common principles.  On the contrary, says Kuyper, “[t]he Christian religion and the theory 
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of evolution are two mutually exclusive systems…antipodes that can be neither reconciled 
nor compared.”238  This antithesis formed the basis for much of Kuyper’s thought.  
Kuyper maintained that there are two kinds of people and two kinds of science.  
What he meant by this was that there are Christians and non-Christians in the world and 
“sin creates a widespread abnormality” affecting orientation and perspective.  His 
apologetic represented more of an implementation of perspective, or “life system,” as he 
called it, within the culture, rather than an appeal to evidence and argument.
239
  As Prime 
Minister of the Netherlands between 1901 and 1905 he attempted to put his views into 
practice as the antidote to modern naturalism.   
The difference between these two kinds of people and two kinds of science is in 
their faith.  Not that one has faith and the other does not, but faith is a common 
denominator with the difference consisting in the content of the faith.  Kuyper 
universalizes the concept of faith with the assertion that faith is a structural part of 
universal human nature.
240
  In other words, Kuyper understood that all people begin their 
science with a first principle based in faith.  First principles are basic beliefs held by faith 
and without demonstration.  So the Christian as well as the naturalist begins his science 
from a first principle believed by faith.  The first principles of these two kinds of people, 
however, are radically different.  The Christian begins with the presupposition that God is 
and he has created the world.  The naturalist begins with an abstract notion of 
contingency—that the evidence may possibly point to a Creator—or may not. 
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As a precursor to Coulson, Dillenberger, Kuhn, and others who have recognized 
that knowledge and theoretical thought is grounded in metaphysical presuppositions, 
Kuyper argues for the concept of faith as a formal function of epistemology.  He builds his 
case on three points.  His first point is whether sense data received through empirical 
investigation of the world accurately corresponds to reality.  Since there is no way to prove 
this proposition absolutely, then to believe that it does, as most, if not all scientists do, is an 
act of faith.  Secondly, axioms are presupposed as valid concepts for the construction of 
theoretical knowledge.  For example, the notion of non-contradiction as a basic rule of 
logic cannot be proven true or false without assuming the rule in the proof.  Therefore, 
axioms of logic are assumed to be trustworthy without demonstration. 
Kuyper’s third point for establishing the universal nature of a faith structure is that 
universal statements derived from specific investigation and determined to be a general law 
are not based on the conclusions of the investigation, but are in fact presupposed prior to 
the investigation.  “Without faith in the existence of the general in the special, in laws 
which govern this special, and in your right to build a general conclusion on a given 
number of observations,” argues Kuyper, “you would never come to acknowledge such a 
law.”241  Faith provides the basis for certitude with respect to sense data, axiomatic 
inferences or deductions, and the application of general laws deduced from specific 
demonstrations. 
From Kuyper’s perspective, faith, then, as a general category, is a formal function 
and is the prerequisite for all knowledge and understanding.  With this position, Kuyper is 
voicing St. Augustine’s dictum “I believe in order to understand.”  Contrary to the 
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naturalist’s belief, the scientific method is not value neutral and objective with respect to 
the data of investigation, but begins with a faith based judgment.  Faith then, for Kuyper, is 
not categorically relegated to the domain of religious, unverifiable knowledge only.  
Neither of the theistic responses just discussed presented a significant challenge, or 
defeater, for naturalism.  At best with these two responses, theism and naturalism may be 
considered equivalent, but with no way to determine one or the other to be more rational or 
privileged.  Kuyper’s argument established all views as fideistic in their most basic beliefs 
and, therefore, incommensurate.  A means to determine which view has knowledge and 
certainty is not to be found in any view.  Faith is not knowledge, however.  If first 
principles are derived from faith, as Kuyper maintains, then how is it determined which 
first principles produce knowledge and certainty?  It appears that skepticism is the only 
logical conclusion.  A valid argument could be made that Kuyper had already anticipated 
the intellectual trend that would come to be called postmodernity.        
Summary  
 The preceding has highlighted how Enlightenment ideals found their way into the 
mainstream of modern life and how some key Christian theologians responded.  As Stow 
Persons has noted, the synthesis formed by the three ideological currents of the Protestant 
Reformed tradition, democratic social ideology, and naturalistic philosophy has resulted in 
an intellectual matrix that produced the modern secular age.   An effort was made in the 
above to focus primarily on the third aspect of this multi-faceted movement—the rise of 
naturalism—and its transformational effect in producing the modern worldview.  The 
impact was controversial indeed and not without a diverse reaction from the philosophical 
and theistic communities.  
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 The extraordinary success of new scientific hypotheses in the nineteenth century 
had truly ushered in the age of positivism characterized by a supreme ‘faith in science’ 
which, according to physicist/philosopher, C.F. von Weizsacker, had replaced faith in 
religion.
242
  Faith in science was merely another way of stating the exclusive role science 
had achieved as the authoritative producer of certainty and knowledge building on the 
foundation set by Descartes and Locke.  This knowledge was experienced in the 
practicality of modern science as it acquired more and more relevance for everyday life.  
What was originally considered a war of principles ultimately gave way to the practical 
and an empirically rooted philosophy of pragmatism.   In keeping with the vision of French 
philosopher, Auguste Comte (1798-1857), the intellectual revolution had entered its third 
phase—the positive stage, following theology and metaphysics of earlier ages—where 
observation and measurement of phenomena is the highest development of the intellect.  
Whether this particular understanding of the scientific revolution is accepted or not, the 
empiricism of the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, nevertheless, generated a 
substantive redirection in philosophy and theology.
243
   
 Naturalism brought about change in the intellectual climate.  The natural sciences 
had a way of subsuming all other disciplines.  The strength of empiricism challenged the 
meaning and purpose of philosophy and even the existence of a metaphysical reality.  
                                                          
242 C.F. von Weizsacker, The Relevance of Science (London: Collins, 1964) 13. 
  
243 For additional discussion on this issue in philosophy during this period see Ayer, Kneale, Paul, Pears, Strawson, 
Warnock, and Wolleim, eds. The Revolution in Philosophy (London: Macmillan & Co. Ltd., 1960, and in theology see 
Flew and MacIntyre, eds. New Essays in Philosophical Theology (London: SCM Press Ltd., 1955). 
  
 130 
 
Theology, of course, was on the endangered species list.
244
  Natural science initiated a host 
of new critically reflective thought that influenced both philosophy and so-called religion.   
 The new science created a cultural consciousness receptive to the idea that an 
empirical test as verification for knowledge was a logical conclusion in the quest for a 
normative science.  Thus, the later developments of the Vienna Circle and A.J. Ayer, 
building on the progression of nineteenth century positivism in science, concluded that 
anything other than the empirical is non-verifiable.  Essentially, observation was deemed 
the only solid foundation for all knowledge.  This proposition led Ayer to expound that no 
type of speculative knowledge about the world is, in principle, beyond the scope of 
empirical science.  Analytical reflection on metaphysics, therefore, is nothing short of a 
delusion.
245
  With the relegation of the exploration of empirical fact to the various special 
sciences, the investigation of a transcendent metaphysical realm becomes fruitless and 
illusory.  The task of the new philosophy was to only clarify propositions of language since 
traditional philosophy could not report on matters of fact and satisfy the newly formulated 
requirements of either inductive or deductive science.
246
  Discovery of the profound truths 
of the universe no longer needed the insights of theoretical philosophical thought.  
Metaphysics was deemed irrelevant due to the belief that knowledge of ultimate reality 
was not possible.  Needless to say, naturalism as a life-system and worldview had reached 
hegemonic proportions and had a radical impact on philosophy and theology.   
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245 Alfred J. Ayer, Language, Truth and Logic (New York: Dover Publications, Inc. ND) 48  Also, see John Macquarrie, 
Twentieth Century Religious Thought (New York: Harper & Row Publishers, 1963) 301-3. 
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 Having taken this direction, philosophy and theology then lost their ability to speak 
authoritatively on questions about the being of God and the universe and became simply an 
analysis of the logical procedures of language and description.
247
  Ayer’s particular brand 
of empiricism was short-lived, however.  Many saw what John Macquarrie observed, 
“’[n]aturalism’ is itself a metaphysic—it is the identification of reality with nature.”248  In 
spite of its critics, logical empiricism and analytical philosophy continued well into the 
twentieth century challenging the legitimacy of contemporary theology, apologetics, 
essentially the religion idea, and eventually philosophy itself.  Logical positivism / 
empiricism was clearly an attempt to move away from Christian theistic principles and 
toward a more distinct philosophical naturalism.
249
  As the discussion above attempts to 
show, with the progression of a naturalistic worldview the marginalization of Christian 
theism became more evident with little help from apologetic strategies. 
 Opposed to the notion that philosophy is solely the analysis of language, 
metaphysical realists looked for an explanation of reality that included more than just the 
human component claiming that metaphysics still has an important role.  Accepting the 
speculative evolutionary process of the positivists, but unwilling to exclude God 
altogether, they developed a metaphysical model with God as part of the process.  With the 
supernatural existence of God challenged, a non-supernatural theism inevitably emerged, 
replacing the idea of an immutable God with a God who is mutable and becoming.  In 
keeping with the naturalist outlook, Alfred N. Whitehead and Charles Hartshorne, 
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metaphysical realists who identified God with the natural processes in the world, initiated 
various forms of a process concept.  One popular theological expression is Hartshorne’s 
proposal that God is an unchanging essence, but who completes himself in an advancing 
experience.   
 Since the emergence of Darwinism, the traditional concept of God has been all but 
vanquished.  The understanding of God as infinite, eternal, and immutable as expressed in 
the seventeenth century’s Westminster Confession of Faith has been removed from the 
public domain.  The emphasis shifted to a type of natural theology that synthesized 
temporal processes with an eternal essence.
250
  Alvin Plantinga has identified logical 
positivism and particularly its subsequent allied streams of naturalistic thought as the most 
influential and most negative of theism’s opponents in the early twentieth century.251 
 Though intense polemics subsided, subtle tension continued between naturalism, 
philosophy, and traditional theism about the question of knowledge—is it possible and 
what perspective can claim to have it.  The faith versus reason controversy has been an on-
going issue.  For centuries the intellectual debate has tended to place faith in opposition to 
reason so it is not surprising that the distinction between religion and science has taken the 
representative roles of religion (faith) and science (reason).  In keeping with Enlightenment 
ideals, modernity sided with the autonomy of natural science and placed faith on the 
irrelevant periphery, thus reinforcing the ostensible impenetrable dichotomy. 
 This new authoritative position of naturalism carries with it the responsibility of 
justifying its privileged position to the culture.  It must rationally justify its claim to 
                                                          
250  Macquarrie, Twentieth Century Religious Thought, 267-277. 
 
251 Alvin Plantinga, “Christian Philosophy at the End of the Twentieth Century,” in James F. Sennett, ed. The Analytic 
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exclusive knowledge and truth.  It must be more than a dogmatic claim—the charge 
leveled against theism.  In keeping with modernity’s conception of knowledge, it must 
demonstrate its truth claims, its foundational first principles, that the material world is all 
that exists and is the sole basis for understanding the nature of reality.  This foundational 
basic belief provides the basis for the system of knowledge affirmed by philosophical 
naturalism.  The naturalistic worldview is constructed on a type of ‘first philosophy,’ a 
Cartesian / Lockean foundation of ‘clear and distinct’ ideas that must be demonstrated.  
The next two chapters will explore how this effort fared in the twentieth century.     
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Chapter 5 
A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF A MODERN DICHOTOMY 
 As the twentieth century has clearly shown, naturalism has gained predominance in 
the Western academy.  Theism was unable to successfully defend itself against formidable 
challenges.  The need for God and the supernatural (commonly understood as the religious 
view), in the minds of many, could not be substantiated.  As a result, an alternative 
explanation of the nature of the world and experience won the day at the end of the 
nineteenth century.  Naturalism claimed reason and verifiable evidence to make its case.  
Theism, on the other hand, with its strong appeal to the special revelation of God 
(scripture) had difficulty establishing a rational basis for its first principles.  It had to settle 
for a notion of faith.  If there is a God, how is this God known?  If it is by scripture, then 
which scripture, if any, is correct?  For naturalists, theism was thought to be rationally 
unjustified belief without proof—fideism.  And, at least since Hume, fideism had not only 
lost its credibility, but also its relevance.   
 As emphasized in earlier chapters, the fundamental issue between science and so-
called religion is one of epistemology, how reality is known.  Which view can claim 
knowledge and, therefore, truth?  The issue is about the nature of these concepts.  Is reason 
capable of grasping knowledge and truth, and what qualifies as evidence of such?  
Descartes’ notion of self-evident clear and distinct perceptions and ideas that form a 
foundation of certainty replacing Reformation fideism continues to be naturalism’s answer.  
The naturalistic belief system is constructed on a foundation that maintains matter is all 
that exists.  Sense data, then, is the exclusive source of knowledge.  Remnants of logical 
positivism still persist.  If it cannot be sensed by empirical analysis, then it cannot exist.   
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 A materialist vision of the universe is not new.
252
  From the ancient Greeks to the 
present the belief that the universe is in no need of divine guidance or origin has persisted.  
Naturalism’s fundamental claims are that alternative non-material perspectives of the 
universe cannot be supported by reason or evidence.  The charge against theism and 
religion in general has been, and still is, that they are non-cognitive and have no 
foundational first principle that can be supported with substantive evidence or proof.  The 
idea of a transcendent reality is a human fabrication and projection, it is argued.  These 
kinds of claims in the modern era range from Ludwig Feurerbach’s projectionist theory, to 
renowned twentieth century philosopher, Bertrand Russell’s comment, “[t]he whole 
conception of God is a conception derived from the ancient Oriental despotisms” to 
eminent biologist, Richard Dawkins’ repeat of the famous Laplace declaration, “there is no 
evidence to favour the God Hypothesis.”253      
 Naturalism and its foundation of matter would not go unchallenged for long, 
however.  Since the end of the nineteenth century at least two epistemological challenges 
have been put forth.  Both question the foundation upon which naturalism is constructed.  
The first challenges the very idea of a foundation for knowledge and translates into what 
has come to be known as postmodernity.  The postmodern ethos, mostly found in the 
academic disciplines of the social sciences and humanities, has found itself at odds with 
the physical sciences, which still holds to a foundation.  This tension came to a head in 
what was called the ‘science wars’ of the 1990’s.  This is an on-going issue and has yet to 
                                                          
252  James Thrower traces this thought progressively as an expression of atheism from the ancient times to the present in, 
Western Atheism. 
 
253 Bertrand Russell, Why I Am Not a Christian (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1957) 23.  Richard Dawkins, The God 
Delusion (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 2006) 83.   
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be resolved.
254
  The second challenge retains a foundation, but challenges naturalism’s 
particular foundational beliefs.  While this second challenge is significant, it will need to 
be addressed in another project due to the space limitations here.       
Deconstructing Modernity’s Foundational Epistemology  
 By the estimation of many, modernity has run its course and has given way to 
philosophic challenges that have impacted all world view narratives.  That the present era 
is in some sense ‘postmodern’ appears to be the consensus.  But as important as it may 
seem, no attempt at a definition of postmodernity will be made here other than to describe 
those features broadly related to epistemology.  
 Epistemic nonfoundationalism,
255
 a philosophical criticism resulting from work in 
metaepistemology, precipitated new philosophical strategies in the twentieth century.  
Pluralism and deconstructionism are two ideologies that characterize the new era and are 
contending for an authoritative voice in the history of thought.  Postmodernity is part of a 
continuum informed by the matured modern era and so must be examined in light of the 
modern.  Though modernity can be assessed from many angles and intellectual disciplines, 
it is clear from the foregoing discussion that a central philosophical feature of modernity is 
epistemic foundationalism.  It should be no surprise then that a nonfoundational 
epistemology represents a major tenet of the postmodern perspective.  Since the late 
nineteenth century much philosophical work from the naturalist tradition has, ironically, 
been offered in an effort to undermine the Cartesian / Lockean view of rationality and the 
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255 In his work, Nonfoundationalism, John Thiel comments that nonfoundationalism is not a position or stance in its own 
right but a judgment about what is not philosophically tenable.  (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1994) 2.  
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assumptions of an epistemology of absolute knowledge.
256
  All available philosophical 
artillery has been aimed directly at the foundation of noninferentially known certitudes 
upon which Locke’s superstructure of knowledge was constructed.  Naturalism needs a 
foundational belief so it is ironic that inferences consistent with the foundational belief are 
being made by naturalist philosophers that are actually intent on undermining the position.  
Locke and his foundation of certainty (and all subscribers to it) has become the target for 
the arsenal of twentieth century philosophers like Willard Van Orman Quine, Wildred 
Sellars, and Richard Rorty, each of whom approaches the subject with empiricist 
inclinations.
257
  For them, indubitable foundations are in fact dubious, if not impossible, 
and have been replaced with a paradigm of practical contextuality.  Though these three 
figures have had predecessors, they, arguably, form the nucleus of the twentieth century 
assault on epistemic foundationalism upon which the current naturalistic view is 
constructed.  While the distinguished position of philosophy has been challenged by 
postmoderns, its conclusions, nonetheless, have formed the basis for the philosophy of 
science and religion.
258
  
                                                          
256 Alvin Plantinga has noted that in the last quarter of the twentieth century naturalism has taken an increasingly 
aggressive and explicit stance. Naturalistic accounts are given on various philosophical topics and phenomena including 
epistemology, intentionality, morality, teleology, proper function, language, meaning, thought, and much more.  
“Christian Philosophy at the End of the Twentieth Century,” in The Analytic Theist: An Alvin Plantinga Reader (Grand 
Rapids: Eerdmans Publishing Co., 1998) 330. 
 
257 For works addressing foundationalism see Quine’s The Web of Belief, Sellars’ Science, Perception and Reality (New 
York: Humanities Press, 1963) and Rorty’s Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature.  
 
258 The editors of After Philosophy: End or Transformation, Baynes, Bohman, and McCarthy have made some insightful 
comments in their introduction about the contemporary status of philosophy and themes representing the 
postphilosophical era.  The rise of the modern sciences of nature, they say, removed—forever, it seems—vast domains 
from the authority of philosophical reflection.  Postphilosophy is characterized by opposition to strong conceptions of 
reason and of the autonomous rational subject, the contingency and conventionality of the rules, criteria, and products of 
what counts as rational speech and action at any given time and place.  They oppose the irreducible plurality of 
incommensurable language games and forms of life, the irremediably “local” character of all truth, argument, and 
validity, to the a priori the empirical, to certainty fallibility, to invariance historical and cultural variability, to unity 
heterogeneity, to totality the fragmentary, to self-evident givenness (“presence”) universal mediation by differential 
systems of signs, to the unconditioned a rejection of ultimate foundations in any form, transcendental conditions of 
possibility no less than metaphysical first principles.  (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1988) 1, 3. 
 138 
 
 With the favored epistemology of postmodernity underscored, a cursory review of 
other related key features of this phenomenon will also be of value here.  An overview will 
highlight some salient modern and postmodern characteristics.  Typically, postmodernity is 
identified by terms like; ‘relativism’ with respect to ethics, truth, and meaning; a 
‘decentered’ humanity; and ‘pluralistic’ worldviews.  In a broad sense these are reasonably 
accurate, however, a little more explanation will be helpful.  
 The first point that needs clarification is the present status of modernity.  While 
modernity may be considered bankrupt by many today, it is not clear as to whether it has 
been superseded.  The present is a time of cultural transition processing the inherent 
features and benefits of modernity against the genuinely novel postmodern elements.  The 
extent to which postmodernity differs from modernity, in addition to the epistemic issue, is 
a topic of current debate.  Is there a difference in kind or only in degree?  Scholars such as 
Jurgen Habermas of the philosophical world, Wolfhart Pannenberg in theology, and John 
Rawls in moral and political theory have worked diligently to preserve the solvency of the 
modern project.  More will be said below on the idea of preserving the modern project.  
 The Enlightenment’s call to autonomous individuality has known no boundaries.  
The phenomenon seems to be omnipresent.  Philosopher/theologian, Nancey Murphy, 
claims that the individualism of the Enlightenment manifested itself in the atomistic and 
reductionistic tendencies of early natural science and ultimately pervaded all aspects of 
modern thought.  “The fragmented ‘postmodern self,’” she argues, “is but a further 
atomization of the modern individual and was already discussed by David Hume.”259  
Postmodern individualism is nothing new.  Perhaps the decentered or “fragmented” self is 
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the product of human autonomy and is, therefore, an abiding continuum regardless of 
whether it manifests itself in modernity or postmodernity.  Murphy goes on to say “what is 
called postmodern in contemporary Western culture is nothing but pure modernity finally 
hitting the streets.”260 
 The idea of a continuum between modernity and postmodernity is also found with 
contemporary philosopher, Richard Rorty.  Based on his contention that “postmodernity is 
characterized by the rejection of the Cartesian ideal and the radicalization of the 
Baconian,”261 there seems to be strong justification for saying that “the postmodern is a 
continuance and intensification of (one aspect of) the modern.”262  The work of Descartes 
and Bacon converged to form an optimistic vision of the world and reality.  What emerged 
was Descartes with his indubitable rational foundation for a science that corresponds to the 
external world, and Bacon, the popularizer, who saw knowledge as a powerful tool for 
controlling nature and improving the human condition.  The combination offered the 
optimism of utopian values through objective realism and human autonomy.
263
  What 
Rorty seems to be saying is that with the collapse of foundationalism the Cartesian ideal 
went along with it leaving Bacon’s vision—the optimistic progress myth—except in a 
more radical form.    
 This progress myth is another overarching psychological characterization of 
modernity that continues to have considerable influence.  Modernity still holds the appeal 
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and promise of Cartesian realism and Baconian natural science.  In his proposal for a 
philosophical interpretation of history, Gordon Graham argues that despite the twentieth 
century decline in optimism due to the world’s wars and the collapse of the old colonial 
empires, “an argument can be advanced to show just how difficult it is to avoid some sort 
of progressivism.”264  A view that considers itself better than previous ones, which is the 
twentieth century opinion with respect to the nineteenth, is, in fact, a progressive view.  
Moreover, modern relativists cannot avoid considering their own view an improvement on 
the narrower thinking of the past.
265
  Progressivism, even with its perspectival aspect, is, 
nonetheless, difficult to deny, affirming Graham’s claim that “some sort of progressivism 
is hard to resist.”266 
 But there is more to modernity than the self-centered subject and the progress 
myth.  The modern outlook has been shaped, not only by a spirit of individual freedom and 
optimism, but also by the autonomous quest for certitude, the absolutizing of the laws of 
nature (including reason), and the relegation of authority to the periphery, to mention just 
the major points.
267
   
 Postmodernity, however, is a phenomenon to reckon with in its own right.  
Theologian, Diogenes Allen, sees the present postmodern situation as “[a] massive 
intellectual revolution” where “[t]he foundations of the modern world are collapsing” and 
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“[t]he principles forged during the Enlightenment…are crumbling.”268  In the postmodern 
environment much of contemporary intellectual inquiry has been shaped decisively by 
fragmentation, indeterminacy, and intense distrust of all universal or ‘totalizing’ 
discourses.   
 But, in the midst of the confusion surrounding postmodernity some believe that 
there are prominent signs that give reason for hope.  Theologian, Stanley Grenz, argues 
that two aspects of the postmodern ethos are particularly significant; “the fundamental 
critique and rejection of modernity, and the attempt to live and think in a realm of 
chastened rationality characterized by the demise of modern epistemological 
foundationalism.”269   As diverse as the postmodern phenomenon is, there is unity among 
postmodern thinkers in their rejection of the modern project’s quest for certain, objective, 
and universal knowledge, along with the hesitation to form rational paradigms for 
replacing the modern vision.    
 Grenz’s first item, the unity in the rejection of modernity, plays out in various 
ways.  Radical aspects can be found in continental deconstructionism, a literary theory, as 
represented by French critics Jacques Derrida and Jean-Francois Lyotard.  
Deconstructionism confronts the world with the claim that all order and convention is 
strictly arbitrary.  This sounds like Toulmin’s account of the French “clean slate” theory 
again with all vestiges of Descartes having been, ironically, authoritatively deconstructed.  
Any criteria for determining such characteristics as order and convention, explains Rorty, 
                                                          
268 Diogenes Allen, Christian Belief in a Postmodern World: The Full Wealth of Conviction (Louisville: 
Westminster/John Knox, 1989) 2. 
 
269 Stanley Grenz / John Franke, Beyond Foundationalism: Shaping Theology in a Postmodern Context (Louisville: 
Westminster John Know Press, 2001) 19. 
  
 142 
 
is itself a human construction—and there is “no standard of rationality that is not an appeal 
to such a criterion, no rigorous argumentation that is not obedience to our own 
conventions.”270  Even the very convention of language, a favorite topic for the 
deconstructionists, does not escape subjectivism, which undermines the biblical medium as 
a metanarrative.  Lyotard has expressed his distrust of language to convey meaning and his 
related disdain for the metanarrative as a medium for meaning with his pointed definition 
of postmodernity, “[s]implified to the extreme, I define postmodern as incredulity toward 
metanarratives.”271 
 Anthropologically, deconstructionists tend to celebrate human decenteredness (no 
essence to human nature) and view it as a virtuous attribute.  The irony, once again, in 
keeping with the tenets of postmodernity, is the decentered self.  While perspectival in 
nature, decenteredness, still derives some sort of meaning, only within a particular context.  
Mark C. Taylor views the dissolution of the individual self as giving rise to “anonymous 
subjectivity” in which “care-less sacrifice takes the place of anxious mastery.”272  With the 
recurring appearance of Nietzsche, arguably the original deconstructionist, in the work of 
Taylor and the French deconstructionists, decenteredness could, perhaps, even be the line 
to the will to power and the Ubermensch.  Deconstructionists, existentialists, and 
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poststructuralists in general have drawn heavily from Nietzsche’s thought, which opens the 
possibilities for various deconstructionist anthropologies.
273
 
 Though the term ‘postmodern’ has been most typically associated with continental 
thinkers and deconstructionism, it is, however, becoming more prevalent in other contexts.  
More ‘conservative’ or ‘constructive’ versions of postmodernity are emerging in America 
with philosophers and theologians such as Thomas Kuhn, Alistair MacIntyre, Stephen 
Toulmin, Jeffrey Stout, George Lindbeck, Ronald Thiemann, and Nicholas Wolterstorff, to 
name just a few.  In the rejection of the tenets of modernity there is unity.  The range in 
congruence, Grenz observes, “extends from Derrida to the so-called post-conservative 
evangelicals.”274 
 The second aspect identified by Grenz as at the heart of the postmodern ethos, and 
of particular interest here, is the attempt in the aftermath of modernity to rethink the nature 
of rationality.  He calls the result of the attempt, chastened rationality.
275
  In retrospect, he 
argues, the faculty of reason, the exalted trademark of the Enlightenment, was given more 
power than it was due.  Theologian, Wentzel van Huyssteen, similarly understands the 
need to reconsider the limits of rationality when he says “postmodern thought also 
challenges us again to explore the presupposed continuity between Christian theology and 
the general human enterprise of understanding the world rationally.”276  Although 
postmodernity does not reject the concept of rationality, it does reject the Cartesian / 
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Lockean starting point for it—an evaluative norm accessible to the mind.  But in spite of 
Richard Rorty’s objections, in this post-metaphysical age, epistemology continues to be the 
focus of attention.
277
  Rationality, its place and function, even if chastened, is inseparable 
from the pursuit of knowledge.  Theoretical reason, Robert Audi has remarked, “is roughly 
the topic of epistemology.”278  The next chapter will further explore the popular idea of 
‘chastened reason’ and whether it is a viable position.  
 Grenz identifies three categories affected by chastened rationality.  The first is that 
humans do not view the world from an objective vantage point, but structure an 
understanding of it through the social convention of language.  But due to the various 
perspectives of the speaker and the lack of a universal language for describing the ‘real 
world,’ no single linguistic description is adequate.  The second is that the metanarrative is 
no longer credible as a universal shaper of the cultural ethos, but functions in a local 
context only.  Diversity and plurality has replaced the notion of a grand scheme into which 
all particular stories must fit.  The third, and possibly the most significant and prominent 
category of chastened rationality, is the collapse of epistemological foundationalism.
279
  
The Enlightenment view that rationality is determined by, and grounded in, self-evident, 
indubitable foundational beliefs that are trans-historical and fixed metaphysical entities, is 
not tenable in the postmodern context. 
 While it is the topic of epistemology, the difficulty in discussing reason or 
rationality in any absolute or reductionistic sense is as philosopher, Hilary Putnam, 
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explains, “the ‘standard’ accepted by a culture or a subculture, either explicitly or 
implicitly, cannot define what reason is, even in context, because they presuppose reason 
(reasonableness) for their interpretation.
280
  On the one hand, Putnam continues, 
reasonableness is shaped by cultures, practices, and procedures and on the other hand, it 
has a universal aspect to it.  For it is “both immanent (not to be found outside of concrete 
language games and institutions) and transcendent (a regulative idea that we use to criticize 
the conduct of all activities and institutions).”281  In other words, reason is used to postulate 
anything about reason.  It can be used incorrectly, but not denied without using it.  
Recognizing this dilemma and others, a new philosophy, pragmatism, was offered as a 
resolution.  
The Rise of Coherentist Epistemology 
   An epistemological revolution, which began with the maturation of naturalism and 
represented by the philosophical pragmatism of Charles Sanders Peirce (1839-1914) and 
William James (1842-1910) of the early twentieth century, has continued through the 
logical empiricism of Bertrand Russell, Gottlob Frege (1848-1925), and Ludwig 
Wittgenstein (1889-1951), and finally to Willard Van Orman Quine, Wilfred Sellars, and 
Richard Rorty of the last half of the twentieth century.  This trajectory of empirically based 
epistemology has impacted and left its mark with implications for naturalism and its 
foundation.  
 A postmodern precursor, pragmatic philosophy, initiated by Peirce and James and 
further developed in the twentieth century, reexamined the Enlightenment constitution of 
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rationality. Pragmatism in philosophy undermined the prevailing Cartesian / Lockean 
tradition in three crucial areas, which represented the beginnings of nonfoundationalism as 
a philosophical criticism.  The first was the rejection of the Cartesian method of 
establishing the first principles of philosophy as a necessary propaedeutic to philosophical 
inquiry itself.  Second, the accepted metaphysics of understanding were rejected.  As the 
foundation for the truth of a philosophical system, neither sense experience nor ideas were 
considered privileged as an authoritative basis of knowing.  Thirdly, the rationalist or 
empiricist definition of truth as an isolated correspondence between self and world was 
also rejected.  In its place was the understanding that truth is found in a social context of 
meaning shaped by the practical implications of ideas.  The contextual and foundationless 
aspect of pragmatism then led to disparate epistemological expressions including 
Wittgenstein’s ‘linguistic turn’ in which language was viewed as the vehicle for 
meaning,
282
 and, additionally of particular importance for naturalism, Thomas Kuhn’s 
‘normal science’ working within a framework of an accepted paradigm.   
 Directing his charge at the spirit of Cartesianism in an 1868 essay, Peirce 
concluded that “[w]e have no power of Intuition,” that “every cognition is determined 
logically by previous cognitions,” and that, because there is “no power of thinking without 
signs,” there is no logical reason for positing some foundational point of departure for this 
intellectual process.
283
  Along similar lines of argument Wittgenstein observed in his later 
work that philosophy “may in no way interfere with the actual use of language; it can only 
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describe it…[and] it cannot give it any foundation either.”284  Language, for Wittgenstein, 
is the vehicle for meaning and is context specific.  Just as the meaningfulness of a language 
is governed by its grammar, so too are the activities of thinking defined by the particular 
frame of reference in which it is functioning.  Thus, the rules for constructing meaning are 
products of the coherent system they regulate, rather than the starting points for the play of 
meaning that engenders them.
285
     
 Building on the tradition of pragmatism, Quine and Sellars, who both reject the 
traditional integrity of philosophy as a special discipline for discovering truth, have worked 
to expose the groundlessness in Cartesian / Lockean assumptions of the theorizing in 
virtually all disciplines to explain their subject matter.  In other words, they reject 
foundations of certitude, whether rationally or empirically determined, as the basis for 
knowledge in all types of theoretical thought.  Philosophy, for Sellars, rather than being the 
discipline for determining objective truth, is “the reflective knowing one’s way around in 
the scheme of things.”286     
 Sellars also recognizes that it is not just the rationalists who hold to the idealist 
epistemology of noninferential knowledge as first principles—empiricists do the same.  
The most basic of axiomatic fallacies identified by Sellars is the ‘myth of the given.’  This 
myth, he explains, is “the idea that knowledge of episodes furnishes premises on which 
empirical knowledge rests as on a foundation.”287  His targets here, of course, are the 
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internal episodes, or principles, used as a theoretical foundation for interpretive schemes.  
He takes for granted that the rationalist versions of the myth are obvious as logical 
fallacies.  But these internal episodes are not problematic, as such, but are part of the 
human condition.  It is only when certain aspects of experience are viewed as authoritative 
and regarded as a foundation for other claims to knowledge within a conceptual scheme 
that a problem arises.  John Thiel makes the comment that, according to Sellars, “this myth 
does not preserve a benign or higher truth but perpetuates a logical fallacy that distorts our 
expectations about what knowledge is and how it functions.”288  
 Sellars sets the contextual parameters for the knowledge issue and the dilemma 
surrounding it by asking the question, “[i]f knowledge is justified true belief, how can 
there be such a thing as self-evident knowledge?  And if there is no such thing as self-
evident knowledge, how can any true belief be, in the relevant sense, justified?”289  What 
he is building on here, of course, is the notion that knowledge is in fact ‘justified true 
belief.’290   Though the definition has been debated, it seems to be the generally accepted 
one.  By taking it as the acceptable definition, Sellars exposes the inherent problems of 
knowledge for the philosopher with the notion of the self-evident, or as he calls it, ‘the 
given.’ 
 He challenges the doctrine of ‘the given’ precisely on the issue of the 
epistemological status of foundational beliefs.  In his essay, Epistemological Principles, 
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Sellars critiques philosopher, Roderick Chisholm, on the points of reported knowledge and 
the authority of foundational beliefs.  Foundational beliefs and reported knowledge, to 
qualify as knowledge, must, Sellars argues, be supported by an authority of some type.  
And the person making the report of knowledge must, in some sense, recognize the 
authority to be such.
291
  Authority, for the empiricist, can only lie in the reliable connection 
between what is observed and the generalization that what has been reported by the 
observation is in fact true.
292
  But, how is the truth of the generalization determined?  To 
make that determination, would, of course, imply, as Sellars has noted, that there is a level 
of cognition more basic than believing and would consist of a sub-conceptual awareness of 
certain facts.
293
   
 As a solution to the problem, he proposes a holistic perspective.  His holistic 
approach to the justification of knowledge is placed in a naturalistic setting, whereby, the 
authority of his epistemic principles is construed in terms of “the acquisition of relevant 
linguistic skills.”294  While he acknowledges the authoritative nature of ‘self-evident’ or 
‘intuitive’ knowledge, and that, in the final analysis, it rests on authoritative non-inferential 
propositions, it is, nonetheless, on his view, not to be construed as a foundation.
295
       
 Quine similarly holds an empirical approach to knowledge, but also rejects the 
notion that truth is deduced from sense data through empirical analysis.  More 
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appropriately, he argues, empirical analysis has the task of piecing together ad hoc theories 
derived exclusively from sensory evidence.
296
  Since knowledge and philosophy’s pursuit 
of knowledge is grounded in sense experience, there is no role for philosophy to play as an 
“a priori propaedeutic or groundwork for science.”  Philosophy provides no external 
vantage point from which to appropriate knowledge.  But, rather, philosophy is 
“continuous with science” and functions as a type of empirical investigation that critically 
describes the process by which sensory evidence is formed into the web of concepts that 
make up knowledge.
297
      
 In his essay “Two Dogmas of Empiricism” Quine called into question the belief that 
each justifiable belief could be traced to special foundational beliefs derived directly from 
experience.
298
  The error in this, he argues, is that the attempt to salvage a special 
indubitable kind of knowledge based on concepts and their relations, fails, because we are 
always able (and sometimes willing) to adjust the meanings of terms in order to maintain 
the truth of the claims.  Building on this, Quinean holism requires that the whole of 
conceptual knowledge face the tribunal of experience, thus allowing for shifts in the 
meaning of concepts due to the pressure from new discoveries and theoretical changes. 
 Theoretical knowledge, for Quine, is context bound.  That is, meaningful theories 
are not context-free, but are limited by their particular disciplines and unable to transcend 
their conceptual schemes to a universal explanation.  Theories are not fully interpreted 
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sentences and determinate explanations of their subject matter because they are always 
located within ever widening language contexts.  Quine views this approach as holistic 
epistemology.  The metaphor that best describes this position is a web.  This web of 
concepts, for Quine, is a metaphor to counter the foundation metaphor.  A sympathetic 
student and supporter of Quine, Nancey Murphy understands his holism as a belief 
“supported by its ties to its neighboring beliefs and, ultimately, to the whole.”299  
Additionally, coherence within the web is critical for justification of belief.  Justification 
within the web “consists in showing that problematic beliefs are closely tied to beliefs that 
we have no good reason to call into question.”300 
 While Sellars and Quine focused on philosophical issues in general, Rorty has 
directed his efforts at subverting the epistemological tradition in particular.  Also interested 
in exposing the illusion of foundations for knowledge and rationality, he takes as his 
investigative field the history of philosophy, unlike Sellars and Quine who address the 
logical framework of theories.
301
  Rorty, nonetheless, acknowledges his dependence on the 
work of Sellars and Quine when he says; 
 
I interpret Sellars’s attack on ‘givenness’ and Quine’s attack on ‘necessity’ 
as the crucial steps in undermining the possibility of a ‘theory of 
knowledge.’  The holism and pragmatism common to both philosophers, 
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and which they share with the later Wittgenstein, are the lines of thought 
within analytic philosophy which I wish to extend.
302
  
   
In his work, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Rorty sets out to, in his words, 
“undermine the reader’s confidence in ‘the mind’ as something about which one should 
have a ‘philosophical’ view, in ‘knowledge’ as something about which there ought to be a 
‘theory’ and which has ‘foundations,’ and in ‘philosophy’ as it has been conceived since 
Kant.”303  He commences his deconstruction project by exposing the erroneous attempt by 
rationalist and empiricist epistemologies to privilege some aspect of mental life, or 
experience that grounds claims to genuine knowledge.  This scheme, then, portrays 
thinking, or experience, as an activity with the capability to mirror reality and is the avenue 
for establishing a certain foundation for knowledge and belief.  Rorty’s argument, explains 
John Thiel, is that modern philosophy’s ocular metaphor of the mind as a mirror reflecting 
the objective truths of reality encouraged the supposition that knowledge possesses a basis 
as immediate and as certain as a visual representation in an experience of optical 
perception.
304
   
 In his assessment of the history of epistemology, Rorty contends that two clearly 
distinguishable components to knowledge emerged.  The first is the factual element given 
to consciousness and the second is the constructive, or interpretative, element contributed 
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by the mind, or by language.  But Rorty’s contention is that Sellars’ critique of the ‘myth 
of the given’ and Quine’s skepticism about the language-fact distinction constitute a 
decisive rejection of these, mistakenly, indispensable ideas.
305
  Rorty’s principle argument 
against foundations, however, is in its use of metaphorical undercurrents for epistemic 
theorizing that have prejudiced the conceptualization of how knowing occurs.
306
  
 Equally important to the neo-Kantian epistemic project, argues Rorty, is the 
proposition that the aim of thought, or language, is correspondence to reality and the 
accuracy of representation.  But in light of Wittgenstein’s argument that approaches 
language through the notion of ‘use’ rather than that of ‘picturing,’ this proposition has 
also been soundly undermined.
307
  The attempt to affirm the mind as the measure of 
certainty and to privilege philosophy as the seat of veridical authority is, according to 
Rorty, a misguided Cartesian desire. 
 Pragmatism, analytic philosophy, and the philosophy of science have successfully 
exposed the sorts of foundationalism espoused by the Cartesian / Lockean and neo-Kantian 
projects as unwitting expressions of a rationalist variety of dogmatism, which, according to 
many, cannot pass the test of close rational analysis.  Particularly, the work of Sellars, 
Quine, and Rorty has been so effective and compelling that Thiel has remarked that “a 
consensus has been reached in the scholarly community that at least any naïve or ‘strong’ 
form of foundationalism is philosophically untenable.”308    
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 With the ostensible collapse of foundationalism as the justificatory basis for beliefs, 
the obvious question then becomes—how are beliefs justified?  Or, are they at all?  The 
answer to this question is critical, not only for knowledge, but for any kind of explanation 
of rationality.  For if what Robert Audi says is accurate, that “[b]eliefs are the basic 
elements of theoretical rationality,” then what constitutes a justified belief is inseparable 
from a view of rationality.  A rational belief is a justified belief.
309
  And if Sellars’s 
assumption that knowledge is ‘justified true belief,’ is true, then what constitutes 
knowledge and how it is acquired has much to do with the grounding or justification of 
propositions.  The main concern for this project, then, is raised again—can naturalism’s 
foundational belief that only a material reality exists for certain be considered knowledge?  
According to the leading twentieth century critical thinkers above, it may be proposed, but 
cannot be considered a universal certainty, rather, only contextualized ‘knowledge.’  If this 
is the case, how then does naturalism qualify as the privileged view?    
Knowledge and Justification   
 Understanding the fundamental bases for the categories religion and science has 
come under the scrutiny of the philosophy of religion and the philosophy of science.  
These relatively new disciplines exist because of the many basic questions that religion and 
science have not made clear.  Despite the above discussion, philosophy has attempted to 
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solve that.  Philosopher of science, Alex Rosenberg, makes this comment about philosophy 
and science; 
 
Philosophy deals with two sets of questions: First, the questions that science 
– physical, biological, social, behavioral cannot answer now and perhaps 
may never be able to answer.  Second, the questions about why the sciences 
cannot answer the first lot of questions.
310
 
 
How much progress is being made is questionable, however.  The current transformation in 
the discipline of philosophy is making continued dialogue with religion and science 
regarding knowledge even more difficult.
311
  Some contemporary philosophers take the 
view that philosophy is at a turning point in need of transformation, and some are simply 
calling for its end as a specialized discipline questioning the value of the ‘philosophy’ of 
anything.  One thing is certain, the classical philosophical categories of metaphysics, 
epistemology, and ethics have all come under critical scrutiny.  The editors of After 
Philosophy: End or Transformation?, Kenneth Baynes, James Bohman, and Thomas 
McCarthy, have categorized contemporary philosophers into two groups; the end-of-
philosophy thinkers and the transformation-of-philosophy thinkers.
312
   
 All of these philosophers, or postphilosophers as they have been termed, reject 
Cartesian and neo-Kantian epistemology on several counts, which include: regarding the 
                                                          
310  Alex Rosenberg, Philosophy of Science (London: Routledge, 2000) 4. 
 
311 Much of the following discussion on the status of contemporary philosophy was gleaned from Baynes, Bohman, and 
McCarthy, “General Introduction,” After Philosophy.  
   
312 Representatives of the end-of-philosophy group are Rorty, Derrida, Foucault and Lyotard.  The transformation-of-
philosophy group is sub-divided into herneneutics, which includes Ricour and Gadamer, and systematic philosophers, 
which includes Putnam, Habermas, MacIntyre and Davidson. 
 
 156 
 
subject of knowledge and action as punctual, atomistic, and disembodied; rational 
autonomy in terms of an ideal of total disengagement; appeals to immediate, intuitive self-
presence as the basis of self-knowledge; and full self-transparence as a sensible ideal of 
self-knowledge.
313
  Additionally, they have all made the ‘linguistic turn,’ pursuing 
Nietzche’s idea that philosophical texts are rhetorical constructs.  While all start from the 
pluralism of language games and forms of life, not all agree that this is an irreducible 
pluralism of incommensurable language games.
314
 
 These disagreements are manifest in at least three areas, the first being the area of 
truth.  The end-of-philosophy group understands truth to be totally immanent and 
contextually derived while the transformation group understands it to have a transcendent 
aspect.  The second area is that of knowledge.  The transformers want to continue inquiry 
and critical reflection, which, in their minds, will bring about greater understanding.  Those 
who want to see an end to philosophy claim, however, that the notion that true meaning is 
discoverable through inquiry is a fallacy due to the essential undecidability of meaning.  
And the third area dividing the end / transformation of philosophical approaches is the role 
of theory in philosophy generally, and philosophy’s relation to the human sciences 
particularly.  The end-of-philosophy advocates oppose the continuation of theoretical 
philosophy while the transformation group conceives of their work to be a continuation of 
practical, and not theoretical, philosophy.
315
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 The end-of-philosophy thinkers, who will be the main focus here, include Sellars, 
Quine, and Rorty.
316
  Several distinctive features affecting epistemology in particular, 
characterize this group of philosophers.  Opposition to strong conceptions of reason and 
the autonomous rational self, contingency, and conventionality, are fundamental to their 
view.  The first significant implication of this position is the decenteredness of the human 
rational subject as discussed above.  The rational subject for this group is decentered with 
the most poignant expression in the area of knowledge.  Knowledge for this group is 
“essentially embodied and practically engaged with the world, and the products of our 
thought bear ineradicable traces of our purposes and projects, passions and 
interests…[T]he epistemological and moral subject has been definitely decentered and the 
conception of reason linked to it irrevocably desublimated.”317  In this view reason and 
knowledge have lost their transcendent nature. 
 Another salient implication is that the traditional notion of knowledge as 
representation has been replaced with the concept that “the object of knowledge is always 
already preinterpreted, situated in a scheme, part of a text, outside which there are only 
other texts.”  From this perspective, then, “the subject of knowledge belongs to the very 
world it wishes to interpret.”  The condition for forming disinterested representations of 
the world is engagement with it and the kinds of representations formed will depend on the 
kind of dealings experienced with it.  Thus, underlying propositional knowledge “is a 
largely inarticulate and unarticulatable grasp of the world that we have as agents within 
it…who are essentially embodied and the locus of orientations and desires that we never 
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fully grasp or control.”  The idea of a knowing subject disengaged from the body and from 
the world, therefore, makes no sense.  For there is no knowledge without a background, 
and that background can never be wholly objectified.
318
   
 The picture revealed here clearly represents a discipline that is experiencing a 
radical departure from Cartesian / neo-Kantian philosophical reflection.  Descartes looked 
for intuitive certainty in his cultural crisis while today’s postphilosophers question that 
wisdom and find the very idea of certitude unacceptable.  The shift in epistemic emphasis 
has not only chastened rationality, but also undermined Kant’s critique of pure reason.      
 Rationality, then, for postmodernity seems to reside within particular contexts and 
is significant, pragmatically, for the purpose of finding one’s way around within them.  It 
also seems clear that modernity’s claim to a privileged position for autonomous reason has 
come to an end.  As an alternative to autonomy, Quine offers the beginnings of a more 
modest proposal for an appropriate contemporary description of knowledge and rationality 
when he writes; 
Much that we know does not count as science [knowledge], but this is often 
less due to its subject matter than to its arrangement.  For nearly any body 
of knowledge that is sufficiently organized to exhibit appropriate evidential 
relationships among its constituent claims has at least some call to be seen 
as scientific.  What makes for science is system, whatever the subject.  And 
what makes for system is the judicious application of logic.  Science is thus 
a fruit of rational investigation.
319
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If Quine’s understanding can be taken as representative of the postphilosophers,320 then 
rationality includes the employment of normative logic for the organization of knowledge 
in order to “exhibit appropriate evidential relationships among its constituent claims.”  
Another way to express it is that rationality is conformity to the relationships of knowledge 
organized by the deductive laws of logic and has an ‘instrumental’ function only.  Not that 
this notion is necessarily new, but it reflects a more moderate (chastened) perspective with 
respect to the limitations of reason.  In the following schema, Sellars addresses the 
function of deductive logic in producing inferential knowledge.  On his account “logical 
implication transmits reasonableness” with the transmission via ‘probabilistic’ implication.  
He explains;   
It is reasonable, all things considered, to believe p;  So, p;  p 
probabilistically implies q to a high degree;  So, all things considered, it is 
reasonable to believe q. 
  
Probabilistic justification of beliefs in accordance with this pattern would, 
presumably, be illustrated by inductive arguments and theoretical 
explanations.  In each case, we move from a premise of the form: 
 
It is reasonable, all things considered, to believe E, where ‘E’ formulates the 
evidence, to a conclusion of the form:   
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It is reasonable, all things considered, to believe H,  where ‘H’ formulates 
in the first case a law-like statement and in the second case a body of 
theoretical assumptions.
321
    
 
This simple formulation demonstrates the extent of the function of logic for Sellars.  Quine 
and Sellars hold similar views on reason, at least in terms of its linear deductive function.  
Reason, or logic, is the method that deduces one belief from another and forms a coherent 
system of beliefs, which, then, constitutes rationality.  But the question of justification still 
remains unanswered.  
 If there is no indubitable foundation for grounding beliefs, then what constitutes 
justification for the postphilosophers?  The answer is that although many postphilosophers 
hold to a weak foundationalism, most hold to some type of coherentist theory of belief 
justification.
322
  With the coherentist account, beliefs are not grounded to a base of 
noninferentially known certitudes.  But what distinguishes a coherence theory from a 
foundationalist theory?  Donald Davidson answers that it “is simply the claim that nothing 
can count as a reason for holding a belief except another belief.”323  In other words, the 
justification of a belief depends on its coherence with the other beliefs one already holds to 
be true.  For the coherentist, nothing exists outside the totality of one’s beliefs with which 
to test or compare new propositions.  All that counts as evidence or justification for a 
proposed belief, explains Davidson, “must come from the same totality of belief to which 
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it belongs.”324  The authority for justification resides not in the certainty of “the given,” or 
the “self-evident,” but in a network of mutually supportive beliefs. 
 The postmodern outlook has adopted cultural context, or conceptual scheme, as the 
necessary and exclusive reference point for reflection and analysis.
325
  What is rejected is 
the Cartesian / Kantian ideal of an objective perspective outside of one’s particular context 
as the vantage point for evaluation.  No transcendent universal exists, or at least none that 
is accessible, by which to objectively evaluate one belief against another.  As Rorty 
explains it, “nothing counts as justification unless by reference to what we already accept, 
and that there is no way to get outside our beliefs and our language so as to find some test 
other than coherence.”326  So, in postmodern thought, the interpreting subject is context 
bound, and what is considered reasonable depends on the orientation of the viewer or 
interpreter.  
 Of course the immediate claim by foundationalists is that nonfoundationalism 
(coherentism) is an infinite regress of beliefs that ultimately ends in relativism, circular 
reasoning, or skepticism.
327
  In the absence of foundations, they maintain, the task of 
justifying belief would lead to an infinite regress in the logic of justification and Locke’s 
fear of the enthusiasts’ “anything goes” attitude would certainly be a legitimate conclusion.  
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The thought is that without a terminal point to ground beliefs, then no final authoritative 
claim could be reached and opinion would multiply endlessly.   
 This claim, though a viable one, has been addressed by the coherentists.  The 
assumption in the claim, then, is that justification must be finite and a foundation provides 
the only means for insuring it.  From a practical standpoint, the notion of an infinite regress 
is highly unlikely simply due to time and human patience.  Davidson comments that, 
“giving reasons never comes to an end,”328 but the regress eventually stops when sufficient 
warrant (whatever that might be) for the belief in question is reached.  Though the 
possibility of an infinite set of beliefs is unlikely, having a sufficient quantity to warrant a 
finite regress is not.  Coherentist Michael Williams explains that “at any given time we 
must have some stock of beliefs which are not thought to be open to challenge, though any 
one of them may come under fire.”329  But this is not unusual; it is as per design.  All 
beliefs within a conceptual coherent scheme are susceptible to criticism.  As Sellars once 
put it, basic beliefs are vulnerable, “though not all at once…because it is a self-correcting 
enterprise which can put any claim in jeopardy.”330   
 The remaining issue is the one of the incommensurability of conceptual schemes, 
which is inherent within postmodern coherentism.  How are conceptual schemes 
(worldviews) to be compared and contrasted with respect to value and truth?  If all 
worldviews are independent, self-contained systems of belief with no common ground 
between them, then no means exist for making value judgments between one view and 
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another.  Once reason is denied its transcendent capabilities, judgments then become 
intuitive, relative, and subjective assertions.  Judgments regarding truth and error, good 
and evil, right and wrong, in any absolute sense, cannot be made.  If this is the case, then 
what difference does it make what anyone, individually or collectively, believes?   
 All worldviews, then, are ultimately of equal value and equally meaningful.  
Philosophical naturalism, for instance, has no rational basis for making its exclusive claim 
to knowledge and truth, but it still makes it.  From Hume to Nietzsche to Freud, to Russell, 
to the contemporary ‘new atheists,’ philosophical naturalists have affirmed that only the 
material world is knowable.  Many have additionally asserted that not only is the material 
world all that is knowable, it is all that exists.  A non-material reality does not exist, they 
maintain.  These are epistemological and metaphysical claims, which qualify as clear and 
distinct ideas positioned as foundational beliefs.  A foundation is necessary for naturalism.  
These beliefs are the presuppositions, the first philosophy, the ‘givens’ for philosophical 
naturalism.  Many agree with Carl Sagan’s now famous proclamation, “the cosmos is all 
that is or ever was or ever shall be.”331  This is a truth claim about existence and the nature 
of reality—a claim to knowledge.  However, no proof or evidence is offered for these most 
basic postulated beliefs.  Rather, the claims are, in the words of philosopher of science, 
John Lennox, “not a statement of science, but of his personal belief.”332          
Summary  
 The purpose of the foregoing discussion was twofold; one, to reveal the general and 
contemporary philosophical context in which naturalism is situated, and two, to explore 
                                                          
331 Carl Sagan, The Cosmos (New York: Random House, 1980) 4. 
 
332 John Lennox, God’s Undertaker: Has Science Buried God? (Oxford: Lion Hudson plc, 2009) 30. 
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this context in some detail as it relates to questions of epistemology, the concept of 
rationality, and the religion / science dichotomy.  To be sure, current philosophical debate 
includes more than just the topic of reason and epistemology.  However, the discussion 
was delimited intentionally in order to highlight the fundamental philosophical elements 
facing naturalism and the idea of religion.  It was necessary for a greater understanding of 
naturalism’s position by exploring the philosophical developments and specific 
philosophers from the late nineteenth century to the present, with an emphasis on 
epistemology.  The twentieth century philosophical ethos has left its mark not only on 
Kuhn and his views on paradigm shifts and normal science, but also on theism and the so-
called religious views.  As was noted above, the collapse of epistemological 
foundationalism has left modernity bankrupt.    
 If the current state of philosophy is reasonably close to the above characterization, 
then any possible application of its conclusions by philosophical naturalism or theism may 
seem extremely remote.   Justified knowledge, therefore, depends on epistemic 
assumptions that classical foundationalism and current nonfoundational criticism alike 
have rendered unwarranted.  Previous chapters explored modern theism’s commitment to 
the principles of Cartesian / Lockean epistemology and its eventual failure due to its 
inability to produce satisfactory evidence that met the criteria for knowledge required by 
classical foundationalism.  As a consequence, theism was relegated to an irrelevant non-
science and put out of the mainstream of intellectual dialogue.  This chapter explored the 
impact of the postmodern project on philosophical naturalism and it, similar to theism, was 
found to be lacking rational justification.   
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 Moreover, modern empirical positivism and postmodern versions of ‘naturalized’ 
epistemology find any claims to knowledge from privileged assumptions, whether 
empirically or rationally generated, unwarranted.  That philosophical naturalism is 
inextricably bound to propositions that are epistemically foundational presents an obvious 
problem.  It seems that the philosophy of naturalism as a worldview has based its concept 
of knowledge on a ‘metaphysical’ naturalism that cannot withstand current critical thought.   
 A critical analysis of the influences of twentieth century thought on naturalism is 
overdue.  Philosophy has critiqued itself and found that it was lacking.  As a result, 
postmodern philosophers, like their Cartesian predecessors, have placed a challenge before 
all who claim to have knowledge.  But the rules that now qualify acceptable knowledge 
have changed and naturalists need to be aware of that.  However, awareness is only part of 
the program of self-evaluation.  Position adjustments also need to be made.  How can 
exclusive knowledge and truth continue to be claimed by naturalists without forfeiting 
consistency and, therefore, integrity?  According to twentieth century critical thought, truth 
claims cannot be universal without a foundation of certainty, but are relative to a particular 
context.  Truth claims only apply within a particular context, or conceptual scheme, or 
worldview.  Different worldviews are, then, incommensurate.  Within the postmodern 
context there is no common ground from which to judge the truth or error of the belief 
system as a whole.  Any worldview claiming exclusive knowledge and privilege would, 
therefore, be misinformed and misguided.  To be rationally justified, philosophical 
naturalism, as well as theism, need to prove their first principles—the presuppositions to 
their worldviews.  As philosopher, David Naugle, has rightly stated, “[t]he struggle over 
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first principles marks the human condition.”333  For theism, the existence of God must be 
rationally demonstrated, and for philosophical naturalism, that matter only exists and is 
eternal are presuppositions that must also be rationally demonstrated.  If neither can do 
this, then skepticism or fideism (a type of skepticism) must be affirmed.  Both skepticism 
and fideism assume that basic things are not clear to reason (not readily knowable) and 
each, then, fails to rationally justify knowledge, which therefore ends in meaninglessness.  
In other words, if one cannot determine which view is based on knowledge and which is 
not, how does one make a meaningful choice?  What criteria are used to choose one view 
over another?  If one cannot know, then the choice is based on feelings.  If one cannot 
know, then the choice makes no ultimate difference—it is essentially a meaningless choice.  
 In summation, the demise of epistemic foundationalism, of the Cartesian and 
Lockean variety at least, seems for many thinkers in the twentieth century to be a foregone 
conclusion.  What were thought by Enlightenment standards to be ‘givens’ and 
foundational building blocks for knowledge no longer retain that privileged position.  Self-
evident truths and certainty once believed to be found in universal norms or standards, 
which could be determined either empirically (Locke) with uninterpreted sensations, or 
rationally (Descartes) with logically unchallengeable ideas, is now suspect.  What has 
become clear to the postphilosophers is that the Enlightenment dream of a universal 
standard of rationality, a single method for determining truth and error and universally 
acceptable common ground for conversation, are Enlightenment ideals of modernity rooted 
in epistemic foundationalism that have been undermined by twentieth century criticism.  
Stout’s pronouncement that the basis for a foundational type cognitive structure seems to 
                                                          
333 David K. Naugle, Worldview: The History of a Concept (Grand Rapids: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Co., 2002) 
xvii. 
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have truly come undone, has been taken seriously.
334
  Foundationalism, born of 
enlightened critical philosophic reflection, has been determined to have missed the mark 
and has, indeed, been declared bankrupt.   
 Postphilosophers have argued that this type of knowledge theory has led to the 
erroneous view that beliefs are justified by an objective demonstration of proof and 
evidence.  There is no god’s eye view from which to objectively make value judgments.  
There is no way to objectively judge between truth and error.  The current epistemic 
atmosphere precludes it.  Proof and evidence are perspectival in nature and epistemological 
relativism has determined that what can be considered ‘true’ is true only for a specific 
context.      
 The epistemological movement in the twentieth century undermined the entire 
structure, foundation and all, upon which naturalism has been constructed.  Privileged 
assumptions postulated as starting points for rational reflection were challenged and 
reduced to presumptive subjectivism by pragmatic philosophers.  Cartesian axiomatic 
givens as certain truths, objective vantage points, knowledge as a subjugation of reality by 
the mind, and true statements as a direct and exhaustive mirroring of reality in 
propositional form are all ideals determined to be unattainable.  These and many other 
attempts by Western philosophy to achieve indubitable knowledge about the nature of 
reality have all collapsed under the heavy scrutiny of contemporary intellectual thought.  
Achieving an objective perspective for a privileged view of reality and for grasping truth, 
                                                          
334 Jeffrey Stout argues that Cartesian epistemic foundationalism is now an historical fact and finished as a philosophical 
issue, The Flight From Authority, Parts 1, 2. 
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which naturalism claims, is not to be had, according to many of the most influential voices 
in recent critical thought. 
  In the world of postmodernity, metanarratives as grand interpretive strategies with 
a universal rationality to appropriate them, such as Islam, Christianity, or Darwinian 
evolution, have not fared well, but have been replaced with contextualized stories and 
contextualized rationality.  Conceptual schemes, framed by ‘culturally derived’ sociology, 
psychology, economy, or history that have shaped and formulated traditions by which 
reality is defined, make up the postmodern perspective.  Human reason as the primary 
privileged capacity once considered able to autonomously discover knowledge of reality 
has been chastened and a more modest view has emerged. 
 In light of these twentieth century conclusions, it appears that naturalism has no 
rational basis, or proof, for claiming exclusive knowledge.  At best, it can only claim 
contextual, circular, consistency.  It is only one view among many, incommensurate with 
all others, and unable to claim privilege.  Epistemological relativism allows all views to 
have their day.  None can be determined to be right or wrong, true or false, good or evil.  
The postmodern ethos has removed, at least theoretically, the ostensible conflict between 
science and religion.  The popular paradigm and dichotomy collapse due to lack of 
evidence on each side.  If there is no rational proof to favor the God hypothesis, what 
rational proof is there, then, to favor the matter only hypothesis?  Why should one view be 
believed rather than the other?  How, then, can naturalism justify its claim to exclusivity?  
Privilege has been reduced to feelings and power.  But whose feelings and whose power 
qualifies as the authority?  
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 Additionally, the implications of applied postmodernity can be, arguably, culturally 
detrimental.  As just noted above, with no rational basis for making distinctions between 
true and false, good and evil, and right and wrong, then choices, whether individually or 
culturally, lose their meaning and significance.  All perspectives on reality are of equal 
value.  If all choices are ultimately of equal value then they are equally meaningful.  If all 
choices are equally meaningful then they are all equally meaningless.  How do cultures 
survive when faced with a relativistic, meaningless existence—when all views are of equal 
value?  With these statements a relativized pluralism is magnified to its logical conclusion.                          
 Some ‘transformation of philosophy’ scholars, however, have attempted to salvage 
the modern project due to the unacceptable implications of postmodern thought, like the 
ones just mentioned.  They believe that a foundation for knowledge of some type is 
imperative for knowledge and that coherentism (non-foundationalism) is unable to avoid a 
skepticism that inherently leads to various forms of subjectivism, relativism and ultimate 
loss of meaning—nihilism.  Some of these philosophers who affirm the need for a 
foundation for knowledge also argue that philosophical naturalism cannot defend its first 
principles and is therefore untenable.  The early part of this chapter mentioned two 
challenges to naturalism.  The first was to challenge the very idea of a foundation for 
knowledge, which has just been explored.  The second was to defend the validity of a 
foundation for knowledge and to challenge the basic foundational beliefs of philosophical 
naturalism, which unfortunately will need to be considered in a different project.  
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Chapter 6 
CONCLUSION AND PROJECT SUMMARY 
 Much of Western scholarship has subscribed to the naturalistic philosophy 
assuming it is objective and neutral.  Many scholars in the area of religious studies have 
approached their research from what they believe to be a neutral position not recognizing 
that their uncritically presupposed naturalistic first principles preclude that neutrality.  
Examples include the ‘classical theories of religion’ where scholars like Hume, Tylor, 
Freud, and Durkheim attempted to interpret and explain the origin of belief systems that 
were understood to be non-naturalistic.  Continuing the tradition, contemporary scholars 
such as Samuel Preus, Donald Wiebe, and Pascal Boyer, as discussed in chapter one, also 
approach their research using the same naturalistic methodology that assumes objectivity 
and neutrality as well as the common religion / science paradigm.  But if naturalism has no 
rational justification for its position, then it becomes just another opinion and methodology 
from which scholarly inquiry is made.  Why should it be the privileged methodology?  The 
popular approach can no longer be supported.  It is inaccurate, inadequate, and therefore 
unacceptable.  Perhaps it is time for a Kuhnian paradigm shift.     
 It has already been introduced above that there is perhaps a better way to 
understand the world’s diverse belief systems, rather than the typically assumed natural / 
supernatural model.  While the natural / supernatural divide is relevant, it leaves too much 
unclear.   The notion of natural or supernatural is not comprehensive enough or basic 
enough.  There are views that do not fall into one of these categories.  A more accurate and 
satisfying approach divides belief systems at a more basic level—at the level of the nature 
of existence.  Our most basic concept is about existence, whether something exists or does 
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not exist and whether it has always existed or came into existence.
335
  All views have a 
belief about the nature of existence.  This approach reveals the most basic presuppositions 
of belief systems.       
 The proposed alternative approach eliminates the term ‘religion’ as the delimiting 
label for a particular category of belief, and replaces it with the term, Weltanschauung, a 
more inclusive term for the world’s belief systems.  The term Weltanschauung is a German 
word that means ‘worldview’ and functions as a concept that describes a perspective of the 
world.  All humans, individually and collectively, affirm beliefs about the nature of the 
world and how it works.  The idea of ‘worldview’ offers a different framework by which to 
categorize the world’s various understandings of reality.  In its most basic sense, 
worldview can be understood as a set of beliefs that give meaning to one’s, or a culture’s, 
experience.  Just below is a chart (a worldview model) that shows how belief systems have 
analyzable formal structures that allow for grouping according to fundamental beliefs.  
These beliefs then produce the descriptive data of phenomenology.    
 The idea of ‘worldview’ encompasses a broad range of concepts, which includes 
metaphysics, epistemology, and ethics.
336
  It is used to express a unified comprehensive 
system of concepts that form a metanarrative and attempts to present a coherent view of 
existence by interpreting and explaining the meaning and purpose of the world and life in 
its totality.  As human beings, we tend to subscribe to and place ourselves into a grand, or 
master, narrative that forms a type of cultural and/or linguistic framework or medium that 
                                                          
335  Some believe only a material world exists and has always existed, some believe that only a spiritual reality exists and 
has always existed, some believe that both matter and spirit exist and have always existed, and some believe a spiritual 
reality has always existed that brought into existence a material reality.  Gangadean, Philosophical Foundation, 40. 
 
336  David Naugle, in his Worldview: The History of a Concept explains this point on worldview as “a semiotic system of 
world-interpreting stories also provides a foundation or governing platform upon or by which people think, interpret, and 
know.” (291). 
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shapes the entirety of life and thought.  As such, it is unavoidably a metaphysical system 
and is interconnected to epistemology and ethics.  The term ‘religion’ has become 
confusing regarding its specific referent.  It does not have characteristics that distinguish it 
from what it is not and therefore lacks clarity in scholarly works.  For this reason the term 
‘religion’ ought to be replaced by the term ‘worldview.’    
 As just discussed above, worldviews can be divided into two separate and 
contradictory categories.  These categories are determined by what is believed to be 
eternal—ultimate reality.  If a chart is developed that shows how the world’s diverse views 
relate and how they are different based on their most basic belief of what is eternal, it 
would look something like the following;
337
 
 
                                            All that exists is eternal                  Some that exists is eternal (some is temporal) 
                                    (implies creation) 
        _____________________________________ 
   
  Dualism                       Spiritual Monism          Material Monism                        Theism 
    _______ _           ______________________ 
                                                         
               Ancient Greece,      Hinduism  Buddhism        Naturalism           Deism Judaism Christianity Islam   
                 Persia 
 
      
This chart indicates the primary division of beliefs between worldviews based not on 
natural / supernatural, or spirit / matter, but on the basic belief about eternal existence.  The 
fundamental divide is between all that exists is eternal and only some that exists is eternal.  
The mind, logically, cannot ask a more basic question than; what has always existed?  
Given the belief that something is eternal, all or some, less basic beliefs are then deduced 
regarding what it is that is eternal.  Is it matter or non-matter or both that ultimately exists?  
Answers to these metaphysical questions regarding the nature of existence are the answers 
                                                          
337  The concepts and divisions here were formulated by Surrendra Gangadean in his Philosophical Foundation. 
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that make up worldviews.  These beliefs then produce less basic beliefs and then, as a 
system of beliefs, produce particular practices (ethics).  Beliefs about what is real (eternal) 
result in behaviors that provide meaning to the respective believers.  Much more could be 
said here, but due to the constraints of the project this will need to suffice.   
Project Summary  
 This project has argued that the category distinction between science and religion, 
as the current paradigm conceives it, is a fabrication by modernity and needs to be 
deconstructed and reformulated.  The grounds for the two categories have been examined 
and were found to be insufficient.  Additionally, there is no rational basis for considering 
naturalism a privileged view—the only view constructed on knowledge.  As it is, the 
dichotomy is perpetuated and confusion implicitly reigns.   
 This confusion, both inside and outside of academia, abounds.  In a recent speech 
concerning terrorism and the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant, the President of the 
United States, Barack Obama, made this statement, “ISIL is not ‘Islamic.’ No religion 
condones the killing of innocents, and the vast majority of ISIL's victims have been 
Muslim.”338  What is the point of this statement?  The President seems to be making a 
judgment regarding what religion is and what it is not.  How clear is this statement?  Is the 
President reflecting a universally understood concept or his personal opinion regarding the 
idea of religion and ISIL?  While he is certainly free to express his opinion, it is offered 
authoritatively, highly nuanced, and at the expense of clarity of thought.  
 This project has argued that the reason for the confusion is due to the way 
modernity has defined and framed the relationship between belief systems.  According to 
                                                          
338  http://www.cnn.com/2014/09/10/politics/transcript-obama-syria-isis-speech/ 
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what has been proposed in this project, a more accurate assessment of ISIL is that it is a 
worldview (or ideology) with beliefs that give meaning and significance to its experience.  
Like naturalism, ISIL, regardless of whether it is considered a religion or not, is 
interpreting and explaining the nature of the world and how it works.  Formally and 
functionally, naturalism and ISIL are the same.  Each view, however, has a different most 
basic belief from which it begins its reasoning process.  They each presuppose a different 
‘given,’ a different first principle as their starting point.  Belief systems, ideologies—
essentially worldviews—are competing for the hearts and minds of humanity.  Worldviews 
are built on foundational beliefs and result in full-orbed cultural expression.  The issue of 
religion or non-religion does not contribute, but detracts from the fruitful understanding of 
cultural expression.     
 The confusion over how to understand the religion category is only part of the 
problem, however.  Enlightened modernity has sought rational clarity and knowledge 
against the dictates of dogmatism and personal opinion.  While the value of reason and 
empirical investigation has been highlighted as modernity’s exclusive means to achieve 
certainty, clarity, and truth; naturalism as the method to achieve it has fallen short.    
 The cause of the tension between the religion / science categories has been 
explored with workable definitions offered.  It was argued that all belief systems formally 
function for the purpose of giving meaning to experience.  All views then, whether 
considered ‘religious’ or not, serve the same function and purpose.  This point alone 
should be enough to dissolve the dichotomy; however, naturalism has resisted this thought, 
which necessitates a stronger argument.  Historical support was needed.   
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 The category dichotomy between science and religion developed in conjunction 
with the intellectual developments through the modern period with an emphasis on 
epistemology.  As a result of the intellectual climate of the day, modern science took a 
particular direction.  Subsequent to the cultural crisis created by the Protestant 
Reformation, an environment consisting of questions surrounding the nature of authority, 
knowledge, reason, and certainty were of central concern.  Consequently, the subject of 
epistemology, ‘is knowledge possible’ was a formidable question—one to which modern 
philosophy attempted to respond.   
 The rise and development of Western modernity with its particular emphasis on the 
move from science within a Christian theistic framework to a non-theistic philosophy of 
naturalism was explored.  As the new science transformed into a worldview philosophy 
and gained dominance, the once commanding Christian theistic view declined and was 
then marginalized and determined irrelevant for dialogue in the public square.  Views 
incommensurate with the new empirical naturalism were categorized, beginning with 
Christianity, as religion, which would then ultimately become an expanded class and 
represented by the term, World Religions.  These views opposing naturalism, these World 
Religions, needed their origins, beliefs, and practices interpreted and explained to which 
religion theorists responded with a new academic discipline—the science of religion.  The 
basic question of David Hume would then need to be addressed, from whence did these 
belief systems—these religions—arise?  
 The religion / science paradigm was assessed by a twentieth century challenge.  It 
specifically challenged naturalism’s claim to exclusive knowledge.  It explained the 
epistemological strategy of non-foundationalism, the epistemic basis for postmodernity 
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that has questioned the very idea of a foundation for objective knowledge that leads to 
certainty.   
 This work also argued that the category and the term, ‘religion,’ is no longer useful 
for a consistent and meaningful advancement of human knowledge and understanding.  It 
argued that the category and term have been misappropriated by modernity in order to 
advance a particular epistemology and worldview—a particular philosophy of science and 
religion.   
 With the dichotomy and paradigm deconstructed, the project then developed a 
radical proposal for better understanding diverse worldviews.  An alternative conceptual 
scheme was offered that has the potential to avoid the difficulties and connotative baggage 
associated with the term ‘religion’ and the resultant theories about origin and nature (e.g. 
cultural, psychological, social, etc.).  The alternative term and concept is the German word, 
Weltanschauung (worldview), which is definable, comprehensive, and distinguishable 
from what it is not.  It was argued that the concept, Weltanschauung, in conjunction with 
basic beliefs, offers a different framework by which to categorize the world’s various 
understandings of reality and showed how this can be done.  Gangadean’s presuppositional 
approach was proposed as a method and conceptual scheme that establishes the basic 
beliefs of particular worldviews and then deduces less basic beliefs from them.  When 
viewed as a whole it forms a system of beliefs.  In its most basic sense, ‘worldview’ can be 
understood as a set of beliefs that give meaning to one’s, or a culture’s, experience.  It 
shows how belief systems have analyzable formal structures that allow for grouping 
according to fundamental beliefs.  These beliefs then produce the descriptive data of 
phenomenology.  
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 This approach also calls for the presuppositions of the researcher and theorist to be 
identified.  While an objective and fair assessment of the various worldviews is the desired 
goal, it must be understood that no particular approach to the interpretation and 
explanation of these views is neutral.  A naturalistic approach is not a neutral approach.  
All worldviews and the worldviews of ‘religious studies’ students and researchers assume 
something about the nature of what is ultimate, how it is known, and ‘the good’ for human 
beings.  The conclusions drawn from these studies reflect the perspective of the interpreter 
/ explainer.  The significant question that needs to be clarified is if the understanding has 
been informed by and constructed on a foundation of knowledge or on one of opinion and 
dogma.  
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